' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.---Petitioner is aggrieved by the Lahore High Court judgment dated 21-6- 1999 passed in Civil Revision No,640 of 1985 setting aside the conflicting judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Jhang and affirming judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge First Class, Jhang in a suit for declaration and permanent injunction brought by the respondent against him.
2. Dispute in this case relates to Square No,70, Khasra No,5/2/1, Mouza Ahmadpur Sial, District Jhang measuring 10 Marlas, which was allotted to the respondent in satisfaction of his verified claim on or about 6-1-1948. In the earlier round of litigation between respondent and allottee Hasan Raza, it was decided in favour of the respondent vide order, dated 23-10-1954 passed by Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner and Mutation No,4205 was attested on 28-2-1976 to this effect.
3. Petitioner filed an application on 30-10-1976 under sections 10/11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 whereupon respondent No,3 i.e, Assistant Commissioner, Shorkot, exercising the powers of Additional Settlement Commissioner (Lands) by his order dated 12-5-1977 cancelled allotment of the land in favour of the respondent holding it as based on fraud. Respondent challenged the validity of this order through a suit as having been passed without lawful authority after the repeal of settlement and evacuee law with effect from 1st July.
1974. Suit was resisted but in the ultimate analysis, it was decreed vide judgment dated 8-1-1983.
Petitioner filed an appeal, which was accepted, obliging the respondent to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, which has been allowed through the judgment impugned in this petition for leave to appeal.
4. Learned Judge in Chambers in the High Court formulated following two points for decision:-- "(i) Whether the impugned order, dated 12-5-1977 passed by respondent No,3, cancelling the allotment of the petitioner was within jurisdiction?
(ii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Civil Court had jurisdiction under section 9 of the. Code of Civil Procedure to decide the suit?"
5. On assessm ent of the record and proceedings, High Court came to the conclusion that respondent No,3 was not competent to re-open the issue of allotment of land in suit after the repeal of evacuee laws with effect from 1st July, 1974 as there was neither any pending proceedings before him nor was he appointed as Notified Officer. On the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court, learned Judge held that Civil Court being a Court of general jurisdiction had the jurisdiction under section 9, C.P.C. To try the suit as, in law, a Civil Court is competent to try 'all suits of civil nature except those, which are expressly or impliedly barred. In support of his view, he referred to Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hamid Khan (PLD 1965 SC 671) and two other cases from the Lahore jurisdiction.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as the impugned judgment with their eminent assistance. We are clearly of the view that issue of allotment of evacuee land in favour of respondent had attained finality and it could not be re-opened long after the repeal of evacuee and settlement laws with effect from 1st July, 1974. In fact it was a past and closed chapter. We also feel that respondent No,3 was neither competent nor authorised to deal with the case in hand as there was no proceeding pending before him nor remanded by the High Court or this Court on the cut off date. We notice the respondent No,3 had acted without jurisdiction. His act in law was coram non judice and nullity in the eyes of law, therefore, Civil Court had the requisite jurisdiction to determine the vires of such act and such jurisdiction was not barred as wrongly held by Appellate Court. It has already been declared by this Court Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. Improvement Trust (PLD 1965 SC 698) that Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act does not grant unlimited powers to Settlement Authorities to bring all properties within their jurisdiction on their own findings. Order of the Settlement Authorities would be binding by virtue of sections 22 and 25 in respect of matters, which the law intended should be decided by them only. Present case is fully governed by the principle laid down in the aforesaid case, in which it was also observed that an Administrative Officer, who is empowered to pass an order if certain circumstances exist, has no jurisdiction to determine these circumstances. Objective existence of these circumstances is an essential condition of the validity of his order in respect of every order passed by him. The Court can make an enquiry and if on finding that all the circumstances needed for passing an order were not present, it can declare the order to be void. Nevertheless, it is possible of course that Special Tribunal may be made the Judge of its own jurisdiction but this would be a very exceptional provision and one which should be made by altogether clear words.
However, with respect to mala fides, jurisdiction of the Civil Court can never be taken away for a mala tide act is in its very nature an illegal and void act and the Civil Court can always pronounce an act to be mala fide and, therefore, void.
7. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, there is no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused.