' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J---The Service Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, herein, Syed Zareen Shah as being barred by time. The appellant is Head Constable in the Reserve Police. He filed appeal against two orders, namely order passed by the Superintendent Reserve Police on 19th October, 1996 and Order Book No,60, dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Reserve Police. By the last mentioned order, the Deputy Inspector- General dismissed two appeals filed by the present appellant.
2. The appellant was appointed as a Constable on 3rd December, 1980 and was promoted on 1st December, 1985 as selection grade Constable. A criminal case was registered against him under sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code and challan was duly presented before Judge Anti-Corruption. On 31st August, 1995 he was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. Subsequently he was proceeded against departmentally, was found guilty and penalty of forfeiture of three years increments was imposed on him. The order was passed on 19th October, 1996 by the Superintendent Reserve Police. The appellant filed appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police on 14th November, 1996. The appeal was pending when four months later the appellant was promoted as Head Constable on 13th March, 1997 with effect from 15th March, 1997.
Against this order the appellant filed another appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police on 15th April, 1997 in which he prayed that his promotion as Head Constable should have been given effect from 1990. Both these appeals were dismissed by a single order on 2nd June, 1997.
3. The appellant filed appeal before the Service Tribunal, as stated earlier, which was dismissed as being barred by time.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant, Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia vehemently contended that the appeal was not barred by time because the first order passed on 19th October, 1996 by the Superintendent Reserve Police was challenged by the appellant by filing appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police on 14th November, 1996. The Deputy Inspector-General dismissed the appeal on 2nd June, 1997 and the appellant filed appeal before the Service Tribunal on 28th June, 1997. According to the learned counsel the appellant took only twenty six days in filing the appeal before the Service Tribunal. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the appeal could not be termed as time-barred and the Service Tribunal fell in error in finding it so. The other order against which appeal was filed before the Deputy Inspector-General was passed on 13th March, 1997 and appeal was filed before the Deputy Inspector-General, on 15th April, 1997. This appeal was also dismissed on 2nd June, 1997 by the same order and appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed on 28th June, 1997. In this view of the matter the learned counsel vehemently contended .That the appeal against the second order was also within time.
5. We find no force in the submissions of the learned counsel so far as they relate to the order passed by the Superintendent Reserve Police on 19th October, 1996. The original order by which penalty, was imposed on the appellant was passed on 19th October, 1996 which was challenged by the appellant by filing appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police the appeal was decided on 2nd June, 1997. In light of the leading judgment of this Court in Shabir Ahmad v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and another (1996 SCR 82), period available to a civil servant to challenge the original adverse order is one hundred twenty days from the date of filing appeal before the departmental authority. According to the dictum laid down in the aforesaid judgment if an adverse order is passed against a civil servant and he files appeal, revision etc. He cannot wait till the outcome of the appeal or revision and he has to challenge the original order, within a period of one hundred twenty days. Clearly the learned counsel for the appellant was in error in contending that the appellant could file appeal within thirty days from 2nd June, 1998, the date on which the appellate order was announced. The appeal was filed by the appellant before the Deputy Inspector-General on 14th November, 1996. Thus, the period of one hundred twenty days available to the appellant commenced form 14th November, 1996 and ended ton 14th March, 1997.
But the appellant filed his appeal before the Service Tribunal on 28th June, 1997 which means that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred.
6. However, there is force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the other appeal filed by the appellant was not barred by time. The relevant dates are that the order passed on 13th March, 1997 by the Superintendent Reserve Police was challenged by filing appeal before the Deputy Inspector-General on 15th April, 1997. The appellant could file appeal before the Service Tribunal to challenge the order passed on 13th March, 1997 within one hundred twenty days calculated from 15th April, which means that he could file appeal till 15th August. The appellant filed his appeal on 28th June which means that it was filed within the prescribed period.
7. However, there is a peculiar aspect of the case. As noted above, the appellant was entitled to file appeal against the order of 13th March, 1997 within one hundred twenty days calculated from 15th April, 1997. The limitation was to expire in second week of August, 1997 but the appeal was decided by the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police earlier than that on 28th June, 1997 when limitation was available. The appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed before expiry of limitation. However, the appeal was filed against the appellate order passed on 28th June, 1997 and not against the order, dated 13th March. In our view there is no legal defect in it because the order of 13th March, 1997 had merged in the appellate order passed by the Deputy Inspector-General which was duly challenged by the appellant. In our view in such circumstances a liberal consideration will advance ends of justice. We hold that where before expiry of limitation prescribed by law as enunciated by this Court in Shabir Ahmad's case the appellate authority dismiss the departmental appeal, the aggrieved civil servant may file appeal against the appellate order and in such a situation it is not necessary to challenge the original order. In this view of the matter appellant's appeal before the Service Tribunal against the order of the Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police so far as it related to the subsequently filed appeal to challenge the order of 13th March, 1997 was within time.
8. In this view of the matter, the appeal, is partly accepted and the case is remanded to the Service Tribunal so that the Tribunal may decide the appeal on merits so far as the appellate order of Deputy Inspector-General Reserve Police rejecting the appeal against the order of 13th March, 1997 may be decided on merits.