' Through this appeal under section 417(2-A), Cr.P.C. The appellant seeks setting aside of impugned judgment dated 26-9-2001 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Jalalpur Pirwala, District Multan by which respondents Nos.1 to 4 have been acquitted in case F.I.R. No,145 dated 16- 7-1996 registered at Police Station Jalalpur Pirwala, District Multan under sections 337-A(4) and 337-L(2)/34, P . P. C .
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case as narrated by the appellant in the said F.I.R. Are that he is a farmer and is resident of Chah Ghulam Shah Wala. On 11-7-1996 he alongwith Sardar Shah his servant were present in the cotton crops. His maternal-cousin Muhammad Nawaz was also present there. Muhammad Bakhsh and Ghulam Hussain armed with Sotas reached there and threatened Muhammad Nawaz to teach him a lesson for demanding money. In the meanwhile Gul Muhammad and Sharif also reached there while armed with Sotas, who raised a Lalkara to murder him. Muhammad Bakhsh gave a Sota blow on the mouth of Muhammad Nawaz on account of which tooth of Muhammad Nawaz was broken and blood started flowing from his mouth. Ghulam Hussain attacked with Sota on the back of right shoulder of Muhammad Nawaz. Muhammad Sharif also gave a Sota blow on the backside of left ribs of Muhammad Nawaz and he fell down on the ground. The police submitted the challan under sections 337-A(4), 337-L(2) and 334/34; P.P.C. The accused/respondents Nos.1 to 4 denied the charge and the prosecution evidence was summoned.
Altaf Hussain complainant appeared as P.W.1 while Muhammad Nawaz injured appeared as P.W.2.
Nisar Ahmad, A.S.-I. And Dr. Riaz Ahmad appeared as P.W.3 and P.W.4 respectively. After the close of the prosecution evidence the statements of the accused were recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C.
And they were acquitted from the charge through the impugned judgment.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the contradictions pointed out by the learned trial Court are minor in nature and section 337-A(4), P.P.C. Is punishable with 10 years' R.I.
Also contends. Altaf Hussain and Muhammad Nawaz were consistent on material points but an application was submitted for the re-examination of Muhammad Nawaz and the non-appearance of Muhammad Nawaz has influenced the learned trial Court which resulted in the acquittal of the respondents though the application was not on 'the record hence the acquittal order is liable to be set aside based on such material which was not part of the record and the respondents be convicted by accepting this appeal. It is further contended that the medical evidence is in line with the ocular account.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and also perused the judgment and the evidence produced by the prosecution during the trial. The learned trial Judge has passed the detailed judgment and discussed every aspect of the case. The contradictions in the statements of P.W.1 and P.W.2 duly mentioned in the judgment, I find that these contradictions are borne out from the statements of the witnesses and these contradictions cannot be said as minor discrepancies in the statements of these two witnesses. On the material points the A contradictions are found in the statements of P.W.1 and P.W.2. Regarding the place of occurrence P.W.1 has stated that the occurrence took place near the metaled road while P.W.3 Nisar Ahmad, Investigating Officer has stated that the occurrence took place on the road. The seeing of occurrence by Ghaus Bakhsh, Malik Yar Muhammad and Haji Allah Dewaya is also contradictory in the statements of P.Ws.1 and 2 as P.W.2 has stated that these witnesses came at the spot after the close of the occurrence. P.W.1 has stated that only one tooth of P.W.2 Nawaz was broken and other teeth were intact while P.W.2 Muhammad Nawaz has stated that his four teeth were broken, out of which two had already been broken while the third was broken in the occurrence and the fourth tooth was removed subsequently by him. Similar type of contradiction has been noted down by this Court after the perusal of the statements of these two witnesses which required independent corroboration but same is lacking in this case. After the perusal of the statements of the witnesses I am of the view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the respondents as both the witnesses were also contradictory with each other regarding the fare settled between Muhammad Nawaz and the accused party. Nothing was recovered from the respondents during investigation.
No material is available to support the ocular account which is not consistent. I do not find any reason for interference in the impugned judgment by accepting this appeal as the criteria laid down for the appeal against acquittal is entirely different than the criteria for hearing of appeal against conviction. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Usman and 2 others v. The State 1992 SCM R 489 has laid down the principle for the interference in an appeal against acquittal and it has been held that the presumption of double innocence after the acquittal of the accused is in favor of the accused and it can only be interfered with if miscarriage of justice has been done and re-appraisement of the evidence will not be sufficient for interference in appeal. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:-- "(1) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the finding of Court acquitting the accused.
' This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the re-appraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carried with it the two well-accepted presumptions; one initial, that till found guilty, the accused is innocent, and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence.
(2) The acquittal will not carry the second presumption and will also thus lose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below--
(a) disregarded material evidence; (b) misread such evidence; (c) received such evidence illegally.
(3) In either case the well-known principles of re-appraisement of evidence will have to be kept in view when examining the strength of the views expressed by the Court below. They will not be brushed aside lightly on mere assumption keeping always in view that a departure from the normal principle must be necessitated by obligatory observances of some higher principle as noted above and for no other reason.
(4) The Court will not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence it comes to the conclusion different from that of the Court acquitting the accused provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusion and irresistible conclusion, and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualized in these cases, in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny under the foregoing searching light, should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous."
' It has also been held consistently by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that if two views can be adopted after the perusal of the evidence the view adopted in favor of the accused will be followed. This case is not a fit case for interference in appeal against acquittal as per principle laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgments reported as State through Advocate- General, Sindh, Karachi v. Farman Hussain and others PLD 1995 SC 1 and The State v. Muhammad Sharif and 3 others 1995 SCM R 635.
5. In view of the above discussion I find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed.