' MUN1R A. SHEIKH, J.-The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 26-11-2001 of the Lahore High Court whereby Constitutional petition filed by him has been dismissed.
2. The facts of the case for disposal of this petition shortly stated are that the petitioner was working as Manager, Bridge 'Colony Branch, A.B.L., Lahore when the State Bank of Pakistan decided to proceed against him under section 41(A) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and issued interim order dated 3-8-2001 against him followed by show-cause notice dated 4-8-2001. About the allegations, a report was submitted by respondent No,2 on 8-6-2001 and audit report was also submitted by respondent No,3 on 23-1-2001. A charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 8-11- 2001 by respondent No,5. These proceedings were challenged by the petitioner before the Lahore High Court through the Constitutional petition which has been dismissed through the impugned judgment dated 26-11-2001 on the ground that by virtue of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, he was a civil servant as such, his remedy was to approach the Service Tribunal and jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 212 of the Constitution was barred without adverting to the merits of the case.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in pursuance of the said charge-sheet, respondent proceeded to confirm interim order dated 3-8-2001 of removal of the petitioner from the office/post of manager on 15-3-2001 in implementation of which the President of the Bank on 19-3-2002 proceeded to terminate his services.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Allied Bank Limited had been privatized long before, therefore, the employees of the said bank were not civil servants within the contemplation of section 2A of the Service Tribunals Act, therefore, the erroneous view taken by the High Court has resulted in failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it to entertain the Constitutional petition, On merits, he argued that even if the petitioner is presumed to be a civil servant within the contemplation of section 2A of the Service Tribunals Act, without conceding, the jurisdiction, of the High Court even then was not barred, for in the Constitutional petition, proceedings initiated by the State Bank of. Pakistan and orders passed by respondent No,1 had been challenged which proceedings were not initiated taken or order, passed by the employer of the petitioner but under section 41(A). Of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 by a Statutory functionary, therefore, the petitioner as a person aggrieved could challenge the legality of those proceedings or orders passed thereunder by the State Bank of Pakistan, for before the Service Tribunal, the orders and proceedings taken in respect of terms and conditions of service of a civil servant by the Departmental Authority could only be challenged. The State Bank of Pakistan was neither the departmental authority of the petitioner nor his employer but an independent statutory body which had acted under a Statute, therefore, the writ petition was maintainable. He also contended that under section 41(A) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, the State Bank of Pakistan could proceed against any of the officer of a Bank not lower in rank of a Manager if it was found that association of such an officer was likely to be detrimental to the interests of the Banking Company or its depositors or otherwise undesirable or it was in the public interest to dissociate him from the said office or it was also necessary to dissociate him to prevent the affairs of a Banking Company being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Banking Company or its depositors or to secure the proper management of any Banking Company.
5. The order which could be passed under the said provisions of the Companies Ordinance was only to the effect that the officer concerned could be disassociated from they office/post which he was holding but the same did not have the effect of his removal from service as such. He also argued that dissociation of officer from the office could be ordered only for a maximum period of three years and the State Bank was under a duty to fix the time within the said period of three years for which the officer was intended to be disassociated with the office which in this case was not fixed. It was also argued by the learned counsel that mere use of the above-mentioned words or expressions in the order passed by the State Bank of Pakistan which was done in this case to dissociate the petitioner from the office of Manager was not sufficient unless reasons were given by application of mind as to how and in what manner his dissociation with the office was necessary in order to achieve the above mentioned objects. He argued that one of the charges against the petitioner was that he having purchased the shares of the bank when it was privatized as its employee was intending to sell the same whereas under the law, there was no bar for the sale of the said shares after five years and even before that mere agreement to sell was not legally objectionable unless the shares were actually transferred and if the same were transferred after the expiry of five years, no legal objection could be taken for it was the right of every shareholder after five years of its acquisition to sell the same to any person.
6. We have gone through the orders passed by the State Bank of Pakistan in this case, and find that apparently the orders have been passed mechanically by using the expression and phrases embodied in section 41(A) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, without giving any reason as to how a particular act of the petitioner mentioned in the charge-sheet in any manner fell` within the expression used in the said section to justify an order thereunder and also find that no period has been fixed during which the said order of dissociation of the petitioner would remain effective which was mandatory requirement. Learned counsel argued that the order passed by the State Bank of Pakistan only had the effect of temporary dissociation of the petitioner with the said office/post and not termination of his services in the bank but the President of the Allied Bank implemented the said order of the State Bank through order dated 19-3-2002 as an order of termination of his service which is not permissible under the law.
7. The contentions, inter alia, require examination, therefore, leave is granted to consider the same.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for suspension of the operation of the proceedings taken by the State Bank of Pakistan and above mentioned orders passed under section 41-A of the Ordinance by the State Bank of Pakistan but we are not inclined to pass such an order, for, effect of the said order was merely to disassociate the petitioner from the office/post of manager and not termination of his services in the Bank, therefore, as such no irreparable loss shall be caused to him as he would continue to draw pay of the post and other service benefits. Besides, such a prayer being the main prayer in the appeal which can be granted at the time of final disposal of the appeal. We however, hereby suspend the operation of the order dated 19-3-2002 passed by the President of the Allied Bank in implementation of the orders of the State Bank of Pakistan of disassociation, converting the same into an order of termination of service, as a result of which the petitioner shall continue to remain in service and draw salary and other service benefits till the disposal of the appeal which shall be fixed on the re-opening of the Court after summer vacations in the month of October, 2002, after obtaining orders from Honourable the Chief Justice of Pakistan.