1. ' SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C.J.--- These Constitutional petitions have been filed by the petitioners, wherein the following reliefs have been sought:--
(a) That the respondcnts be directed to fulfil the promise of the Chief Executive and provide employm ent to the petitioners in the same or equivalent grade/sal ry in which they were working at the time of the retrenchment.
(b) That the U.B.L. May be d rected to pay the salaries to the petitioners from the date o retrenchment to the date of reemployment.
(c) That the U.B.L. Be directed to pay the profit obtained by the bank at 16% ram per annum on the retrenchment benefits of the petitioners.
(d) That the respondents may be directed to allow the petitioners to utilize the amount of retrenchment benefit during the pendency of the petition without any prejidice being caused to their right or re-employment with the respondents.
(e) That any other relief deemed fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be granted to the petitioners.
(f) That the cost of the petition may also be awarded to the petitioners.
2. ' The brief facts leading to the filing of these Constitutional petitions are that the petitioners wer working as officers in the various departments of respondent No,3 Messrs United Bank Limited as permanent employees and in view o the decision taken by the Federal Government to reduce the strength of officers in various banks and other Government-controlled organizations, respondent No,3 introduced ' a retrenchment scheme, dated 9-10-1997. A copy of the retrenchment scheme has been produced alongwith the petitions as Annexure "B" and it contains in detail the terms and conditions and the benefits, which were to be provided to the officers/employees of respondent No,3 on their retrenchment from service. In pursuance of the above retrenchment scheme, the services of the petitioners were retrenched. It is the case of the petitioners that the retrenchment icheme prepared by respondent No,3 was not in accordance with the policy and the directive issued by the Federal Government, which had directed the Nationalised Banks and Government- controlled organization to introduce a Golden Hand Shake Scheme and to obtain the approval from the officers/employees sought to be retrenched but respondent No,3 instead framed a policy of forcible retrenchment/termination of the officers/employees as per discretion without providing any opportunity the officers/employees to give their option or consent. The petitioners rther submitted that in the light of the above retrenchment scheme,respondent No,3 issued termination letters to them without any notice or providing an opportunity of hearing. The petitioners further submitted tiat some of the retrenched officers filed appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal against their alleged illegal and discriminatory termination and all such appeals were allowed by the Federal Service Tribunal by its judgment, dated 28-7-1998. This judgment was challenged by respondent No,3 before the Supreme Court and several petitions for leave to appeal were filed. The Supreme Court while granting leave to appeal for considering the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, directed respondent No,3 by an interlocutory order either to induct the terminated 'officers/employees in the service or pay to them future monthly salaries till the disposal of the appeals by the Supreme Court. It was further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that they had neither taken the retrenchment benefits from respondent No,3 nor they were involved in litigation in any forum and as such they were entitled to rehabilitation and/or employm ent in various Government Departments on same salaries and privileges as they were getting from respondent No,3 prior to their retrenchment as per promise made by the then Prime Minister, who had formed a Committee for the above purpose. The grievance of the petitioners is that they were entitled to rehabilitation/re-employment in various Government Departments in accordance with the promise made by the then Prime Minister but great injustice was done to them by not implementing the order/promise of the then Prime Minister, who was the Chief Executive of the country, which has resulted in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners contained in Articles I A, 4, 9, 14, 25, 37 and 38 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The petitioners further submitted that their retrenchment/termination was mala fide and in colourable exercise of the powers by the officers of respondent No,3 inasmuch as after their retrenchment/termination, a number of persons have been appointed as "consultants" and "officers" and many junior officers have been promoted on the posts/vacancies created by the retrenchment/termination of the petitioners.
3. As the petitioners failed to get the relief promised by the then Prime Minister, they had no alternative but to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Hence these Constitutional petitions with the aforesaid reliefs.
4. ' Respondent No,3, U.B.L. Filed their reply statement, wherein they raised several preliminary legal objections with regard to the maintainability of the Constitutional petitions and also denied the contents of the petitions. They vehemently objected to the maintainability of the Constitutional petitions in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan and submitted that after incorporation of section 2A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the petitioners had attained the status of civil servants and in respect of any of their grievance relating to the terms and conditions of their service, they were required to approach the Federal Service Tribunal inasmuch as retrenchment of the petitioners from service of respondent No,3 was covered by the terms and conditions of service of the petitioners and this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan was precluded from determining the issue involved. The other objection on which great stress was laid by respondent No,3 was that retrenchment of the petitioners was resorted to in pursuance of a policy decision taken by the Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and policy decision taken by the Government could not be challenged or questioned before this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction as unless it could be established that the action of retrenchment of the petitioners was opposed to any statutory provisions or was in conflict with any settled rule of law or it was mala fide. The Supreme Court while deciding the case of 42 retrenched employees of respondent No,3 PLD 1999 SC 990, had approved the scheme of retrenchment as well as the retrenchment of the employees. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed by Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa on the case of (i) Mian Muhammad Nurullah and 2 others v. District Magistrate, Lahore and 3 others 1970 SCMR 217, (ii) Zohra and 5 others v. The Government of Sindh, Health Department through its Secretary, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and another PLD 1996 Kar.
1. Respondent No,3 in reply statement further submitted that the petitioners after their retrenchment, never approached respondent No,3 for collecting their dues which respondent No,3 was always ready and willing to pay to them and further that they had avoided to receive the benefits with mala fide intention to present themselves as being victimized, subjected to injustice and rendered destitute so as to invoke sympathies and consideration.
5. ' Respondent No,4, Government of Pakistan, also filed its preliminary legal objections as well as parawise comments. The legal objections were to the same effect as were raised by respondent No,3 and which have already been enumerated above. They denied that the scheme of retrenchment was mala fide, colourable discriminatory and submitted that the same was introduced in the Establishment of respondent No,3 in a uniform, transparent and indiscriminate manner with a view to improve the financial condition, managerial and good governance of respondent No,3. Both, respondents Nos.3 and 4 prayed that the petitions were not legally maintainable as well as was also bereft of merit as such were liable to be dismissed in limine.
6. ' We have heard the arguments of Messrs Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada and Shahid Anwar Bajwa, the learned counsel for the petitioners and respondent No,3 respectively. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the parties had agreed that these Constitutional petitions may be disposed of finally at the stage of Katcha Peshi.
7. ' At the outset, it may be pointed out that the question of retirement/retrenchment of the officers/employees of respondent No,3 including the petitioners under the retrenchment scheme, dated 9-10-1997 formulated by respondent No,3 has been declared to be legal and valid by the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank Limited v. Shamim Ahmed Khan and 41 others PLD 1999 SC 990. In this case, the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, whereby it held the termination of the officers/employees of respondent No,3 in the afforested case as illegal and directing re-instatement in service on the ground that it was not legally sustainable.
8. It will be advantageous to reproduce the relevant portions from the aforecited judgment relating to the right of respondent No,3 to dispense with the services of its employees who were found surplus and the non-issue of notices to the retrenched employees. The portions sought to be reproduced are as under:-- "Page 1013 .... It was contended before the Honourable Tribunal and also before us by the appellant Bank that before undertaking the exercise of retrenchment of the employees of the Bank, a study was made with the help of Nexus Group and in the light of the findings and recommendations of the study group. Board of Directors of the Bank decided to retrench 5416 employees of the Bank. It is contended by the Bank that to give effect to the Scheme of retrenchment, the principle of Last Come First Go was strictly followed. These facts were sufficiently brought on record before the Honourable Tribunal and were not seriously in dispute. The Bank being a commercial organization has to be run on commercial considerations. In view of the continuous losses suffered by the Bank for the last several years, it was open to its management to reorganize its working to improve its commercial viability which included the right to dispense with the services of the staff which was found in excess of necessity. In our view so long the action retrenchment of employees by the Bank was not opposed to any statutory provisions or it came in conflict with any settled rule of law or it was held to be mala fide, it could not be objected to on the ground that the retrenchment could be avoided by some other alternative method by the Bank."
9. Page 1023 ".... The termination of the service of an employee is one of the modes of retrenchment. There is no justification to read rule 15 (ibid), in a way so as to restrict its application only to the case of termination of service of an individual employee. There being no specific rule in the United Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981, dealing with the retrenchment, general provisions for termination of service contained in rule 15 was applicable. Mere fact that as a result of retrenchment, services of large number of employees were to be terminated would not make rule 15 (ibid) inapplicable in such case."
10. Pages 1023-1024 "It has been very vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the respondents jointly that termination of services of respondents from the Bank was in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice as the respondents were not afforded any opportunity of hearing or to place their cases before the authority before they were terminated from the service. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents has not impressed us at all. The termination of the services of respondents as a result of retrenchment carries no stigma. In fact, an employee terminated under the Retrenchment Scheme is eligible for future employment as and when such contingency arises.
11. As the termination of respondents from service did not carry any stigma, in our view, in terms of rule 15 of the Rules, they were not entitled to any notice of hearing before termination of their employment. Apart from it, the reasons for termination of their services were set out in detail in the retrenchment scheme which was circulated to all the employees of the Bank in advance and, therefore, the respondents could not plead that they were not informed of the reasons for termination of their services. We have already pointed out earlier that as there were no statutory rules applicable to the respondents, the terms and conditions contained in U.B.L. (Staff) Service Rules, 1981, were applicable to them. These rules continued to govern the service of the respondents notwithstanding the fact that under section 2-A (ibid), their services were declared to be one in the service of Pakistan and they were deemed to be civil servants for the purpose of Service Tribunals Act, 1973."
12. 'In view of the observations made by the Supreme Court, the question of the legality and propriety of the termination/retrenchment of the petitioners by respondent No,3 does not require to be considered as the matter stands finally decided by the Supreme Court pronouncing that respondent No,3 had the right and authority to retrench the petitioners, who were found to be in excess of their requirement and further that service of notices on the petitioners before making order of their retrenchment was not legally required.
13. ' The next question which requires consideration is whether the petitioners had acquired vested rights for providing them employment in any other bank or financial institution Or Government Department as vehemently contended by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada on the ground that the then Prime Minister of Pakistan had publicly offered and made announcement that the employees of the Nationalized Banks, who were retired involuntarily would be entitled to the same salaries and the privileges as they had been enjoying before their forced retirement till such time as they got alternate jobs themselves or the Government provided them employment commensurate to their earlier jobs. The contention of Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada was that the then Prime Minister of Pakistan being the Chief Executive of the country had made such offers/announcements on several occasions and had assured the employees, who were sent on forced retirement, for providing them interim relief and also jobs in Government Departments, banks and other financial institutions commensurate to the posts held by them prior to their forced retirement and by such unambiguous, specific and definite offers/ announcements the petitioners had acquired vested rights of getting alternate jobs either in the Government Departments or Banks or other financial institutions. He further submitted that the petitioners having acquired vested rights for provision of alternate jobs were competent to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for enforcement,: of their vested right on failure of the Government to fulfil the promise, offer/announcement made by the then Prime Minister.
14. ' The contention advanced by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, in our view, does not carry any force.
15. Any party invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court has to establish the existence of a clear legal _right and further that such legal right must be so clear so as not to admit of a reasonable doubt or a controversy. Such legal right must be a personal and individual right and that it must be statutory right or a right recognized by law. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan can be invoked only by an aggrieved person and a person can be said to be aggrieved only when he is denied a legal right by someone, who has a legal duty to perform relating to the right. It is also to be noted that for invocation of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, the aggrieved party has to establish not only a legal right but a right which is justiciable in a Court of law, in the absence of which no order can be issued under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. It is incumbent upon the party invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to satisfy that some illegal wrong had been inflicted or was about to be inflicted on the IB petitioner. In the present cases the vested right which the petitioners are claiming is the promise, offer or announcement publicly made by the then Prime Minister of the country for absorbing the employees of the Nationalized Banks who were involuntarily retired, to which category the petitioners claimed to be belonging to. Such promise, offer or announcement, in our opinion, would not create a vested right or a legal right in favour of the petitioners to claim alternate employment in Government Departments, Banks or financial institutions. Such public statements would not confer a legal or a vested right, which could be enforced by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. Such promise, offer or announcement could at best be treated as a desire or intention on the part of the then Prime Minister to provide relief to the involuntarily retired employees of the Nationalized banks. Such intention or desire did not have the backing or support of any statute, law or the rules and regulations framed under any statute. Mere words of the then cPrime Minister without having the support or backing of any law or statutory provision would not amount to conferring any legal or vested right in the petitioners, which could be enforced by a Court of law. For assessing the value or the legal force, which such promises/offers or announcements could have, it will be useful to refer to the case of Majlis Intizamia, Jamia Masjid Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur v. Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Communication and Works Department, Lahore reported in PLD 1967 Lah.
709. The facts of the case were that guidelines/rules were provided governing the working of Satellite Town Scheme, which were not backed by any statutory rules. In this case, a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore concluded where a policy was laid down or directions were given for guidance of the officers connected with a department without any statutory backing, no claim of a vested right could arise on account of such directions or rules and a writ petition in such matters would not be competent.
16. ' In the case of Haji Ghulam Zamin and another v. A.B. Khondkar and others PLD 1965 Dacca 156, the then Dacca High Court while examining the legality of implementation of scheme to control inter- Provincial trade observed that such scheme did not have any legal backing and declared it to devoid of law incapable of being enforced. It further observed that the Executive did not possess any inherent power except that which vested in it by law and that Government's Executive act must be backed by contemporaneous law. A similar pronouncement was made by the then Dacca High Court in the case of Haji Ghulam Sabir v. Pan Allotment Committee and another PLD 1967 Dacca
607. In this case, a notice was issued in a newspaper inviting applications only from the residents of the then East Pakistan for allotment of air space in P.I.A.C. Planes for exporting pan to the then West Pakistan. The notice did not refer to any Statute or law in pursuance of which allotment of air space in P.I.A.C. Planes for exporting Pan was to be permitted only to the residents of East Pakistan. The then Dacca High Court declared the notice as illegal as it was not backed by any law, regulation or rule made under any Statute observing that the law was the source of all Government/Executive powers or duties; the existence or non-existence of a power or a duty was a matter of law and not of fact; and there were no powers or duties inseparably annexed to the Government/Executive.
17. ' Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada further submitted that public statement made by the then Prime Minister for absorption of the petitioners in Government Department, banks or financial institutions was in the nature of an offer to all the employees involuntarily retired and it would be deemed that a scheme or a policy was devised when on the orders of the, then Prime Minister, a Committee was formed which publicly called upon all those involuntarily retired employees, who were not paid their legal dues and had also not invoked the jurisdiction of any Court or Tribunal for agitating or challenging their forced retirement, thereby creating rights in favour of the petitioners to be provided with alternate employment in the Government, banks and other financial institutions. In the first place, we are doubtful as to whether any scheme or policy had allegedly come into existence. Even if it be so, it would not confer any legal right on the petitioners to claim alternate employment as the same also did not have the backing of any Statute. As already pointed out hereinabove, every executive order for being enforceable or for conferring legal rights on the citizens or a class of citizens must have the backing of law. Even the formulation of the Committee to examine the cases of the petitioners would be without' any legal sanction and such Committee would have no legal status and authority to embark upon the task of providing alternate employment/ jobs to the petitioners. With regard to the contention that the announcements made by the then Prime Minister were in the nature of a Policy decision/matter providing alternate employment/jobs to the petitioners, we may point out that policy decisions taken by the Executive are not justiciable in exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court or before any Court of law and should be resolved by the Executive or the Legislature. The Lahore High Court in the case of M.D. Tahir v. Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab and another 1995 CLC 1687 observed that policy matters should be decided on political platforms and as such were required to be resolved by the Executive or the Legislature and not by the Judiciary.
18. ' It also may be noted that the alleged promise/offer/ announcement made by the then Prime Minister for providing alternate jobs to the petitioners was based on fulfilment of two conditions.
19. Firstly, that they were not paid legal dues which they were entitled to on being involuntarily retired and further that they had not approached any Court of law or Tribunal for agitating or challenging their forced retirement. With regard to the first contention, it may be pointed out that respondent No,3 was always ready and willing to make payment of all the legal dues which the petitioners were entitled to receive on their retirement/ retrenchment under the Retrenchment Scheme framed by respondent No,3 but they did not accept or receive the monetary benefits to which they were entitled on their retirement/retrenchment. This fact is borne out from para.14 of the reply statement filed on behalf of respondent No,3, wherein it has been specifically stated that the petitioners themselves did not approach respondent No,3 to receive their dues/benefits in accordance with the Retrenchment Scheme Circular, dated 9-10-1997 and had chosen not to collect their dues, if any, after adjustment of their respective liabilities. Thus, on this ground also, the petitioners did not qualify for any alternate employment even if it be assumed that the promises, offers or announcements made by the then Prima Minister had any semblance of backing of any law or any Statute so as to provide vested or a legal right to the petitioners.
20. ' The maintainability of the Constitutional petitions was vehemently challenged by respondents Nos.3 and 4 on the ground that reliefs sought by the petitioners related to the terms and conditions of their service in the establishment of respondent No,3 which was an establishment, managed, controlled and run by the Federal Government and in view of the provisions of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, the petitioners had acquired the status of civil servants, as a result of which they were barred by Article 212 of the Constitution from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court in respect of any matter relating to the terms and conditions of their service.
21. ' Lastly, it was submitted by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada that the petitioners in the cited case of United Bank Limited through President v. Shamim Ahmed Khan and 41 others PLD 1999 SC 990 had filed a review petition which was decided by the Supreme Court vide its judgment, . Dated 28-11-2000, wherein the Supreme Court had granted certain benefits to the petitioners therein. Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada further submitted that the case of the petitioners in these petitions is at par with the case of the petitioners in the aforecited case and, therefore, they would be entitled to the benefits granted/allowed by the Supreme Court to the retrenched employees. In the judgment, dated 28-11- 2000 in the review petition, the Supreme Court had allowed certain reliefs/benefits relying on paragraph 6(i) and (ii) of its judgment in the case of Akram Zahoor v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCM R 1232. The reliefs granted are as under:--
(i) Adjustment of loans obtained by the petitioners herein from the respondent bank with the respective loan agreements executed between each of the petitioners and the respondent bank;
(ii) The grant of pensioner benefits shall be available to those petitioners who are found entitled in accordance with the Service. Rules of the respondent bank in force at the time of termination of their services.
22. ' After going through the judgment of the Supreme Court, dated 28-11-2000, we hold that the petitioners would also be entitled to the benefits/reliefs provided by the Supreme Court to other retrenched employees of respondent No,3 as per its judgment, dated 28-11-2000.
23. ' Upon the above discussion, we find that these Constitutional petitions are neither maintainable nor there is any merit in them, which requires consideration. The petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs sought by them. The petitions stand disposed of in terms of the above.