' ASIF SAEED KHAN -KHOSA, J.--- Wazir Ahmad appellant was convicted for an offence under section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act. 1997 vide judgment dated 10-11-2001 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajanpur and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs,1000 or in default of payment thereof to undergo simple imprisonment for two months.
The benefit under section 382-B, Cr.P.C. Was extended to the appellant. The allegation against the appellant was that he was found in possession of Charas weighing 510 grams.
2. At the outset the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the appellant was never afforded any opportunity to engage the services of a learned counsel to represent him before the learned trial Court and, thus, the appellant was forced to conduct cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses himself and then to address arguments in the main case before announcement of the judgment. In order to verify the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant we have gone through the record of the learned trial Court and have found that the charge in this case was framed by the learned trial Court on 1-10-2001 at a time when the appellant was not represented by any learned counsel and Then the matter was adjourned on 22-10-2001 for recording of evidence of the prosecution witnesses. On 22-10-2001 no prosecution witness was in attendance, and therefore, the matter was adjourned to 10-11-2001. On 10-11-2001 the appellant was produced from the jail before the learned trial Court which recorded the statements of five prosecution witnesses and that of the appellant under section 342, Cr.P.C. And then after hearing arguments the learned trial Court passed the final judgment on the same date i,e, 10-11-2001. We have failed to find anything on the record of the learned trial Court suggesting A that the appellant was ever afforded any opportunity to engage the services of a learned counsel to represent him.
3. It may be true that' in terms of Article 37 of the Constitution delivery of expeditious justice is one of the Constitutional responsibilities of the State of which the Judiciary is an Organ but at the same time it is equally true that a right to ,consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice is a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 10 of the Constitution. Fulfillment of responsibility qua expeditious delivery of justice surely cannot be achieved at the cost and altar of a Fundamental Right guaranteed by the Constitution. As a matter of fact the post-haste manner in which the learned trial Court had conducted its proceedings in the present case has been found by us to be a circumstance which may encourage an aggrieved person to raise an eyebrow of suspicion and mistrust.
4. As the trial of the appellant has been found by us to have been vitiated by violation of his Fundamental Right contained in Article 10 of the Constitution, therefore, in order to foster the ends of justice we accept this appeal and set aside the appellant's conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajanpur on 10-11-2001. The case of the appellant is resultantly remanded to the Court of Session, Rajanpur for retrial from the scratch after affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity to engage the services of a learned counsel to represent him.
Without casting any aspersion on the integrity, competence or bona fide of the learned Sessions Judge, Rajanpur we would expect that this time the appellant shall not be tried by the learned Sessions Judge himself but instead the case of the appellant shall be entrusted for trial to any available Additional Sessions Judge. It goes without saying that sometimes even the most honest and competent Presiding Officers can fall prey to speed at the altar of justice and the best of intentions entertained by them in this regard may still not be good enough to uphold the exercise undertaken by them. If' justice delayed is justice denied' is by now a hackneyed truism or a cliche then at the same time, we cannot forget that justice rushed is sometimes justice crushed.
Unfortunately the case in hand appears to us to fall in the latter category.
5. Before parting with this judgment we would like to observe that the matter of bail of the appellant during the post-remand proceedings shall be attended to by the learned trial Court as and when an occasion arises therefor and the same shall be attended to and decided strictly in accordance with the law relevant to the subject.