1. ' Brief facts out of which the present writ petition arises are that petitioners purchased the land in question measuring 169 Kanals, 10 Marlas from the original owner Fazal Abbas vide registered sale- deed dated 4-2-1978 for consideration of Rs,75,000. Respondents Sultan Ahmad and Muhammad Hanif being aggrieved filed suit for pre-emption against the petitioners in the Court of Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Shahpur on the ground that respondents were tenant of the original owner. Petitioners filed written statement controverted the allegations levelled in the plaint. The Assistant Commissioner decreed the suit vide judgment and decree, dated 20-10-1980 with the following condition:-- "The plaintiff is directed to deposit the required sum on or before 10-11-1980 after deducting the amount of Zar-e-Punjam if any deposited failing which the decree shall stand automatically cancelled."
2. ' The respondents failed to deposit the amount within the prescribed period and respondents filed application before the Assistant Commissioner/Collector for extension of time on 10-11-1980.
3. Present petitioner filed reply controverting the allegations levelled in the application: The trial Court dismissed the application vide order, dated 22-3-1981. The respondents being aggrieved filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner Revenue, Sargodha Division, Sargodha who dismissed the same vide order, dated 16-7-1981. Respondents being aggrieved filed revision petition before the Member, Board of Revenue who accepted the revision petition vide order, dated 4-7-1983.
4. Hence the present writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Member, Board of Revenue has no authority to alter the date fixed in the decree for depositing of the pre-emption amount in revisional jurisdiction. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:-- ' PLD 1966 SC 983 (Shah Wali's case) and 1976 SCMR 502 (Haji Nawab Khan's case).
5. ' He further submits that learned Member, Board of Revenue accepted the revision petition in violation of the mandatory provision of C.P.C., i,e,, Order 20, Rule 14 and the law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgments:- ' 1999 MLD 135 (Manzoor Ahmad's case), PLD 1994 Lahore 200 (Dullah's case) and 1994 CLC 1311 (Ghulam Rasool's case).
6. ' The writ petition was admitted for regular hearing on 22-11-1983 by' this Court, respondents engaged Ch. Abdur Rashid Gujjar, Advocate who filed C.M. 210 of 1984 for vacation of stay order in which the notice was issued by this Court vide order, dated 25-1-1984. Thereafter, Ch. Abdul Rashid Gujjar, Advocate for respondents filed C.M. No,1271 of 1988 for early fixation of the case which was disposed of by this Court vide order, dated 13-4-1988. It appears that legal heirs of respondent No,1 Sultan Ahmad have engaged Mr. S.M.K. Lodhi, Advocate who filed C.M. No,1 of 1997 before this Court on 12-6-2000 to bring on record legal heirs of respondent No,1 which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 16-6-1997. Petitioners have also filed this writ petition through. Ch. Nawab-ud-Din, Advocate who has since been died. Petitioners engaged Ch. Farooq Mahmood Kahloon, Advocate.
7. Subsequently. Petitioner engaged Rana Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate. Case appeared in the cause list of this Court dated 1-11-2000. Rana Muhammad Sarwar, Advocate was directed to appear alongwith Ch. Farooq Mehmood'Kahloon, Advocate. Office was also directed to send notice to respondents within two days positively directly as well as through the agency of the Senior Civil Judge concerned. Office sent notice to the respondents on 4-11-2000 for 15-11-2000. The name of the learned counsel for the respondents Ch. Abdur Rashid Gujjar and S.M.K. Lodhi, Advocate are mentioned in the cause list dated 1-11-2000 and 15-11-2000. Learned counsel for the respondents did not enter appearance on both dates. The list of old cases was sent in advance to the respective members of the bar with the following note:-- "Old cases will not be adjourned. Advocate, however, may be solicited, in highly exceptional circumstances with the consent of opposite counsel, through an application to the D.R. Latest by 7 days, before the date fixed for hearing."
8. ' It is pertinent to mention here that the learned counsel for the respondents did not get the case adjourned in terms of the aforesaid note. In these circumstances, I have no alternative except to decide the case ex parte against respondents.
3. I have given my anxious consideration to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record myself. It is admitted fact that this Court did not suspend the operation of the order of the Member, Board of Revenue dated 4-7-1983. Status quo order passed on 22-11-1983 which was subsequently confirmed vide Order, dated 9-4-1984 by this Court. Respondents did not come forward to bring on record any document that the respondents had deposited the amount in terms of order of the Member, Board of Revenue dated 4-7-1983. It is also admitted fact that Member, Board of Revenue through the impugned order had reversed the orders of the Tribunal below in revisional jurisdiction without adverting to the reasoning of the Tribunals below. The Member, Board of Revenue has only authority to reverse the concurrent findings of fact of the Tribunals below in revisional jurisdiction in case the Tribunals below had passed the orders in violation of the law laid down by the superior Courts or orders are result of misreading or non- reading of the record. The impugned order does not reveal that the Member, Board of Revenue has found any illegality committed by the Tribunals below. The Member, Board of Revenue has only authority to reverse the concurrent finding of fact after satisfying himself upon the following three principles:--
(i) That the order of the subordinate Tribunal is within its jurisdiction.
(ii) That the case is one of which the Tribunal ought to have exercised jurisdiction.
(iii) That in exercise in jurisdiction, the Tribunal has acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the Member, Board of Revenue is satisfied upon those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, how profoundly, from the conclusion of the subordinate Tribunals upon question of fact or law."
9. ' Learned Member, Board of Revenue did not mention in the impugned order that the Tribunals below have violated the aforesaid principle. It is also admitted fact that Assistant Commissioner/Collector has passed the decree in favour of the respondents with specific direction to deposit the amount within the specified period but the respondents failed to deposit the same within the specified period. The question, therefore, which I was called upon to determine, is as to whether in the absence of such a stipulation in the decree the failure of a pre-emptor to deposit the decretal amount within the time fixed would entail automatic dismissal of the suit or it will still keep the decree alive. Judicial concept of the law is that a provision of pre-emption law must strictly be complied with to attract its rigour and even the technicalities, therefore, are also relevant to this law. A person who wishes to avail himself of a right under such law, is required to be vigilant and see that he complies with all the conditions imposed upon him. It is pertinent to mention here that both the Tribunals below did not exercise discretion in favour of the respondents. The contents of the application for extension of time filed by the respondent also does not contain plausible reasons for extension of time as the respondents failed to mention a word that the respondents had moved an application against their counsel for committing misconduct in the Punjab Bar Council. Even otherwise, the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue is not in accordance with law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haji Nawab Khan's case (1996 SCMR 502) and the relevant observation is as follows:-- "In any event, it is clear that no relief could be granted, because if the decree of the trial Court stated that in the event of the default in the payment the suit 'shall stand dismissed then, on the happening of the default, the decree became operative of its own force and the time fixed thereunder could not be extended thereafter'."
10. ' Coupled with the fact that the learned. Member Board of Revenue reversed the concurrent findings of the Tribunal below in revisional jurisdiction is not in accordance with law laid down by this Court in Ghulam Rasool's case (1994 CLC 1311).
11. ' In view of what has been discussed above, this writ petition is accepted and the impugned order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue is set aside and the orders of the Tribunal below are upheld.