AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J.--- The plaintiff was awarded contract for installation of 11KV Distribution Line in Nawabshah and South Sanghar by the defendant on 28.1.1989. The work under the contract was to commence within thirty days from 19.2.1989 and was to be completed on or before 27.2.1991. The contract price was agreed between the parties to Rs. 32,751,728.50. The work commenced on 8.3.1989 and was delayed on account of reasons of the defendant, which included the following factors:--
(a) Delays in providing construction drawings;
(b) Delays in providing the possession of site to the plaintiff;
(c) Non-supply of material which was to be supplied by the defendant for incorporation into the works such as the transformers, 40 feet and 45 feet structures;
(d) Delays in the giving/giving of approvals of designs of some of the component of the works;
(e) Change of priority of completion of various parts of the works; and
(f) Delays in providing locations of tube-wells and pump stations.
2. According to the plaintiff and also the material on record, the delays on the part of the defendant resulted in prolongation of the time for completion of work which work was actually to be completed on 10.7.1999. In any event, the delay in the context. Referred to hereinabove has no bearing in regard to the issue on which the Arbitrators have' given award in favour of the plaintiff against which the Objections were preferred by the defendant.
3. The dispute relates to stealing of material. The work since involved erection and completion of installation of the material supplied by the defendant and the project was considerably delayed for reasons which even according to the Engineers were attributable to the defendant, the plaintiff on various sections and completed the work but before the same could be taken over by the defendant the completed section were to be tested and commissioned to the satisfaction of the Engineers. Admittedly there was inordinate delay in such testing and commissioning of the completed section for reasons at least not attributable to the plaintiff. During this intervening period of completion of the sections and inspection and commission some installed/erected material was stolen which had to be , replaced or substituted. The controversy arose as to the liability for the cost involved in such substitution replacement of the stolen material.
4. The plaintiff on 21.1.1999 raised a dispute in terms of clause 67 of the conditions of contract, before the 'Engineer' in regard to loss of uninsured installed WAPDA material. In its letter of 21.1.1999 the plaintiff has pleaded that under the normal circumstances the installed WAPDA material would have become the liability of the defendant but since they unilaterally avoided inspecting the site and commission the installations which has landed the plaintiff in this dispute. According to the plaintiff once the material has been installed and the same has not been taken care by the defendant inspite of the fact that they were put to notice for inspection and commission, the plaintiff would not be liable for any loss either by way of theft or otherwise and the provisions in regard to the loss or damages under the conditions of contract would not extend to cover such an eventuality. The plaintiff further pleaded that the insurance cover procured by them to the knowledge of the Engineer and the defendant did not extend to the subsequent material supplied by WAPDA. The plaintiff, therefore, had stated that the theft of the material already erected would not be their liability and it was the defendant/WAPDA who should be saddled with this liability.
Moreso, when the plaintiff had already requested for issuance of substantial 'completion certificate' which request was pending with the Engineer. The plaintiff had pleaded that the deduction made from the running bill by WAPDA towards the costs of the material, which was supplied by WAPDA and erected by them in substitution of stolen material was uncalled for. The Engineer gave a decision on 21.4.1999 in which' in para 3 of his decision he admitted that there were major delays in completion of the contract and these delays be attributable to the defendant. However, in his findings, he had held that the plaintiff was responsible for the material stolen and, as according to him, the liability of the plaintiff continues till the issuance of final construction certificate as according to the Engineer the provisions in regard to loss and damages of the conditions of contract makes the plaintiff liable to pay cost of the stolen material.
5. Against this decision of the Engineer the plaintiff preferred the reference to arbitration by invoking clause 69 of the conditions of contract. In the statement of claim, the plaintiff had pleaded that the stolen material was the liability of the defendant and Engineer's decision dated 21.4.1999 was self-contradictory. The defendant filed reply to the statement of claim thereafter the representatives of both the parties were provided opportunity to file additional documents in support of their respective position as both the parties had mutually agreed before the Arbitrators that the dispute should be decided on the basis of documentary evidence. The Arbitrators after hearing both the parties had given unanimous Award reversing the decision of the Engineer holding that the defendant was liable for the cost of the substituted material while the cost of installation of the substituted material was to be accounted for by the plaintiff.
6. Against this unanimous Award dated 2.2.2001 which was filed in this Court the defendant has filed objections under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 impugning the said award.
7. Mr. Samiuddin Sami, learned counsel for the defendant/Objector has argued that the findings of the impugned Award were based on the basis of the "delay" for which the conditions of contract provide independent procedure. He submitted that in the event of delay attributable to the Objector the defendant could have invoked the relevant provisions for compensation but in the present controversy by impugned Award the plaintiff/respondent have been benefited twice. He argued that the conditions of contract were interpreted by the learned Arbitrators against the cannons of interpretation. According to him, clause 20 of the conditions of .Contract clearly inakes the contractor liable until the certificate of completion is issued by the Engineer, which certificate is issued under clause 48 of the said conditions of contract. Clause 48 further spells out the liability of the contractor. He submitted that clause 21 of the conditions of contract which was subsequently amended speaks of the insurance cover and this insurance cover clause has to be read with specification clause 4.02. It was submitted by Mr. Samiuddin that acceptance of all the material supplied to the plaintiff/respondent from the Objector/defendant shall become the responsibility of the plaintiff. According to him factor of delay was independent and could neither shift the liability of the plaintiff nor could it diminish their liability under the terms of the contract.
8. He further submitted that the Arbitrators travelled beyond the terms of the Reference and, therefore, the Award was bad in law. In support of his argument he has relied upon definition clause 2(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in which the word "Reference" was defined. He further placed reliance on the cases of James Finlay & Co. v. Gurdayal, reported in AIR 1924 Sindh 91 and the case of R.B. & C. Ltd. v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd., reported in 1987 CLC 83. He submitted that the terms of Reference cannot be extended in an unilateral manner and the delay was hardly a ground to shift the liability of the plaintiff. According to him, the Arbitrators had given Award outside the Reference and has relied upon the case of Farida Malik v. Khalida Malik, reported in 1998 SCM R 816 (835) and the case of Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v. M.D. PIA, reported in 2002 SCM R 1034 (1040).
9. He submitted that the WAPDA Objector/defendant was condemned unheard by the Arbitrators inasmuch as the reasoning in the impugned Award were based on another Award and the Arbitrators did not adjudicate the proceedings and applied , independent mind while giving the impugned Award. While elaborating his arguments he has submitted that the Engineer's decision which was impugned before the learned Arbitrators by the plaintiff/respondent was initially confined to the controversy that whether the uninsured material which was stolen was the liability of the plaintiff. He submitted that the letter of 18.11.1998 which was addressed to the plaintiff by the Insurance Company reflects that the Insurance Company, with whom the plaintiff got the material insured in terms of provisions of conditions of the contract, clearly informed them that the claim in regard to stolen material was not payable by the Insurance Company in terms of the Insurance Policy procured by the plaintiff in April, 1993. Mr. Samiuddin Sami also referred to another letter of 7.8.1995 addressed by- the defendant/Objector to the Resident Engineer in this regard.
10. Mr. Samiuddin Sami further pointed out letter of 30.6.1994 in which the Project Director had addressed a letter to the Chief Resident Engineer of the defendant stating therein that the concerned Chief Engineer of the defendant had accorded approval for release of material against the material lost from various sides on the condition to recover the costs of the said material by deducting it from the subsequent running bills of the contractor. He submitted that the very letter of 30.6.1994 clearly reflects an understanding that the plaintiff's liability to reimburse the amount of the stolen material from the subsequent running bills was not under dispute. The plaintiff according to the learned counsel had became subsequently when the Insurance Company had refused to pay claim to the plaintiff in regard to stolen material. He had also drawn my attention to another letter Ex.103/1 of 4.3.1993 where in the last para of this letter It has been stated by the plaintiff that no Insurance Company is coming forward to issue Car Policies as required under clauses 21, 22 and 23 of the contract. They therefore plainly had showed their inability to arrange guarantee and insurance policy. The further argument of Mr. Samiuddin Sami was that on 28.6.1994 a requisition slip for the material was issued by WAPDA and endorsement contained on /the back clearly suggests that the material was issued on emergency basis while the cost of material would be recovered from the subsequent running bill of the contractor in terms of the letters of the defendant 25.6.1994 and 30.6.1994. According to Mr. Samiuddin Sami since the plaintiff were experiencing difficulties in getting their claim from Insurance Company, therefore, they initiated the claim before the Engineer. According to him, the plaintiff first referred the matter to the Engineer about insurance and when the Engineer asked for the clarification the plea was changed by the plaintiff.
11. Referring to the impugned Award Mr. Samiuddin Sami submitted that paras 6 and 8 of the Award contained the case of the plaintiff and paras 9 and 10 of the Award spells out the case of the defendant. On the legal aspect Mr. Samiuddin Sami has submitted that the Award is based on the reasoning of another Award and is, therefore, defective and merits to be set aside. He submitted that every case is an Island with its on environment and it cannot be mixed up with another case.
12. His next leg of contention was that the plaintiff has not filed any Counter-Affidavit to the Objections filed by the defendant under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and, therefore, the contents of the Objections to the Award amount to admission by the plaintiff. He has relied upon the case of Ghulam Nabi v. Khuda Bux reported in PLJ 1984 Karachi 147. According to Mr. Samiuddin Sami. The Award was not returned by the Arbitrators after adjudication and in fact after signing it without applying their mind the Arbitrators have filed the Award. He further submitted that the Award was contrary to the terms of the conditions of the contract and the controversy involved requires re-adjudication. He submitted that the stolen material having been accepted by the plaintiff on their account and the relevant deduction from the running bill has been effected, the plaintiffs are estopped in law from raising the dispute of liability. He submitted that the findings in the impugned Award are based on the findings of another Award, which Award was not identical on facts. He submitted that the defendant was not allowed to lead oral evidence and the Arbitrators have wrongly held that delay could affect duty of care by the contractor under Clauses 20 and 48 of the conditions of the contract and specification 4.02. It has also been argued by the learned counsel that the Arbitrators' failure to enforce the clause of the contract was an error on the face of record and this Court can intervene in the award. He has relied upon the case of Aslam Saeed & Co. Vs. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PLD 1985 SC 69 (74). The Arbitrators, according to him, had imported an agreement which did not exist between the parties and, therefore, the Award was illegal. While arguing on the doctrine of "ejusdum generis" he submitted that the Court while examining the Award may set it aside on the basis of any illegality which was not covered under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. He has cited case-law in support of his submission relying on Pakistan v. Rajistan Alloy & Steel Ltd. (NLR 2002 Civil 169 (177), case of Muhammad Hayat Khan v. Rehma Khatoon, reported in 2002 SCM R 473, case of Amir A.I Malik v.
Transpak Corporation Ltd., reported in 2002 CLC 129 and the case of Tribal Friends v. Province of Baluchistan, reported in 2002 SCM R 1903 (1915).
13. As against this, Mr. Muhammad Masood Khan, learned counsel for the plaintiff, has argued that the impugned Award was uninfluenced and the findings of .The Arbitrators in the impugned Award were based upon detailed discussions of the material and interpretation of the provisions of the contract. He submitted that the Arbitrators have given their findings after complete adjudication and merely in addition to such adjudication concurrence with the findings of another reference would not make the impugned Award illegal. Mr. Muhammad Masood Khan submitted that the terms of the insurance contained under clause 21 of the conditions of the contract was amended by substitution of 21(a). He has referred to a letter of 16.8.1995 which confirms that the insurance policy was obtained/procured with the concurrence of WAPDA and the material which was stolen was not material lying at the site but was material which was installed.
The letter dated 15.8.1994, which is available on the record addressed by them to the Project Manager, WAPDA, clearly reflects the schedule and location of feeders. In response to the arguments of Mr. Masood Khan, my, attention was drawn to the letter of 13.9.1994 which was addressed by WAPDA admitting 'delay' on their part for want of concerned persons to test and inspect the site of which the plaintiff have executed the work. He further submitted that the letter of 12.6.1994 from the Consultant to the Director Technical WAPDA, clearly reflects that it was the defendant who was avoiding inspection and commission of the work executed by the plaintiff. He submitted that if the inspection and commission had taken place in time as per the request of the plaintiff, the dispute in regard to the alleged liability of stealing of the material would have not arisen. He submitted that the Engineers in terms of clause 48(3) of the condition, of the contract was required to issue substantial completion certificate. The present executed work by the plaintiff was covered by such an eventuality under Clause 48(3) and, therefore, non-issuance of the substantial completion certificate when`such request was made by the plaintiff, would not make the plaintiff liable for any loss of damage as alleged. He submitted that in the reference before the Engineer they have pleaded specifically the area of controversy in which delay was also one of the ingredients. He submitted that even in the statement of claim before the Arbitration Tribunal they have pleaded the question of delay. He submitted that the work was completed and after the completion of work the inspection was offered which inspection and commission was delayed by WAPDA and this aspect of delay unless examined by the Arbitrators the question of liability could not have been determined, in particular, the effect of contractual obligations between the parties. He submitted that paras 11 to 20 onwards of the impugned Award clearly reflect that the Arbitrators have discussed the evidence adduced by the parties before them and the defendant at no point of time had ever requested to lead oral evidence. Even no such application of the nature was made.
14. In regard to the non-filing of the Counter-Affidavit by the plaintiff to the application under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, Mr. Muhammad Masood Khan submitted that such Counter-Affidavit will have no bearing as the affidavits are sworn in regard to the facts only and the present proceedings before the Arbitrators were the outcome of the documentary evidence and, therefore, oral evidence in substitution of the document would have no significance in terms of the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat. Even otherwise, according to him this Court would not act as Court of Appeal nor would it re-appraise and or and re-appreciate the evidence of the parties to reach a different conclusion. He has relied upon the case of Joint Venture KG/Rist v.
Federation of Pakistan, reported in PLD 1996 SC 108, case of National Construction Co. v. WAPDA, reported in PLD 1987 SC 461 and case of Ghulam Abbas v. Trustees of Port of Karachi, reported In PLD 1987 SC 393. He has submitted that the scope of Section 30 has been determined by chain of authorities of the Honourable Supreme Court where their Lordships have held that the question of facts as well as law fall within the domain of the Arbitration Tribunal. He has relied upon the case of Ashfaq A.I Qureshi v. Municipal Corporation, reported in 1985 SCM R 597 and the case of Lahore Development Authority v. M/s. Khalid Javed & Co., reported in 1983 SCM R 718.
15. I have heard the arguments of both the learned counsel and perused the record.
16. In order to decide the controversy raised by the parties, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions of the conditions of the contract. Clause 20 relating to "care of works" read as under:- "20. (1) From the commencement of the Works until the date stated in the Certificate of Completion for the whole of the Works pursuant to Clause 48 hereof the Contractor shall take full responsibility for the care thereof. Provided that if the Engineer shall issue a Certificate of Completion in respect of any part of the permanent works the Contractor shall cease to be liable for the care of that part of the Permanent Works from the date stated in the Certificate of Completion in respect of that part and the responsibility for the care of that part shall pass to the Employer. Provided further that the Contractor shall take full resistibility for the care of any outstanding work which he shall have undertaken to finish during the Period of Maintenance until such outstanding work is completed. In case any damage, loss or Injury shall happen to the works, or to any part thereof, from any cause whatsoever, save and except the accepted risk as defined in sub-clause (2) of this Clause, while the Contractor shall be responsible for the care thereof the Contractor shall, at his on cost, repair and make good the same, so that at completion the Permanent Works shall be in good order and condition and in conformity in every respect with the requirements of the Contract and the Engineer's instruction. In the event of any such damage, loss or injury happening from any of the excepted risks, the Contractor shall, if and to the extent required by the Engineer and subject always to the provisions of Clause 65 hereof, repair and make good the same as aforesaid at the cost of the Employer. The Contractor :hall also be liable for any damage to the works occasioned by him in the course of any operations carried out by him for the purpose of completing any outstanding work or complying with his obligations under Clauses 49 or 50 hereof.
(2) ..........
17. Sub-clause (a) and (b) of Clause 21 relating to insurance of Works etc." read as under:- 21 ........ (a) The works for the time being executed to the estimated current contract value thereof, or such additional sum as may be specified in Clause 21, conditions of contract, Part II, together with the materials for incorporation in the works at their replacement value.
(b) The constructional plant and other things 'brought on to the site by the contractor to the replacement value of such construction plant and other things.
1 8. Clause 21 was however amended in the following words:-- "21. Insurance of Works
(a) In the second line of Clause 21 and "prior to commencement of the works" in-between "the contractor shall" and "insure in the joint names".
(b) Delete paragraph (a) and substitute the following:--
(a) The works for the time being executed to the estimated current contract value thereof plus 10 percent thereof to allow for any additional costs and professional fees resulting from the loss or damage."
19. Clause 48 of conditions of the contract read as under:- "48. (1) When the whole of the works have been substantially completed and have satisfactorily passed any final test that may be prescribed by the contract, the contractor may give a notice to that effect to the Engineer or to the Engineer's Representative accompanied by an undertaking to finish any outstanding work during the period of maintenance. Such notice and undertaking shall be in writing and shall be deemed to be a request by the contractor for the Engineer to issue a certificate or completion in respect of the works. The Engineer shall, within twenty-one days of the date of delivery of such notice either issue to the contractor, with a copy to the employer, a certificate of completion stating the date on which, in his opinion, the works were substantially completed in accordance with the contract or give instructions in writing to the contractor specifying all the work which, in the Engineer's opinion, requires to be done by the contractor before the issue of such Certificate.. The Engineer shall also notify the contractor of any defects in the works affecting substantial completion that may appear after such instructions and before completion of the works specified therein. The contractor shall be entitled to receive such Certificate of Completion within twenty-one days of completion to the satisfaction of the Engineer of the works so specified and making good any defects so notified.
(2) Similarly, in accordance with the procedure set out in sub-clause (1) of this clause, the contractor may request and the Engineer shall issue a Certificate of Completion in respect of:--
(a) any section of the permanent works In respect of which a separate time for completion is provided in the contract, and
(b) any substantial part of the permanent works which has been both completed to the satisfaction of the Engineer and occupied or used by the employer.
(3) If any part of the permanent works shall have been substantially completed and shall have satisfactorily passed any final test that may be prescribed by the contract, the Engineer may issue a Certificate of Completion in respect of that part of the permanent works before completion of the whole of the works and, upon the issue of such Certificate, the contractor shall be deemed to have undertaken to complete any outstanding work in that part of the works during the period of maintenance: Provided always that a Certificate of Completion given in respect of any section or part of the permanent works before completion of the whole shall not be deemed to certify completion of any ground or surfaces requiring reinstatement unless such Certificate shall expressly so state."
20. Clause 4.02 of Specifications-Technical Provisions describes contractor's responsibility as under:-- "4.02 The acceptance of all materials supplied to the contractor from WAPDA Stores and materials received by the contractor from these Stores shall become the responsibility of the contractor from the time of commencement of loading operation until the issuance of the final completion certificate by the Engineer."
21. Clause 4.04(x) of Specifications-Technical Provisions regarding "Storage and Handling" reads as follow:-- "4.04(x). Security. -- The contractor shall set up depots as required for the receipt and storage of the materials. The contractor shall take proper measures to protect the materials stored at site from theft and damage. A 24 hours guard rota shall be organized by the contractor for the security of the materials and equipment."
22. Mr. Samiuddin Sami has stressed hard on the word "delay" which was taken note of by the Engineer as well as by the Arbitrators. The controversy raised by the parties could not have been 'decided in isolation with the aspect of the delay. It is correct that the over all delay in completion of the contract has no bearing in regard to the issues raised before the Engineer and the Arbitrators.
But, at the same time, this delay cannot be overlooked in the context that in spite of the repeated requests made by the plaintiff to the defendant to inspect the site and commission installations, the defendant kept avoiding their obligations under the terms of the contract by failing to depute the concerned persons for inspection and commission of the work executed by the plaintiff. In the intervening period and on account of the inordinate delay the material installed was stolen and such theft has been made the liability of the plaintiff. There is sufficient exchange of correspondence between the parties and the defendant cannot be absolved of their liabilities to take care of the executed work.
23. The language of a provision of contract has to be interpreted in a manner to gather the intent of the parties. But, at the same time, the eventualities which are not covered should also be read into it by examining the conduct of the parties. Any person who has failed to discharge its liability cannot seek benefit of a provision of a contract unless it is shown that he has discharged his obligations under the contract. In the present case, it has been urged by Mr. Samiuddin Sami that since the plaintiff was not issued th completion certificate, therefore, their liability in term insurance under clauses 20, 21 and Specifications-Technical Provisions Clause 4.02 continues irrespective of the fact that plaintiff have executed the required work. Such an interpretation cannot be placed to disentitle the plaintiff who had otherwise performed their part of contract and had also requested for issuance of substantial completion certificate in terms of clause 48(3) of the contract which provision clearly covers such an eventuality. Inordinate delay on the part of the defendant to carry out inspection and commission could not be made ground to withhold substantial completion certificate nor could the plaintiff would be made liable to make good loss of such stolen material which was installed by them either under the garb of clause 21 or 48 of the contract. There is no justifiable explanation given by the defendant which could appeal to the reason that the plaintiff was liable to make good the loss in the given circumstances. The proposition of law advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant and the pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan have no application to the case in hand. No party can be allowed to take advantage of its on wrong. The defendant was in default and could not recover any loss under the pretext or the insurance policies which was the responsibility of the plaintiff for a certain period of time and such liability could not be extended for indefinite period. In other words, if the defendant failed to inspect the site and commission the installation for years together then the responsibility/liability would continue in terms of clauses 21. And 48 of the conditions of the contract. Such an interpretation would be absurd even effect of clause 4.04(x) of the Specifications-Technical Provisions cannot be overlooked while interpreting the aforesaid clauses referred to hereinabove. I, therefore, hold that the Arbitrators rightly observed that the 'delay' of the nature have bearing on the duties of care by the plaintiff under clauses 20, 48 and Specifications-Technical Provisions Clause 4.02.
24. It is an admitted fact that the parties have not offered oral evidence before the arbitration proceedings, therefore, the question of non-providing opportunity to the defendant/Objector does not arise.
Both the parties have led evidence by producing documents and were further allowed to produce additional documents. It is, therefore, unfair on the part of the defendant to raise such an objection before this Court.
25. The question in regard to the findings of the Arbitrators beyond the terms of the reference is also not borne from the record. I have gone through the contents of the written request made by the plaintiff in the reference on which the Engineer has given the decision. The plaintiff being aggrieved by such decision has preferred the arbitration. The request before the Engineer as well as the statement of claim before the Arbitration Tribunal contained the detailed grievance of the plaintiff and the Arbitrators have decided the controversy within the terms of the reference.
26. As regards the contention of Mr. Samiuddin Sami that the Arbitrators were influenced by the reasoning of another Award while giving the impugned Award and they in fact have adopted those reasoning in the impugned Award without applying their independent mind. With profound respect, I do not agree with this argument as I have noticed that the Arbitrators have discussed in detail the entire material which the parties have placed before them and thereafter in the last para of their findings they have concurred in addition to such material with the finding of the Arbitrators in the other Award. This by itself is no ground to set at naught the impugned Award.
27. It has argued by Mr. Samiuddin Sami that the plaintiff have not filed any counter-affidavit to the application under Section 30 read with Section 32 of Arbitration Act, 1940 therefore, it amounts to admission on the part of the plaintiff an they are estopped in law from arguing the matter otherwise. The Affidavits are sworn in regard to the facts which are within the knowledge of deponents. Under the law of pleadings a party is required to plead a fact and not the proposition of law. The arbitration proceedings are governed by the general principles of Civil Procedure Code and therefore, non-filing of a Counter-Affidavit in regard to the legal controversy raised in the application under Section 30 read with Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, could /not be termed as admission. I do not find any force in this argument.
28. As regard the different letter on the basis of which the defendant had released the material in substitution of the stolen material I am of the view that all these letters have been addressed unilaterally and plaintiff at no point of time have ever consented to such understanding. Even otherwise, there was no bar either under the conditions of the contract or otherwise, restraining the plaintiff from invoking the clause of arbitration in order to remedy their grievances.
29. I have also examined the impugned Award and the material based on it and could not find any finding in the Award based on import of an agreement which did not exist between the parties. In fact, the findings are based by construing Clauses 20, 48 and Specification Clause 4.02. The proposition of law enunciated by the Honourable Supreme Court and cited by the parties have no cavil but at the same time every case has to be examined in its on prospective and the present case is distinguishable to the cases cited by parties on facts. I am, therefore, of the view that this Court would not substitute its on view even if a different view was possible to upset the findings of Arbitration Tribunal which findings were otherwise very correctly based on the material produced before the Arbitrators.
30. For the foregoing reasons I had overruled the Objections of the defendant and ordered the Impugned Award to be made rule of the Court by my short order, which was passed on 29.1.2003.