1. MUHAMMAD MUJEEBULLAH SIDDIQUI, J.---These cross-appeals under section 7 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction of High Courts Ordinance, 1980, are directed against the judgment dated 9-1-1999 by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in Admiralty Suit No,699 of 1995. The sole point for consideration in both the appeals is up to which date, Sikandar the appellant in Admiralty Appeal No,2 of 1999 and respondent in Admiralty Appeal No,3 of 1999, is entitled to receive his wages. The admitted facts are that Sikandar (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) signed on Articles of Agreement under section 28 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, on 4-4-1995, for the period of 12 months and joined vessel on 5-4-1994. The vessel on which the appellant was employed called at Karachi Port in October, 1995 and was arrested upon the suit filed by the appellant. The vessel was ultimately sold and the sale was confirmed on 9-5-1996 and ultimately signed off in presence of Shipping Master on 7-3-1997. The appellant was not paid his wages and, therefore, an application was submitted before the Admiralty Judge of this Court seeking direction for payment of wages for the undisputed period of wages. The appellant claimed that un-disputed period of wages was up to 11-6-1996 when he was discharged while the defendants submitted that undisputed period of wages was up to 6-10-1995. It was directed that the undisputed period was up to 6-10-1995 and, therefore, the wages up to the said date be paid to the appellant. The parties led their evidence and the learned Admiralty Judge, observed that question was, up to which date the appellant was entitled to claim wages. He held that the question was not free from ambiguity as there was no such method laid down in this regard for calculation of wages of Pakistani seaman who serves on board foreign owned vessel. The learned Judge further observed that the issue can be resolved by deciding the question as to when, time of service of a seaman on board the vessel ends. Further question was, whether the period of service ends, when he physically leaves the vessel or does it end when he arrives at the place of his engagement i,e, Karachi or does it end when he actually appears before the Shipping Master to sign off from the Articles of Agreement? He concluded that a seaman's time of service would end when he signs off the Articles of Agreement at the Shipping Office. However, he observed, that, it is left at the will of a seaman, he could manipulate not to sign off the Articles of Agreement under one pretext or the other and thus continue to be regarded in service hence entitled to claim wages much beyond the period that was originally intended. The learned Single Judge further held that it was consequently necessary that there must be some nexus between the date on which a seaman's actual period of service on board the vessel ends and his final discharge from service at the port of engagement upon signing off from Articles of Agreement. He observed that usually the local agents try to sign off a seaman within a few days of his discharge from vessel but in cases where a seaman is repatriated from abroad or where the vessel, though at Karachi, is abandoned or stranded then a seaman finds it convenient to continue to avoid signing off from the Articles of Agreement so that he can claim wages for the additional period. He further observed that sometimes in case of foreign owned vessel a seaman deliberately and justifiably does not sign off, from the Articles if his wages have not been paid in full. The learned Single Judge further observed that the provisions regarding signing on and signing off from Articles of Agreement at the Shipping Office were introduced in the 20th Century to prevent unfair and exploitative practices. He further observed that much water has flown under the bridge since then and in the changed circumstances, it is necessary to determine as to what will be the date when the seaman would no longer be entitled to wages in respect of his service on board a vessel in order to avoid confusion. He held that there has to be a nexus between the service on board a vessel and the wages that accrue therefrom. He further held that at the same time due consideration has to be given to the fact that a seaman may not necessarily be able to sign off from the Articles of Agreement immediately upon is. Being discharged from the vessel concerned. Therefore, a reasonable period should be fixed for the purpose of signing off from the Articles of Agreement after a seaman leaves a vessel. The learned Single Judge then explained the process involved in signing off from the Articles of Agreement and held that the entire process could take three to seven days depending upon whether the seaman has been repatriated from aboard or is being discharged from a vessel at Karachi. He held that for a seaman serving in a vessel owned by a foreign national i,e, a foreign flag vessel, the reasonable period for signing off from the Articles of Agreement at the Shipping Office will be a maximum of one week from the time of his arrival from abroad at the port of engagement. It was further held that even if a seaman does not physically sign off from the Articles of Agreement he will only be entitled to wages up to one week after arrival from abroad after being discharged from the vessel in which he was serving. On the other hand when a seaman is discharged from the vessel in Pakistan then such period will be reduced to a maximum of three days. It was clarified that the ship owner was at liberty for arranging the signing off earlier than the period laid down by the learned Judge. It was further held that these periods will also apply even if the seaman's wages have not been paid in full. In such an event the seaman can reserve his right to claim wages by Signing Form 17 and pursue other remedies for recovery of his balance wages. Discussing the facts of the present case, the learned Judge observed that there was no satisfactory evidence on record front which it could be ascertained as to when the appellant left the vessel or seized to be on board the vessel as a member of crew. He, therefore, held that the admitted fact was that after sale of the ship it changed hands on 9-5-1996, and therefore, for all practical purposes the plaintiff ceased to be a member of the crew on board the vessel on 9-5- 1996. According to the principles laid down by the learned Single Judge the appeal should have signed off the Articles of Agreement at the Shipping Office latest by 12-5-1996. So far the actual date of signing off from the Article of Agreement is concerned, the learned Judge observed that according to appellant he signed off on 7-3-1997 but perusal of. Articles of Agreement showed that by an overwriting it was written as 11-6-1996. The learned Judge held that the date of actual signing off, appeared to be 7-3-1997. However, in view of the principles laid down by the learned Judge, it became immaterial whether it was signed off on 11-6-1996 or 7-3-1997 because according to the learned Judge, the appellant' ceased to be a member of crew on board the vessel with effect from 9-5-1996, when the sale of the ship was confirmed by this Court and the ship actually changed the hands. He, therefore, held that the appellant would be entitled to his wages up to 12-5-1996. He further held that under the interim order of the Court, the appellant already received wages up to 6-10-1995 and therefore, he was entitled to receive further wages from 7-10-1995 to 12-5-1996. The appellant/plaintiff felt aggrieved and preferred Admiralty Appeal No, 2 of 1999, contending that he was entitled to receive his wages up to 7-3-1997 when he signed off the Articles of Agreement in the presence of Shipping Master. On the other hand, the owner of the vessel also felt aggrieved and preferred Admiralty Appeal No,3 of 1999, contending that the agreement with the appellant was signed for a period of one year which expired on 3rd April, 1996, and therefore, at the most he was entitled for wages up to 3-4- 1996 and in the facts and circumstances of the case, he was not entitled for the wages for the whole period of employment as the agreement of service stood frustrated in October, 1995 and the appellant was paid wages for the period up to 5th October, 1995, as the presence of the appellant is shown in the Master's statement on board the vessel up to 5th October, 1995 only. We have heard Mr. Agha Faqir Muhammad, learned counsel for the appellant Sikandar and Mr. Muhammad Arif, learned counsel for the respondent C.I.T. Group/Capital Equipment Financing Inc. The learned Advocates for the parties have agreed on the point that a seaman on board the vessel is entitled to claim wages up to the date of termination of his services. The contention of Mr. Agha Faquir Muhammad, is that by virtue of the provisions contained in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, a seaman's services are terminated and he is discharged, from the date of signing the Articles of Agreement before the Shipping Master and in the present case the appellant signed off the Articles of Agreement before the Shipping Master on 7-3-1997, therefore, the appellant was entitled to receive wages up to the said date. On the other hand, the contention of Mr. Muhammad Arif, is that on the basis of facts alleged by the appellant himself in his affidavit-in-evidence,he remained on board the vessel till he signed off on 11-6-1996 and thus, there was no question of granting wages up to 7-3-1997. He has further submitted that the appellant got the ship arrested and thereafter did not render any services. The ship was arrested under the order dated 5-10-1995 and up to the said date, the wages have been paid to the appellant and thus the appellant is not entitled for any wages after 6-10-1995.
2. We have carefully considered the contentions raised by the learned Advocates for the parties. As already observed, the learned Advocates have agreed that a seaman is entitled to claim wages up to the date of termination of his services only and thus the point which will clinch the issue as to when in the present case the services of the appellant shall be deemed to have been terminated.
3. So, far the contention of Mr. Arif that the ship was arrested on 6-10-1995 in pursuance of order dated 5-10-1995 by this Court, therefore, from the said date, the appellant should be deemed to have been discharged is not in consonance with the provisions contained in sections 42, 43, 44, 46 and 47 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, and therefore, we are not persuaded to agree with the submission. So far, the contention of Mr. Agha Faquir Muhammad, is concerned, it has been accepted in principle by the learned Single Judge that services of a seaman shall be terminated and he shall be discharged in accordance with the provisions contained in the sections of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, enumerated above. The learned Single Judge, has held that the services of seaman shall be terminated with the signing off, from the Articles of Agreement. The learned Single Judge, has however, held that the question of signing of the Articles of Agreement, cannot be left at the will of the seaman as such uncontrolled discretion shall lead to a manipulation and exploitation. The learned Judge, has very rightly held that there should be some nexus between the date of a seaman's actual period of service on board the vessel ends and his final discharge from service at the port of engagement upon signing off from Articles of Agreement, because there should be nexus in the wages claimed and the services rendered. We are persuaded to agree with the principle laid down by the learned Single Judge. By now it is established principle that if for performing certain acts no period is prescribed in law then looking to the facts and circumstances, the Court can prescribe a reasonable period for performance of the act. The sole purpose of law is to maintain discipline and to deliver justice to all the parties concerned. The raison deter of prescribing period of limitation for performance of an act is that finality should be attached to the transaction and the act required to be done should be performed within the specified period. If no period is provided by the Legislature then the Court can prescribe a reasonable period for the purpose of such acts. The law is a living organism and is required to be updated according to the needs of the time. However, if amendment is not made in the laws in accordance with the needs and requirements of the changing times, the superior Courts shall always be supposed to prescribe the conditions lacking in the law, keeping in view the purpose and intent of the Legislature, provided always, it does not contravene any specific provision of law and is without doing any violence to the patent or latent intention and purpose of the law and is only meant to promote the ends of justice and is in furtherance of the purpose of law. Doing so, would not amount to resorting to a legislative act but it would only mean the fulfillment of the purpose and intent of the legislation. Coming to the findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, we find that he has very rightly observed that the provisions in the Merchant Navy Laws, regarding signing on and signing off from Articles of Agreement at the Shipping Office were introduced because of unfair exploitative, practices that prevailed in the engagement of seaman in the early 20th -Century in England. We agree with the view of learned Single Judge that the protection given to the seaman should not result in counter exploitation on his part and therefore, a balance is to be struck which will serve the purpose of introducing the provisions of signing on and signing off in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1923. In the present case, we find, that the plaintiff admittedly had no concern with the vessel after it was sold under the Court's Order dated 9-5-1996 and thus it was incumbent on the seaman to sign off the Articles of Agreement so as to bring a terminus a quo, determining his services with the vessel, which was sold, until and unless the new owner employed him, and getting himself free, for employment with any other vessel. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinion, that the findings and the principles laid down by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are not open to any exception.
4. The impugned judgment is upheld and both the appeals stand dismissed accordingly, with no order as to cost.