1. SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, C J.--M.As. Nos.853 of 2000 and 854 of 2000. M.A. No,853 of 2000 has been filed on behalf of respondents Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and others in Special Anti- Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,46 of 2000 and M.A. No,854 of 2000 has been filed on behalf of respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in Special Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,50 of 2000. In both the applications, it has been prayed that the order of pre-admission notice may be recalled and the appeal may be dismissed in limine. In both the applications, objections have been raised with regard to the maintainability of the aforesaid appeals on the grounds that they have been filed without any lawful authorization in view of the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti- Terrorism Act, according to which an appeal against acquittal can only be filed on the directions issued by the Federal Government or .a Provincial Government to the Attorney-General for Pakistan or the Advocate-General, as the case may be, which directions were not issued by the Provincial Government. Notices of both the applications were ordered to be served on the learned Advocate- General, Sindh on 22-5-2000. The learned Advocate-General, Sindh waived notices, copies of the applications were supplied to him and by consent of the learned counsel for the aforesaid respondents and the learned Advocate-General, Sindh, the applications were fixed for hearing on 23-5-2000. We have heard the arguments of Messrs Ijaz Hussain Batalvi and Khawaja Haris, the learned Advocates, on behalf of the respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and respondent Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh appearing for the appellant/State.
2. Mr. Ijaz Hussain Batalvi raised the following objections with regard to the maintainability of the aforesaid appeal:--
(1) That no order from Provincial Government directing the Advocate-General, Sindh to file appeal for enhancement of sentence against respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif has been brought on record, which was a condition precedent for filing of such appeal under section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act;
(2) that Annexures 'B' and 'C' annexed to the memo. Of appeal cannot be deemed to be the direction of Government of Sindh to the Advocate-General to file an appeal of the above nature as it only empowered the Advocate mentioned therein to conduct/pursue an appeal;
(3) that the aforesaid document did not empower the Advocate General, Sindh to file an appeal against respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif although it empowered him to file the same against others; and
(4) that even if it be considered that the contents of Notification (Annexure 'C') were to be treated as directive of Government of Sindh, the same would be of no effect as it was not issued by an incompetent authority. Elaborating his aforesaid objections, Mr. Ijaz Hussain Batalvi submitted that the wordings of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act unambiguously and very clearly require 'the directions' from the Provincial Government to the Advocate-General for filing an appeal against an order of acquittal of the Anti-Terrorist Court or for enhancement of sentence awarded by an Anti-Terrorist Court. He further submitted that the word 'direct' used in section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act cannot be equated with the words 'sanction or approval' so as to empower the Advocate-General to file an appeal against acquittal or for enhancement of sentence without having been specifically directed by the Provincial Government to file the same. His further submission was that the contents of Annexures 'B' and 'C' do not establish that the Provincial Government had taken a decision to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence awarded to respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in pursuance whereof the Advocate-General, Sindh had filed such appeal and in the circumstances, the filing of the appeal against respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif seeking enhancement of sentence awarded by the Anti-Terrorist Court was in violation of clear, and unambiguous provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act and such an appeal would be deemed to be a nullity. He had also drawn our attention to the designation of the person who had signed the Notification dated 10-4-2000 (Annexure 'C.) and submitted that being the Registrar of the Special Courts, constituted under me Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975, he would not be the proper person or authority to sign such Notification, which could only have been issued by the Provincial Government and the said Registrar could not by any stretch of imagination be considered or treated to be an officer representing Government of Sindh. In support of his above contentions, he placed reliance on the cases of:-
(1) Muhammad Umar Farooq v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 851;
(2) Haji Muhammad Ibrahim v. State and 2 others 1998 PCr.LI 850;
(3) Faiz Muhammad and others v. Mehrab Shah and others PLD 1997 Pesh. 166;
(4) Jalil Ahmad- v. Public Service Commission and another 1998 CLC 435; and
(5) State through Advocate-General, Sindh v. Hanif Ahmed and others 1994 SCMR 749; Mr. KhawajaHaris appearing in Special Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,46 of 2000 on behalf of respondent Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif adopted the arguments submitted by Mr. Ijaz Hussain Batalvi and in addition to the same also submitted the following arguments:--
(1) that even if it be admitted that the said Notification purported to issue direction to the Advocate-General, Sindh to file an appeal for enhancement of sentence and against acquittal of the respondents, the same would be illegal, invalid and of no legal effect in view of the fact that such directions could have been given only by the Federal Government in view of section 2(d) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, wherein Government has been defined to mean the Federal Government; and
(2) that the Notification dated 10-4-2000 as well as the letter dated 8-4-2000 purported to give sanction to file an appeal against acquittal, whereas section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act requires directions from the competent Government. In addition to the aforesaid grounds, his further submission was that the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act were to be construed strictly in view of the fact that the matter related to administration of criminal justice and it is a settled principle of law that in interpreting the provisions of any Statute or Notification, the mandatory provisions are to be interpreted strictly in accord win the letter and spirit and in favour of the accused persons. To substantiate his above contention, he placed reliance on the case of The State v. Muhammad Nasim Baig 1989 PCr.1..1 1842. Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh in rebuttal to the aforesaid arguments submitted that as a matter of tact mere filing of memo. Of appearance by the Advocate- General/Public Prosecutor alongwith the appeal either against acquittal or for enhancement of sentence would be sufficient compliance of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act as it would imply that he has been authorized/directed by the Provincial Government to file the same. He further submitted that as per the words 'directed to appear in the High Court of Sindh' in the memos. Of appearance as well as in view of the specific grounds taken in both the appeals to the effect that necessary sanctions have been accorded by the competent authority for preferring the aforesaid appeals, the question of raising of objection with regard to the appeal having been filed without obtaining directions from the Provincial Government is absolutely frivolous, baseless and has been raised merely for the sake of protracting the appeal. In order to satisfy us with regard to the validity of the Notification dated 10-4-2000 and the letters dated 8-4-2000, Mr.Raja Qureshi referred us to Rule 2(xiii)(xiv) and such sub-rule (iii) to Rule 19 of the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986 and submitted that an order passed by a Minister or any authority to whom powers have been delegated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 19 in respect of any subject or matter allocated to the Department in the charge of such Minister, shall be deemed to be the order passed by the Government. He further submitted that from perusal of the aforesaid Notification and the letters, it is absolutely clear that they have been issued on behalf of Government of Sindh and there will be a presumption in view of the provisions of Article 129 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat that official documents have been issued by an officer having authority and competence to issue them. We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and respondents Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and others and the learned Advocate-General, Sindh, appearing on behalf, of Government of Sindh. We have also perused the relevant provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Criminal Procedure Code and the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel in support of their respective arguments. In order to appreciate, the arguments of the learned defence counsel relating to the question that specific directions should have been given by the Sindh Government to the Advocate-General, Sindh/Public Prosecutor to file the appeals for enhancement of sentence against respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and against acquittal of Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and five others and that such directions should have been produced in Court to satisfy it regarding the existence of such directions, it is to be observed that from the material available on record of the files of the above two appeals the respondents have not been able to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the requirement of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act was not complied A with. From the case-law relied upon by them, it is no doubt to be accepted that giving directions for filing an appeal against acquittal is a condition precedent for filing such appeal in view of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act but it is nowhere required therein that such directions should be produced in Court in writing without which the question of issuance of directions would remain disputed and unresolved. In this connection, we may also refer to the provisions of section 417(1) of the Cr.P.C. Where similar provisions as are made in section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act exist i,e, 'The Provincial Government in any case may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or an appellate order of acquittal'. We have not been able to lay our hands on any authority either of any of the High Courts in Pakistan or of the Hon'ble Supreme Court wherein it has, been specifically and categorically pronounced or observed that the Advocate-General/Public Prosecutor should produce the extract of the directions instructions issued by the Provincial Government for filing an appeal against acquittal or for enhancement of sentence. With regard to the contention that the Notification dated 10-4-2000 and the letters dated 8-4-2000 issued by the Government of Sindh, Home Department do not give authorization or direction to the learned Advocate-General, Sindh to file the aforesaid two appeals, it will useful to appraise ourselves of the meaning of the words 'conduct' and 'pursue' which have been used in the afore-referred Notification and letters as it was contended by the defence counsel that the words 'conduct' and 'pursue' could not convey and/or establish that Provincial Government had directed or authorized the learned Advocate-General, Sindh to file the appeals but he had only been authorized to plead before this Court in the above two appeals. In this regard, we will refer to the meanings of these words given in the various English Dictionaries as well as legal Dictionaries. In the Sixth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary on pages 295 and 296, the word 'conduct' has been defined to mean: 'personal behaviour; deportment; mode of action; any positive or negative act.
3. An action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions'. In the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary in its Fourth Edition (1993) on page 473 the word 'conduct' has been defined to mean: 'leadership, command, management'. The action or manner of carrying on a proceeding, business, etc.; management, handling, discretion; a proceeding, a course of conduct.' It will also be useful to ascertain the meaning of the word 'pursue'-. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition on page 1237 defines the word 'pursue' to mean: 'to follow, prosecute, or enforce a matter judicially, as a complaining party. To pursue the practice of any profession or business, contemplates a course of business or professional practice, and not single isolated act arising from unusual circumstances' . The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1993) in Volume 2 defines the word 'pursue' to mean: 'prosecute in a Court of law, sue a person, proceed in compliance or in accordance with (a plan, system etc.).'
4. From perusal of the aforesaid meanings/definitions of the two words as they appear in ordinary English and Legal Dictionaries, specially that of the word 'pursue' as provided in the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition on page 1237 (to prosecute or enforce a matter judicially as a complaining party), we are of the view that the controversy or the objection relative to the non-compliance of the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act has no legs to stand and crumbles to the ground. The meanings produced in parenthesis leave no room for doubt that the Government of Sindh in authorizing the learned Advocate-General, Sindh, Mr. Raja Qureshi for pursuing the aforesaid two appeals had authorized or directed him to file the said two appeals. To prosecute or enforce a matter judicially will as of necessity include the power or the right to file the required appeal by the person who had been authorised to pursue the appeal. This view is further fortified by the meanings/definitions assigned to the word 'pursue' by the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Fourth Edition (1993) in Volume 2 on page 2422 which are: prosecute in a Court of law, sue a person'. For prosecuting a person in a Court of law or suing a person, the aggrieved party or affected person has to have the power to initiate the prosecution or bringing any other legal action which would confer in him the power to file a complaint, application, plaint, appeal, etc. We, thus hold that Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh had been authorized and directed by the 'Government of Sindh by the Notification dated 10-4-2000 and letter dated 10-8-2000 to file the aforesaid two appeals in accordance with the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act. We now take up the case-law which has been relied upon by the learned defence counsel in support of their arguments. At the very outset, we may point out that the pronouncements made in the cases of: (i) Haji Muhammad Ibrahim v. The State and 2 others 1998 PCr.LJ 850; and (ii) Faiz Muhammad and others v. Mehrab Shah and others PLD 1997 Peshawar 166 are of no assistance or help to the cause of the defence as in those cases the question was with regard to the maintainability of appeal against acquittal filed by the private complainant. In the cases of: (i) The State through Advocate-General, Sindh v. Hanif Ahmed and others 1994 SCMR 749: (ii) The State v.
5. Muhammad Naseem Baig 1989 PCr.LJ 1842 and (iii) The State v. Nooro alias Noor Muhammad and others 1998 PCr.LJ 35 the question primarily for consideration was with regard to the powers of the Advocate General/Assistant Advocate-General and the Special Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor to file appeal against acquittal. In none of the afore-cited three cases, the Courts were faced with the question of interpreting or dilating upon the controversy whether by authorizing the Advocate-General/Public Prosecutor to conduct and pursue the appeal against acquittal the Advocate-General or the Public Prosecutor would not be clothed with the power to file the appeal against acquittal and would be confined only to appear and plead or advance his arguments. The issue as to whether production of such directions in Court was necessary for validly and legally filing an appeal against acquittal ordered by a Court of competent jurisdiction or for enhancement of sentence awarded by such Court was also not in issue in the afore-cited cases. In the circumstances, the pronouncements made in the afore-cited three cases do not advance the case of the defence relating to their objection with regard to the maintainability of the appeals. We may refer here to the case of Nawab Khan v. The State PLD 1959 SC 4. In that case the Supreme Court was faced with identical question whether the Government's direction/sanction for preferring of appeal against acquittal was to be filed alongwith the memorandum of appeal and the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-- "His second objection also appears to be without much substance. A certified copy of the endorsements made by the office of the Peshawar Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, on the memorandum of appeal in this case, has been produced before us, and the document clearly established that the necessary copy of the sanction of the Provincial Government, directing the appeal to be filed, had been annexed to the memorandum of appeal, by the Advocate-General". A copy of the sanction letter dated 8-4-2000 authorizing Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate- General, Sindh to conduct and pursue both the aforesaid appeals has been attached with the memorandum of appeals. With regard to the objection that directions/sanction for filing the appeals against acquittal and for enhancement of sentence were not issued by the competent authority of the Provincial Government inasmuch as the Registrar (Special Courts), Suppression of Anti-Terrorist Activities could not be deemed to be the competent authority having powers to issue the letters in question, we refer to the arguments of Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate-General, Sindh for resolving this question that it has never been the case of the appellant that the direction as required under section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act was issued by virtue of the letters dated 8-4-2000 issued under the signatures of the abovesaid but the decision for issuing direction for filing the aforesaid two appeals was taken by the competent authority/appropriate authority of Government of Sindh and by letter dated 8-4-2000 he was conveyed or communicated the decision of the Government of Sindh directing/authorizing him to file the aforesaid appeals. Reference here to the case of Kadir Bux and others v. The Crown PLD 1955 FC 79 would be useful. In that case, the directions/instructions were said to have been received from the 'Legal Department, Government of Sindh' and the question was whether the 'Legal Department, Government of Sindh' meant the same thing as the 'Provincial Government'. The Federal Court observed that it was conceivable that reference to the 'Legal Department, Government of Sindh' indicated only the authority by which the direction was communicated and that the direction itself was in fact given by the Provincial Government of Sindh, for the foregoing reasons, we find that this objection is without any substance. The learned defence counsel Mr, Khawaja Haris had also referred us to the case of Jain Ahmad v.
6. Public Service Commission and another 1998 CLC 435 in support of his contention that when the law provides the doing of thing in a particular or certain manner then that thing can be done only in that manner or not at all. It was elaborated by him that the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act mandawrily required issuance of directions by the Provincial Government to the Advocate-General for filing an appeal against acquittal or fair enhancements of sentence against the order/judgment passed by an Anti Terrorist Court and production of the said directions in Court, failing which the appeals tiled would be deemed to be illegal, ultra vires and of no legal effect. However, the learned defence counsel has failed to establish that in interpreting the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, it is to be held that production of directions issued by the Provincial Government for filing such appeal would be necessary or there should be specific directions or order by the Provincial Government to the Advocate-General for filing an appeal against acquittal or for enhancement of sentence and for production thereof in Court. On the contrary, we have come to the conclusion that any act on the part of the Advocate-General gives the suggestion or leads to a presumption that he has been duly authorized and directed to do so. Mr. Ijaz Hussain Batalvi in Special Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,50 of 2000 vehemently objected to the validity and authenticity of the letter dated 8-4-2000 issued by the Government of Sindh, Home Department, addressed to the Advocate-General, Sindh, conveying 'necessary sanction' to prefer appeal/revision against the judgment dated 6-4-2000 and submitted that it should not be taken into consideration for deciding the question whether Sindh Government had directed the Advocate-General to prefer the above appeals on the ground that it was not in existence at the time when the appeals were filed and that it was fabricated and manipulated with a view to comply with the provisions of section 25(4) of the Anti-Terrorism Act. He further submitted that in order to overcome the lacuna in filing the above appeal, the same was surreptitiously inserted in the file. This contention is without any substance and is absolutely baseless. 'This letter was placed on record alongwith a statement filed by the Advocate-General, Sindh in the concerned Branch on 15-5-2000. This action was necessitated on account of the inadvertent mistake in filing the wrong letter conveying 'necessary sanction' for filing appeal for enhancement of sentence against respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif Annexure 'B' page 337 in Special Anti-Terrorism Acquittal Appeal No,50 of 2000 pertains to the 'necessary sanction' for preferring appeal against acquittal of respondent Syed. Ghous Ali Shah and 5 others. It was for overcoming/rectifying the above inadvertent mistake that the correct 'necessary sanction' letter dated 8-4-2000 was filed by the learned Advocate-General, Sindh. The Criminal Branch made a mention of this statement and had sought orders thereon when the matter was fixed in Court on 22-5-2000. Such note had also been made/recorded by the concerned official of the Branch at the back of the statement dated 15-5-2000. In the circumstances, we refute the contention advanced by Mr. Ijaz Hussain Batalvi that the said statement alongwith sanction letter dated 8-4-2000 was fabricated and was surreptitiously inserted in the file. We hold that it had been legally brought on record in accordance with the procedure.
7. Upon the above discussion, the legal objections raised on behalf of respondent Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and respondents ,Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif and others are ill-founded and are consequently overruled. The listed applications stand dismissed to the extent of the maintainability of the appeals. Mr. Raja Qureshi, the learned Advocate-General Sindh is directed to advance his submissions and arguments to satisfy us that the said two appeals warrant admission to regular hearing or otherwise.