' CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.---The brief resume of the facts giving rise to the instant appeal by leave of the Court is that the suit land measuring 98-1/2 Kanals situated in Chak No,186/9-L, Tehsil and District Sahiwal was allotted to respondent-Muhammad Akram, as an oustee from Islamabad Capital Territory, on 15-6-1963. He fulfilled all the conditions of the allotment but the District Collector on 2-2-1970 (Exh.P.2) cancelled his allotment pursuant to an earlier order passed by the Divisional Commissioner on 4-7-1969 (Exh.P.4). The cancellation was gone ahead by the District Collector by taking into consideration Government Policy letter, dated 28-7-1969 (Exh.D.5) ruling that Islamabad oustees were to be settled on land in excess of 39 acres around a village for that area was to be utilized as village/Deh-Abadi and also as pasture (Chiragah). He made a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction pleading, among others, that the order, dated 2-2-1970 (Exh.P.2) was void and inoperative against his interest. He also filed a suit for Prohibitory Injunction against Sardar Muhammad, Muhammad Munawar, Muhammad Bashir and Province of Punjab.
2. The trial Court after framing the issues, receiving whatever evidence the parties wanted to adduce in support of their respective claims and hearing the learned counsel for the parties decreed Suit No,128 of 1970 in favour of respondent/plaintiff vide judgment and decree, dated 11-3- 1977. It was held under Issues Nos.1 and 2 that since the plaintiff was not heard by the Commissioner while rendering order dated 4-3-1977 the same was coram non judice. It was also ruled that, as held by this Court in Major Syed Walayat Hussaiin Shah v. Muzaffar khan etc. (PLD 1971 SC 184), all subsequent orders passed in terms of the import of the order of Commissioner dated 4-7-1969 have to fall to the ' ground. Even the plea of the appellants/defendants that it was necessary for the respondent/plaintiff to further impugn the order of the Commissioner, did not find favour with the trial Court as the said order was a nullity and the plaintiff was within his right to make the same as a subject-matter of the suit before the Civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction. On the question of the disputed parcel of land having under-went a change into (Chiragah) with the result that it was not allotable to the plaintiff as an Islamabad oustee, the trial Court held that as ruled by this Court in Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another (PLD 1966 SC 639) Crown 'grant' is to be read "... According to its tenor, any statute or law to the contrary notwithstanding ..." and that valid grant can be cancelled only in accordance with the provisions of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (No,V of 1912), hereinafter referred to as the Act and conditions of grant and that law could not accord stamp of validity to arbitrary cancellation of grant. Section 10 of the Act clearly provides that after a tenant has taken possession of the land in question, "... The grant shall be held subject to the condition declared applicable thereto". It was further held that as there was no allegation that the respondent/plaintiff had committed any breach of any such condition. ".. It was not open to the Collector to pass the impugned order arbitrarily".
3. Petitioners remained unsuccessful in challenging the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 11-3-1977 before the District Judge, Sahiwal and their further Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No,V of 1908) also met the same fate, vide judgment and decree dated 2-11-1983, now impugned in this appeal, paras. 7 and 8 whereof read thus:-- "7. It is to be borne in mind that the Commissioner had entertained a time-barred appeal, which had been filed before him 4-1/2 years beyond the prescribed time-limit, and he had noted this fact in his order, but strangely enough he did not make any express observation or direction that he was condoning the delay for certain reasons, which must have been stated in the order: 'IT Commissioner had also not afforded an opportunity of hearing Akram allottee, observing that the matter had earlier been on the file. Of the learned Additional Commissioner, who had ordered ex parte proceedings against Muhammad Akram on 24-4-1969, after having effected service upon him through a press proclamation, and there was no need to make a renewed bid to serve him. I would entirely agree in this regard with the view-point of the learned trial Judge, who has referred to PLD 1962 Lah. 1041 pronouncing that when a case is transferred from one Court to another, by an administrative order, the parties were entitled to fresh intimation, even though one of them has already been proceeded against ex parte. This principle of natural justice having been violated, and the allottee having been condemned unheard, entailing an adverse order against his interests, passed by the Commissioner, and that too, on entertaining time-barred appeal, could be treated as a non-entity and could just be ignored. The superstructure build thereon will go with the foundation; and the impugned order passed by the Collector on 2-2-1970 would also be rendered a nullity (Major Syed Walayat Hussain Shah v. Muzaffar Khan etc., PLD 1971 SC 184). In view of the matter, it was also open to the affected party to have knocked at the door of the Civil Court, rather than agitating the matter in the higher forums in the hierarchy of the Revenue Courts.
"8. When the land was originally allotted to the plaintiff, there was no prohibition on its allotment, especially as it was not a Chiragah. It was not open to the Collector to convert the disputed piece of land into a Chiragah subsequently, and deprive the original allottee, of the valuable rights which had accrued to him. Conditions of grant of State land could not be altered in an arbitrary manner, and the allottee also could not be diverted of his rights, unless he was found to have committed breach of any condition. There is a procedure provided for cancellation of a mutation or a deed of sale respecting a tract of State land, and without observing that, cancellation of allotment could not be ordered. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants had not been able to satisfy the Courts below, as to what was the basis available on mechanism provided for proceeding in the impugned manner. He has not been able to point out this Court even, as to what were the premises on which the Commissioner and the Collector could reverse the order of allotment of the land made in favour of Akram in the year 1963. This being the sitaution, and the orders being patently without jurisdiction and, in derogation of the provisions of the statute, the aggrieved party could straightaway come to the Civil Court, without exhausting his remedies, if any, which he could avail of, by having recourse to the higher revenue forums. The learned lower Courts, it appears, were wholly justified in holding that the impugned order passed by the Collector, based on the remand order of the Commissioner, was arbitrary, invalid and void, even if it was not mala fide, and the original order dated .5-6-1963, by which the Collector had made the order in favour of Akram, had attained finality, particularly when the allottee had made payment of the dues and fulfilled all the conditions, and when the transaction had assumed tht character of a closed chapter. The orders of the Courts below are unexceptionable; and finding no ground for interference therewith, I proceed to dismiss the appeal, which had no merit, whatever."
4. Paras. 5 and 6 of the leave granting order, dated 17-5-1995 are couched in the following words:-- "5. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has contended that the plaintiff/respondent could not have resorted to the Civil Court without first exhausting his remedies before the authorities in the Revenue/Colony hierarchy. It is further contended that the order of the Collector vires whereof were assailed in this civil suit was passed in compliance with the direction contained in the order of the Commissioner dated 4-7-1969 which order was never challenged in any appropriate forum. The order of the Collector was, therefore, immune from challenge. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the order of the Collector dated 2-2-1970 based on the report/recommendation of the Colony Assistant amounted to reservation of the area in dispute as 'Chiragah' and as such it was exempted from allotment in view of memorandum Exh.D.3. Learned counsel has also pointed out that the payment of dues by the respondent on which reliance has been placed by the High Court was of no effect as it was made during the subsistence of the stay order issued by the High Court.
"6. Contentions raised by the learned counsel require deeper consideration. Leave to appeal is accordingly granted. Status quo as regards the petitioner's possession of the land in dispute shall be maintained."
5. Hence this appeal.
6. Ch. Noor Elahi, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing in support of this appeal has simply contended that his client is also owner in the village and as in that capacity he will hitherto partake of the facilities to be provided therein for the purposes of pasture Chiragah, therefore, he had the requisite locus standi to challenge the grant of land to respondent-Muhammad Akram.
7. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of respondent No,1 was critical of the very locus standi of the appellant to take out any proceedings against his client in that the former has no right whatsoever in law to have the grant tinkered with after the respondent had made full payment therefor and also obtained 'sale-deed', copy whereof has been produced for perusal in Court which has been placed on record as mark 'A'. He has also placed reliance upon Agha Fakhruddin v. Muhammad Paryal and others' (PLD 1989 SC 16) in support of his plea that in the absence of any special dispensation in relation to the reservation of the land for the -purposes of pasture (Chiragah) within the contemplation of the Act, the respondent could not be deprived of his legitimate/legal rights in the land, the subject of the 'grant'. Learned counsel concluded his arguments with, the submission that all the Courts below having concurrently held that neither the grant suffered from any legal infirmity nor even the appellants have any visible right to lay arty claim to the suit land on any ground whatsoever, therefore, the concurrent findings of all the Courts below, favouring respondent/plaintiff, are not open to interference in these proceedings.
8. We have considered the arguments addressed at the Bar and also gone through the available material, with the help of the learned counsel for the parties. A perusal of mark 'A' clearly brings it to the fore that the same had been gone ahead under the discipline applicable in relation to the Islamabad oustees. It is not the case of the appellants that the respondent/plaintiff was not a grantee under the relevant scheme. The case of the appellant No,1 that he being one of the owners of the land in the village was possessed of the requisite locus standi to take out proper proceedings against the respondent/plaintiff, has not impressed us a wee bit. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf was on strong footing in contending that in the absence of any violation of the terms and conditions of the grant by his client, neither the administration i.e, the District Collector, Divisional Commissioner and/or Member, Board of Revenue nor the Civil Courts had any jurisdiction to undo his grant dated 26-4-1977.
9. In the absence of any jurisdictional error and/or misreading or non-reading of material evidence on record being discernible to the naked eye, we are not inclined to the view that any ground for interference with the concurrent findings of fact and law by all the Courts below has been made out to justify any interference therewith in these proceedings.
10. Looked at from whatever angle, the appeal is sans merit and is liable to be dismissed with no order as to costs so be it.