' This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 2-3-77 of the learned Additional District Judge, Jhang, who dismissed the first appeal arising from the judgment and decree dated 4-7-75 dismissing the suit of the appellant for perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from interfering in the possession of the appellant over the property in dispute. The appellant claims to be the owner of the property in dispute having got it transferred in the name of the respondent as benami. He is alleged to have purchased the claim and paid all the dues and raised construction out of his own expenses. Previously he had brought a suit for injunction on the same lines but when the defendant made statement that he would not misappropriate the property he withdrew the same. He now has brought another suit for injunction on the same ground. Objection was raised by the respondent that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred under section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and that since the previous suit was withdrawn without permission to bring fresh suit, therefore, the suit was barred under Order XXIII, rule 1 (3), C. P.
C. Both the pleas found favour with the learned trial Judge. The learned District Judge however, found that since the property went out of compensation pool after the issuance of the P. T. D. And that the question whether the respondent was only a benamidar was triable by civil Court, the jurisdiction of the civil Court was not barred. However, he concurred with the learned trial Judge that the suit was barred under Order XXIII, rule 1 (3).
2. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore, has argued only one point which is that the suit is not barred under Order XXIII, rule 1. The ground given by him is that the respondent has denied the title of the appellant, therefore, he rightly brought the suit on fresh cause of action. In the statement of the respondent recorded in the previous suit he also said that if he violated his statement the appellant would be entitled to bring a suit against him. His statement was only to this extent that he should not misappropriate the property. As the suit was for injunction restraining the respondent from interfering in the possession and ownership of the appellant, the statement made by the respondent was sufficient even if now the suit is decreed, the same kind of injunction would be issued for which the respondent had in the earlier suit made the statement, viz., restraining the respondent from interfering in the possession or ownership of the appellant. If the respondent does any act which gives fresh cause of action, the appellant ma be entitled to bring another suit but no such eventuality has at present occurred giving new cause of action. If the respondent has made any attempt to interfere in the possession of the appellant, the former may be proceeded for contempt as will be done if the present suit is decreed and the respondent happens to violate the decree. Learned counsel says that since decree was not passed and the suit was dismissed as withdrawn there is no injunction against the respondent therefore now it is necessary to hear and decree the suit for injunction. I cannot agree with him. There is no difference in an injunction issued by the Court and the statement of a party binding himself not to do an act for the prevention of which a suit has been brought against him. The respondent himself agreed to restrain him from doing an act for which now the suit has been brought. There is no new cause o action and thus the suit is barred by Order XXIII, rule 1.
3. So the question whether the respondent was only a benamidar, was neither decided in the previous suit nor in the present suit. So if any fresh cause of action arises to the appellant he may bring a suit and get finding on the point from the civil Court. As a result of the observations made above, I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss it with costs.