JAVED IQBAL, J.- The appeal, with leave of the Court, is directed against the order dated 11.2.1996 passed by learned Peshawar High Court (Company Judge) whereby the appeal preferred on behalf of appellant has been dismissed.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case as enumerated in the impugned judgment are to the effect that "the Provincial Government claims that the respondent-company under liquidation owes as a debt a sum of Rs. 56,127/- and is recoverable as arrears of land revenue per Notification No. SO.IV (l&D) 4-4/85-86 dated Peshawar 26.2.1991 under the provisions of the W.P. Government Dues Recovery Ordinance, 1962 (W.P. Ordinance XXII of 1962). The Joint Official Liquidators in their Report No. 7 in CC N. 7/94 (Liquidation proceedings) have treated the claim of the Provincial Government in the following manner:-- "The Director of Industries, Commerce, Mineral Department NWFP Peshawar has lodged a claim for recovery of an amount of Rs. 56,127/- as balance amount of price of Steam Coal and Hard Coke supplied by the Directorate to the Company (in liquidation) through Trading Corporation of Pakistan, It is said that the supply was made during year 1970-71 to 1980-81 on provisional prices.
Later on when the prices were find, it was found that the Company (in liquidation) had to pay an amount of Rs. 120,583/-. Out of that amount the Company has paid a sum of Rs. 64,456/- and the amount claimed in still balance recoverable from the Company. We do not want to question the correctness of account but the claim can be entertained, It is a commercial, deal by a department.
At this late stage the department cannot claim the amount even if we verify it, it would be an ordinary unsecured one. Verified for Rs. 56127/- as ordinary trade debt".
The report of Joint Official Liquidators was assailed before learned Company Judge of Peshawar High Court with the submission that instead of ordinary trade debt the amount due should have been treated as secured and preferential claim as contemplated in section 405(i)(a) of the Company Ordinance, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) which has been rejected vide impugned order, hence this appeal.
3. Leave was granted by means of order dated 3.6.1999 which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:- " Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 11.2.1996 of the learned Company Judge, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in appeal No. 6 of 1995.
2. During the liquidation proceedings the claim of the Provincial Government for an amount of Rs.
56,121/- as debt owned by the Company, which was ordered to be recovered as arrears of land revenue, was declared an ordinary unsecured amount chargeable from the company. Appeal against the same was dismissed by the learned Company Judge vide the order against which leave to appeal is prayed for.
3. Inter-a/ia, leave to appeal is granted to consider whether the learned Company Judge and respondents No. 4 and 5 (official liquidators) erred in law in classifying the claim of the petitioner as unsecured ordinary debt."
4. It is mainly argued by learned Additional Advocate General that the factual and legal aspects of the controversy have not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice as the provisions contained in section 405(i)(a) of the Ordinance has been misinterpreted and misconstrued, It is urged emphatically that the claim of Provincial Government amounting to Rs. 56127/- should have been treated as preferential claim which has been treated as ordinary unsecured debt on the wrong assumption that the amount due and payable was result of a commercial deal made by the Government of North-West Frontier Province Industries, Commerce, Mineral Development, Labour and Transport Department.
5. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of the appellant in the light of relevant provisions of the Ordinance. We have also perused the report prepared by the Joint Liquidators as well as the order impugned. Section 405 (0(a) of the Ordinance being relevant is reproduced herein below for ready reference:- "405. Preferential payments.- (1) In a winding up, there shall be paid in priority to all other debts:-
(a) All revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the company to the Federal Government or a Provincial Government or to a local authority at the relevant date and having become due and payable within the twelve months next before that date."
A bare perusal of the provisions as contained in section 405 (i)(a) of the Ordinance as reproduced herein above would reveal that the language employed in the said section is free from any ambiguity, absurdity or confusion and it cannot be twisted whatever principle of interpretation may be pressed into service, It is to be interpreted in such a manner that the object of its enactment is promoted rather than hampered. No undue advantage could be taken on the basis of farfetched scholarly interpretation which the plain language does not imply nor intended to mean, It is well settled by now that "the purpose of construction or interpretation of a statutory provision is no doubt to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature, yet that intention has, of necessity, to be gathered from the words used by the Legislature itself. If those words are so clear and unmistakable that they cannot be given any meaning other .Than that which they carry in their ordinary grammatical sense, then the Courts are not concerned with the consequences of the interpretation however drastic or inconvenient the result, for the function of the Court is interpretation, not legislation." Muhammad Ismail v. State (PLD 1969 SC 241). It is, however, clear that the claim of the appellant does not fall within the ambit of "taxes", "cesses" and "rates", It is imperative to mention here that the word "Revenue" and "relevant date" would require some examination before dilating upon the meaning of "become due and payable within the twelve months next before that date". The term "Revenue" as used in section 405(i)(a) of the Ordinance cannot be confined within a limited sphere as it covers variety of fields which mainly relates to income generated areas or resources of the government for such generation. The term "Revenue" was interpreted and discussed in case titled Punjab Cables v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1989 Lahore 121) and the relevant portion whereof is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "14. The expression "revenue" as applied to the income of a Government has a broad and general meaning, It would include all public moneys which the State collects and receives from whatever source and in whatever manner. The revenues of a State include all income, annual profits received from lands or other funds, money at the disposal of the Government, etc. The chief sources of Government revenue are (1) State property belonging to the State, (2) Taxation'' wealth- tax, customs and excise duty, stamp duty, death duty, managed enterprises as posts and telegraphs, telephones, lands, woods and forests and miscellaneous holdings, such as shares and collections and other profits or fiscal prerogatives of the State.
15. The expression "public revenue" means the revenue of the Government of the State or nation.
Used in a general sense, it would include all the income of the Government or State from all sources, out of which the public expenses can be defrayed.
6. We have also consulted the dictionary meaning of "Revenue" and "public revenue" which are as follows:-- "Revenue. The gross receipts of a business, individual, government, or other reporting entity. The receipts are usually the results of product sales, services rendered, interest earned, etc. See also Gross revenue.
As applied to the income of a government, a broad and general term, including all public moneys which the State collects and receives, from whatever source and in whatever manner. See Public revenues, below, Land revenues.
Public revenues. The income which a government collects and receives into its treasury, and is appropriated for the payment of its expenses. Public Market Co. Of Portland v. City of Portland, 171 Or. 522, 130 P. 2d 524, 644. Annual or periodical yield of taxes, excise, custom, dues, rents, etc., which a nation, state or a municipality collects and receives into treasury for public use; public income of whatever kind. City of Phoenix v. Arizona Sash, Door & Glass Co., 80 Ariz, 100, 293 P. 2d 438, 440.
Current income of nation, state, or local government from whatever source derived which is subject to appropriation for public uses. Spink v. Kemp. 365 Mo. 368. 283 S. W. 2d 502,513."
(Prem's Judicial Dictionary, Vol.IV 1964, Arora Law House, New Delhi, India).
7. In the light of the definition of "Revenue" as discussed herein above it would not be possible to subscribe the view of learned company Judge and Liquidators that it was a commercial deal simpliciter and, therefore, the amount due and payable was declared as unsecured debt for the reason that such deal on behalf of the Provincial Government was initially for the generation of more income and all the resources available at the disposal of Provincial Government can be employed for generation of income as has been done in this case and hard coke was supplied to the respondents by the Industries Department, Government of NWFP Peshawar, In so far as the expression "relevant date" is concerned that has been defined in sub-section (8)(c) of section 405 of the Ordinance, which runs as follows:-- "405 (8) For the purposes of this section:--
(c) the expression 'the relevant date' means:--
(i) in the case of a company ordered to be wound up compulsorily by the Court, the date of the appointment (or first appointment) of the provisional manager or, if no such appointment was made, the date of the winding up order, unless in either case the company had commenced to be wound up voluntarily before that date; and
(ii) in any other case, the date of the passing of the resolution for the voluntary winding up of the company."
8. The above reproduced expression is neither ambiguous nor confusing which simply means that the date of winding up order shall be the relevant date where the company was wounded up compulsorily by the Court, It may be kept in view that an application was initially moved for winding up by the National Bank of Pakistan which was never objected by the company. Now we intend to dilate upon the meaning of the words "due and payable within twelve months next before that date", which means the amount free from any dispute or controversy liability whereof has either been admitted by the company or otherwise duly proved on the basis of record will be subject to preferential treatment if it related to period within twelve months next before the date of winding up of the company, It is, therefore, not disputed that the amount in question was certainly due and payable to the government but such payment was due in the year 1980-1981. In this case the company was wounded up on 16.6.1994 by the order of the Court and had the amount due and payable within twelve months next before the date of winding up the preferential treatment could have been claimed which cannot be extended now as the amount was due and payable in the year 1982. Notification dated 26.2.1991 issued by the Government of NWFP, Peshawar, Industries, Commerce, Mineral Development, Labour and Transport Department, under section 3 (1) of the West Pakistan, . Government Dues Recovery Ordinance, 1962 (W.P. Ord. XXII of 1962) relied heavily has surely no overriding effect on the mandatory prerequisites and prescribed procedure ps envisaged under section 405(i) (a) of the Ordinance. The above mentioned notification whereby the due amount is treated as arrears of land revenue was issued on 26.2,1991 but no effort worth the name could be made by the concerned functionaries of the Government for realization of the amount in question and they woke up from the slumber after couple of years which cannot be appreciated. There is no denying the fact that the amount in question could have been recovered as arrears of land revenue prior to passing up the winding up order. Presently the company is not in existence for practical purposes and, therefore, the question of recovery of due amount as arrears of land revenue does not arise because the procedure as enumerated in the Land Revenue Act, could not be followed. As mentioned herein above winding up order was passed on 16.6.1994, the notification for recovery was issued on 26.2.1991, the application for winding up for the company was move on 21.2.1994 and sufficient time was available at the disposal of the government to realize the amount in question. Merely by issuance of notification that amount in question could have been recovered as arrears of land revenue does not entitle the Provincial Government to claim that preferential treatment should be made by declaring the amount in question as secured debt which cannot be done in view of the provisions as contemplated in section 405(i) (a) of the Ordinance as discussed herein above.
9. The appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.