CHAUDHARY MUHAMMAD TAJ, J.---This appeal, by leave, has been filed to challenge the judgment and decree passed by the High Court on 13-5-2002, whereby the appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Kotli was accepted.
2. The necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal are that two suits, one on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants and the other by the plaintiff-respondents were filed in the Court of Additional Sub-Judge Kotli. Both the suits were consolidated, hence issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties were framed. The trial Court received evidence and after hearing the parties decreed the suit filed or, behalf of the plaintiff-- appellants and dismissed that of the respondents. An appeal filed with the District Judge Kotli on behalf of the respondents also failed. However, the appeal filed with the High Court was accepted and decree was passed in favour of the respondents. The suit of the plaintiff-appellants was held to be dismissed.
3. The plaintiff-appellants filed Suit No.121 for possession in respect of the land measuring 5 Kanals, 3 Marlas, comprising Survey Nos. 1102 and 1003, situate in Village Parahi, Tehsil Kotli on 23-9-1985. It was claimed that the suit-land was in their ownership and the respondents dispossessed them from the last two years. A cross-suit No. 187 was also filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents on 14-12-1985 for the land measuring 3 Kanals, 18 Marlas, comprising Survey No. 1102, situate in village Parahi, Tehsil Kotli for declaration that they were in possession of the suit-land as owners as such their adverse possession for a period of more than 12 years had ripened into ownership.
4. Raja Hassan Akhtar, the learned counsel for the appellants, raised the following points in support of the appeal:-
(1) That the judgment and decree passed by the High Court were illegal and not maintainable as, according to him, the concurrent findings recorded by the Additional Sub-Judge Kotli and District Judge Kotli were disturbed;
(2) that the judgment and decree passed by the High Court were against the evidence on the record. It was explained that the suit was filed in the year 1985 whereas the only Revenue Record supporting the respondents was 'Jamabandi' for the year 1974-1975 as such no decree could be passed for adverse possession in absence of necessary requirement of law, i.e. 12 years possession; and
(3) that the learned Judge in the High Court passed the decree when the law with regard to adverse possession did not exist on the statute book. It was contended that the law with regard to adverse possession remained no more in existence by repealing section 144 of the Limitation Act in the year 1996, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the High Court were illegal.
5. Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, the learned counsel, appearing from the opposite side, while controverting the arguments addressed on behalf of the appellants, argued in the following manner:--
(i) That adverse possession with regard to the suit-land had ripened into ownership. It was also added that it was admitted on behalf of the plaintiff--appellants that they were dispossessed from the suit land which required to have filed the suit for possession within 12 years under Article 142 of tire Limitation Act. The suit in view of the facts for having been filed after the prescribed period was liable to be dismissed. The suit filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents having fulfilled the requirements of law was to be decreed and the repealing provision had no effect on that suit; and
(ii) That according to the Revenue Record i.e. 'Jamabandi' for the year 1974-75 and other evidence which also included the oral evidence and supported by the appellant's evidence it was proved that the adverse possession of the plaintiff-respondents had ripened into ownership alongwith the fact that the suit on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants was filed beyond the period of 12 years.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record. Before adverting to the other merits it would be relevant to mention that the point raised with regard to the repeal of Article 144 of the Limitation Act was not disputed as both the learned counsel submitted that the same would not be applicable to the case in hand for coming into force that amending law in the year 1996 and the suits having been filed in the year 1985. Therefore, the law holding the field before the repeal would determine the rights. However, it would, suffice to mention that keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in the cases reported as Fazal Dad vs. Khadim Hussain (1995 M LD 1299) and Said Hussain Khan v. Muhammad Hussain Khan and another (PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 25), the application of amending law will have no effect to the case in hand.
Reference may be made to Fazal Dad's case, referred to above, wherein 'the question of amendment in Right of Prior Purchase Act was discussed at pages 62 and 68 in the following words;- "28. We thus from the opinion that, unless the intention gathered from the subsequent enactment is otherwise, if a law or provision of law is superseded or revoked through a legislative measure it is to be taken as repeal. In this view of the matter we respectfully own the view of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that an amendment is the same thing as repeal.
38. As discussed elsewhere the effect of substitution of section 14 is that the new section shall be deemed to have been legislated on 13th of March, 1993 when the Amendment Act was enacted.
Since the law was not inforce when the sale-deed under dispute was executed, the, rights granted by the new section cannot be made available to the respondent-plaintiff. The fact that respondent-plaintiff had in his plaint included these grounds does not make any difference in legal position. "
The proposition was also resolved in the case of Said Hussain Khan v. Muhammad Hussain Khan and, another (PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 25 wherein application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was discussed in the following words:-- "In case reported as State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Sindh AIR 1955 it has been observed that in case of simple repeal, there is hardly any room for the argument that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to such a case. However, case where repeal is followed by the fresh legislation on the same subject, the Courts would undoubtedly have to look into the provision of new Act only for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of inquiry would be not whether it manifests an intention to destroy the old rights. Thus, section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be applicable despite the new Legislation if an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of section 6 is not manifest."
7. The next question arises whether the suit on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants was filed within 12 years of their dispossession as required under Article 142 of the Limitation Act and the suit filed on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents for declaration of adverse possession fulfilled the requirements of law, i.e., 12 years adverse possession. We have to revert to the evidence brought on the record by the parties. The plaintiff-appellants brought on record the documentary evidence of Revenue Record the 'Jamabandi' for the year 1965-66 alongwith 'Khasra Girdawari' for the year 1952 to 1962 while plaintiff--respondents placed on record the 'Jamabandi' for the year 1974-75 and the 'Khasra Girdawari' for the year 1978 to 1981. The oral evidence produced by the plaintiff--respondents supported their claim which can be appreciated from the evidence of Gazal Khan, Lal Khan, Allah Ditta, Sangar Khan and Muhammad Siddique, the attorney of the plaintiff-respondents. The fact of plaintiff-respondent's old possession attracting the provisions of adverse possession envisaged in Article 144 of the Limitation Act was also supported by the oral evidence led by the plaintiff- appellants. The evidence of Muhammad Sadiq, Qudrat Khan and Muhammad Malik witnesses can be referred.
8. It is settled proposition of law that the Revenue Record has to be appreciated in light of the facts particularly when those are admitted. All the witnesses produced by the plaintiff-respondents supported their claim that the plaintiff-respondents were in possession of the land since old days, i.e., for the period of more than 12 years when the suit was filed. Similarly, the witnesses mentioned above, whose evidence was relied upon by the plaintiff-appellants, also supported, the aforesaid claim of the plaintiff--respondents. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that keeping in view the oral as well as the documentary evidence the suit filed on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants was beyond the period of 12 years and the other suit instituted on behalf of the plaintiff--respondents was after the period of 12 years as such the adverse possession had ripened into ownership. To support the proposition reliance can also be placed upon a case reported as Aksar Ali and 2 others v. Fazal Karim and 11 others (1982 CLC 1309) wherein the proposition was resolved in the following words: "(d) The mere entry in the Revenue Record, unless it does not get support from any other quarter, would not support the entry and cannot be accepted. One has to interpret such an entry in the light of other facts anti circumstances of the given case.
11. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it must be adequate in continuity and in extent to show that it is a possession adverse to the competitors. A wrong notion, it appears, is entertained by the subordinate Courts that the quantum of proof in the civil cases is as much strict as is required in criminal cases. In fact it is not so. In civil cases only preponderance of probability is sufficient to record a finding in favour of the parties, while in criminal cases the offences must be established beyond reasonable doubts. It. Therefore, follows that in civil cases the Courts have to see cumulative effect of all the material placed on record and if such material creates the preponderance of probability in favour of a party, that party must win the case."
9. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the concurrent findings were disturbed by the High Court against the accepted law. It may be stated that both the Courts below did not advert to the real question in controversy while appreciating the evidence as discussed above. It is by now settled proposition of law that the concurrent findings of fact are open to attack if the same are not supported by any evidence or otherwise are unreasonable or perverse.
Reliance may again be placed upon the case reported as Aksar Ali and 2 others v. Fazal Karim and 11 others (1982 CLC 1309) wherein at page 1313 the following verdict was given:-- "14. There is another factor worth consideration. Whether evidence makes out a case of adverse possession is undoubtedly a finding of fact? A finding on a question of fact is open to attack as erroneous in law only if it is not supported by any evidence or if it is unreasonable and perverse; but where there is evidence to consider the decision (as the case is before us) even though the High Court might not, on the materials, have come to the same conclusion if it had the power to substitute its own judgment, it would not be a ground to re-open this fact. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact however gross and inexcusable the error may seem to be unless the error is in the procedure provided by law which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case on merits. A fallacy in appraising the evidence, as was contended before us, as to a fact unless it amounts to material mistaken assumption, is merely an error of law justifying interference in second appeal."
10. In view of the above, we arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff-respondents have proved their case for declaration that their adverse possession had ripened into ownership for the land measuring 3 Kanals, 18 Marlas, comprising Survey No.1102, under Article 144 of the Limitation Act and the plaintiff-appellants have failed to substantiate their claim of filing their suit for possession within 12 years under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the appeal is found to have no substance in it which is dismissed with cost.