ORDER MUHAMMAD AFZAL SOOMRO, J.- By this order I propose to dispose of this Civil Revision Application under Section 115, CPC arising out of orders dated 19.1.2001 and 2.5.2001, passed in Civil Appeal No. 166 of 2000 by the learned lst Addl. District Judge, Karachi (South), confirming the findings of the learned IInd Sr. Civil Judge, Karachi (South).
2. The brief facts giving rise to the filing of this revision application are that the applicant engaged respondent for legal remedies against Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan. The respondent served a legal notice on the said Institute on 6.2.1 976 and charged Rs.5,000/-. Oh receiving negative reply of his legal notice from the said Institute the respondent advised the applicant to file a Const. Petition in this Court and demanded Rs. 100,000/- from the applicant which was subsequently reduced to Rs.80,000/-. The applicant could not arrange for such huge fee and engaged one Mr. Shabhir Ghori, Advocate, and filed Civil Suits. While the suits were pending the respondent met the applicant and put pressure upon him and convinced the applicant that proper remedy in his case lay in Const. Writ Petition and according tb him by filing civil suits he was wasting his money and time. The respondent offered that now he was prepared even to accept Rs.50,000/- as his fees for filing the writ petition and further said that he was offering this concession to the applicant only because he was respondent's friend and also because of difficult case, black-mailing, discrimination, mala tides and victimization by the Institute. Thus, the respondent obtained Rs.50,000/- as fee plus Rs.5,000/- for Court expenses and filed Const. Petition bearing No, D-680 of 1985. When the above petition came at regular hearing stage it was held by this Court that- because the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan was not amenable to writ jurisdiction the petition was liable to be dismissed, In spite of the fact that Corporate Law Authority was the controlling authority of the Institute, the respondent did not make party in the referred petition, either Federation of Pakistan, CLA or Ministry of Finance, which was the requirement of law. After loosing writ petition respondent even refused to file appeal in the Hon'ble Supreme Court and rather encouraged applicant to file review and appear in person, In review on pointation of misstatements of respondent the Division Bench of this Court gave finding that had the respondent been sincere in his duties result of the petition would have been different, In the judgment of the petition it was also recorded that "Mr. Gharib Nawaz Dhakawalla" has failed to invite attending of the Court to any of the provisions of either the said Ordinance or bye-laws. As a result of dismissal of Const. Petition the other suits of the applicant were dismissed.
3. However, in view Of the findings of this Court, given in the judgment of the Constitutional petition, and dismissal of the suits, the applicant demanded refund of his money from the respondent paid to him. The respondent always promised to refund the fee but requested to forgive the notice fee and expenses which came to Rs.10,000/-. After lot of persuasion and visits the respondent promised to pay/refund the fee and gave such assurance on his visiting card.
4. The respondent on the one hand promised to pay the fee received and on the other hand made a bogus/obnoxious complaint to SDM Preedy Street that the applicant was visiting the premises with arms and the applicant was a very dangerous man but when the SDM Preedy Street called the applicant at his office he was of the view that the complaint was bogus/obnoxious. The respondent complained to the SPIO Preedy Street with another written complaint leveling similar allegations as were alleged in the complaint made to SDM Preedy Street. On hearing the applicant in person the SHO was convinced that some fraud/injustice had been practiced upon the applicant. However, after recording of statement of the applicant, complaint of the respondent was filed and chapter was finally ^closed in view of the pendency of civil litigation between the parties.
5. The. Applicant, ultimately, filed Civil Suit bearing No. 1 53/2000 in the Court of VIIIth Senior Civil Judge Karachi South against the respondent for recovery of Rs.50,000/- alongwith mark-up at the rate of 25%. However, learned Senior Civil Judge rejected the plaint of the suit by his order, dated 24.8:2000, allowing application, filed under Order VII, Rule 1 1, CPC by the respondent. The applicant, being aggrieved, filed lst Appeal, bearing No. 166/2000, before the learned lst Additional District Judge Karachi South which was dismissed vide order dated 19.1.2001 by the learned Appellate Court. Against that order, the applicant filed a review application, which was also dismissed vide order dated 2.5.2001.
6. The applicant, being dissatisfied, has assailed both these orders by filing this Civil Revision Application.
7. I have heard the applicant and the respondent who both argued their case in person, it has been contended by the applicant that both the Courts below have not applied their mind that the respondent on the one hand under paragraph (3) of his counter reply dated 20.7.2000 stated that the applicant's suit did not fall within the purview of Section 18 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) and on the other hand argued before the learned Trial Court that there was three years period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. It has , further, been contended that both the Courts below have also refused to appreciate that for the applicant cause of action arose on 15.5.2000 and in computing the date of limitation from the date of judgment in C.P. No. D-680 of 1985 to the date on which respondent issued the promise receipt of fee on record is 14.7.1998 which has to be omitted, In other words at the most time of limitation is to be computed from 14.7.1998 and even from that date the applicant is very-much in time and the civil suit so. Filed is very much in time and competent also, it has , further, been argued that the learned Trial Court has wrongly recorded in its order that the applicant has claimed interest since, the year 1985- He has, further, urged that orders of both the Courts below were bad in law and on facts and they have failed to exercise jurisdiction vested by law. Both the learned lower Courts have not appreciated the arguments advanced by the applicant and have also not made any observation in this regard while passing their impugned orders and decree. The applicant in support of his above contentions has relied upon the following citations:--
(i) Khan Muhammad Khan and others v. Mir Sardar AH and others (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Baghdad-ul- Jadid 42);
(ii) Court of Wards Hyderabad v. Mst. Shahzadi Begum (PLD 1960 (WP) Karachi 70);
(iii) Ghulam Bhik v. Mst. Hussain Begum (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lah. 998);
(iv) Nek Bibi v. Muhammad Taufail and others (1989 M LD 3990);
(v) Government of Sindh v. Khalil Ahmed (1994 SCM R 782);
(vi) S. Zafar Ahmad v. AbduI Khaiiq (PLD 1 964 (WP) Kar. 149);
(vii) Mahraj Puttu Lai v Sripal Singh and others (AIR 1937 Oudh 191);
(viii) Arif Yazdani and others v. Sheikh Abdul Salam and others (PLD 1957 (WP) Lah. 983).
8. 0n the other hand, the respondent has contended that the present Revision Application had been presented in Court on 30.7.2001 and while computing the period the appeal has become time-barred by 98 days as the learned Appellate Court passed the order on 19.1.2001. He has further contended that no application under Section 5 of the Limitation .Act has been filed by the applicant for condonation of delay in filing the present Application. He has, further, urged that period spent in filing Review Application could not be ignored and/or excluded, it has , also , been contended that the actual and final order of the learned Trial Court had not been challenged but the revision has been field against the order on the Revision Application, it is further contended that applicant is a unique man. He calls himself an Upright Social Reformer destined to put the world on the right track. He is a chronic litigant in the uniform of a lawyer. He has a very large number of personal cases to his credit. He js using and abusing the sacrosanct privileges of the black coat. He has not spared anyone with whom he has ever come in contact, in any capacity, it is further argued that he has not spared even the Judges of this Court and lodged a false complaint against Hon'ble Mr. Justice Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, the then Chief Justice of this Court, with the Supreme Judicial Council, the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Chief of Army Staff. To support his contentions, the respondent has relied upon the cases of Morari Rao and others v. Balavanth Dikshit and another (Appeal Suit No. 294 of 1920 Madras Series), Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Abdul Rahim (1989 CLC 575), Sabir Hussain alias Tonchi v. The State (PLD 1989 SC (AJ&K) 01), Pir Muhammad v. Education Town Co-Operative Society Ltd., Lahore (1982 SCM R 995), Muhammad Sharif v. Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi (1994 M LD 2442), Izzat Khan v. Mst. Insha Allah Begum and others (PLD 2001 Kar. 396), Ghulam Hussain and another v. Kanwar Ashiq AH Khan and another (PLD 1980 SC 198), Ghulam Nabi and 5 others v. Rashid (PLD 2000 SC 63) + (2000 PSC 204), Muhammad Irfan Khan and 4 others v. Mst. Nasreen Anwar (2001 CLC 1256), Khan Muhammad and others v. Mst. Zainab Bibi (2000 SCM R 1227) + (2000 PLR SC (Pak) 1322), Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others (NLR 2001 Civil 574) + (2001 CLR 965), Qamarul Islam v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (1999 M LD 1805), Muhammad Bux v. Muhammad AH (1984 SCM R 504), Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. And 2 others (1999 M LD 3352).
9. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments, advanced by both the parties and also perused the material brought on record which shows that the learned Vlllth Sr. Civil Judge, Karachi (South)/ vide its order dated 24.8.2000, allowed an application, filed under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, by the respondent/defendant in Suit No. 153/2000, and arrived at the conclusion that since the suit was filed after the lapse of eight years which should have been filed within the period of three years from the date when cause of action, if any, accrued to plaintiff/applicant. According to the conclusion of the learned Trial Court, cause of action, if any, accrued to the plaintiff/applicant in year 1 992 and the present suit was filed in the year 2000.
10. The record further discloses that the Civil Appeal bearing No. 166/2000, filed by the applicant against the order passed by the learned Trial Court on the application under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, was dismissed on 19.1.2001 with the observation that the order passed by the learned Trial Court was well-reasoned, well- discussed and same had been passed after taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the Trial Court had rightly rejected the plaint of the suit of the applicant/plaintiff. The applicant again moved an application in the aforesaid appeal for review of the order dated 19.1.2000, passed by it, and after hearing both the parties upon service, the learned Trial Court was of the opinion that Review Application was only maintainable when there was apparent error in the impugned order, it was further observed that the applicant failed to point-out any such error or mistake on the face of the order and the judicial findings cannot be reviewed until and unless some cogent and judicial reasons are shown by the applicant and finding no merit in the review application dismissed the same by its order dated 2.5.2001, There is no denying the fact that the right of filing Review Application is substantive right as it has been allowed by Section 1 14 and Order XLVII, CPC but the crucial point that arises for determination in this case is whether non-availing the remedy available under the law against the basic order and instead prosecution the review in the same Court would entitle the applicant to the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act or in other words the time so spent can be excluded from computing period of limitation. The answer would be in the negative in the case the Review Application is dismissed on the grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, In the present case, admittedly, the basic order dismissing the appeal of the applicant was passed on 19.1.2001 and this Civil Revision Application has been filed on 30.7.2001, after the lapse of 192 days which has become barred by 102, days and there is no application nor prayer for condonation of delay. The argument of the applicant that limitation starts from the date when the order on Review Application was passed i.e. On 2.5.2001, is untenable as refusal to review the order passed by the learned Appellate Court does not give a fresh period of limitation to the applicant to challenge it. In this peculiar situation the applicant cannot be allowed to bypass it by simply pleading that the present petition is against ing to review the same because while stating so his intention is to point out errors and mistakes in the basic order which were sought to be reviewed through a Review Application but which failed. There may be cases where for instance application for review may be refused merely for want of jurisdiction in which, of course, an application may lie but will be on ground of refusing to exercise jurisdiction vested in a Court by law on the ground that it has no jurisdiction whereas in fact and in law it had such jurisdiction, In those cases an application against refusal to review will not be an application directly or indirectly against the main previous order on merits but only against the order in review itself. The position in the present case is, however, different since here the question is not of lack of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to entertain review but after entertaining it refusing the same on the ground that no case for review .On merits exists, such decision will essentially compel a suitor to challenge the previous order itself to point the mistakes allegedly existing therein which exercise obviously cannot be resorted to if the period of limitation for challenging the main previous order has run out. It is the normal rule that in case an application/appeal is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, each and every day is to be explained satisfactorily to make out a plausible ground for condoning the delay. Strictly speaking under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,, an appeal or an application for revision can be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed subject to satisfactory explanation by the applicant, but the statutory pre-condition, as legislated, is that the aforesaid provision will have its effect only when this section is made applicable to such proceedings, and in this context it goes without saying that this section of the Limitation Act has not been made applicable to Section 11 5,, CPC. Nevertheless, on the point of limitation, it may be pointed out. That in the cases reported as Mirza Ali Asghar v. Qadeer Ahmed (1993 CLC 1869), Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Hassab (1999 M LD 1084), Nasir-ud-Din v. Muhammad Bashir (1999 M LD 2999) and Ajbar Khan v. Said Hakim Khan (1999 CLC 362) the Revision Applications were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and no convincing reason was advanced for condoning the delay in filing the Revision applications, they were, therefore, dismissed as barred by time.
Resultantly, I am of the considered view that this Revision Application is not maintainable under the law having become time- barred by 102 days, which accordingly, is dismissed in limine.