MOAZZAM HAYAT, MEMBER.- Appellant Nadeem Murtaza Khan was appointed as Passenger Service Officer in Grade. V by the respondent. He joined his duties at Lahore Airport on 28.3.1994. He proceeded on leave from 22.12.1996 to 20.1.1 997 as he was to be married on 27.1 2.1996. On his return to duty, he came to know that his services had been terminated w.e.f. 12.12.1996. Aggrieved by'. The termination order, the appellant find a Writ Petition before the Honourable Lahore High Court, but it was abated by the Order of the Honourable Lahore High Court dated 27.5.1998 in view of the insertion of Section 2- A in the Federal Service Tribunals Act, 1973, hence this appeal.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and have also perused the record.
3; It is maintained by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was condemned unheard as no notice had been issued to him to show-cause as to why his services be not terminated. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the appointment of the appellant was. Irregular as a result of which his services were terminated on 12.12.1996. An objection with regard to period of limitation has also been taken by the respondents.
4. The appellant had been appointed by the respondent on 28.3.1994. He remained in service ti|l 12.12.1996 when the impugned order was issued. We have gone through the termination order and find that no reason was advanced for the termination of the services of the appellant. It is pleaded by the respondent that the service of the appellant was terminated because his very appointment was irregular and violative of the rules of service governing appointment to any office in the PIAC.
We are afraid we cannot uphold this argument. Because the termination order is totally silent about it. It was not stated in the termination order that the appointment was void ab initio, In any event, the appellant remained in service till 12.12.1996. He had been getting service benefits from the respondent till that date. He had also complete his period of probation. The rules of equity and natural justice demanded that a notice should have ben issued to the appellant before any action could be initiated against him. We have before us 2001 SCM R 934 and 1994 SCM R 2232. Both these cases relied upon .By the appellant relate to the employees of respondent - PIAC. In both these authorities, it was held that when the employer had framed rules as- well as regulations tor its domestic purposes, it was bound to strictly follow/adhere to the same and the deviation from such rules and regulations was bound to violate principles of natural justice incorporated in the maxim audi- alteram-partem'. In the light of these two authorities, we are constrained to hold that the respondent was bound to issue a- show-cause notice to the appellant before taking the impugned action against him. By not issuing a show-cause notice to the appellant to principles of natural justice were violated flagrantly.
5. As regards the objection that the present appeal is barred by time. We have no hesitation in holding otherwise. Firstly for the reason that the impugned order was not valid and was void for want of show-cause notice and secondly this appeal was find within three months from the date the Writ Petition of the appellant was abated by the Honourable High Court.
6. For the reasons above, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order and order the reinstatement of the appellant. The payment of the back benefits shall be made on the condition.
That the appellant had not remained in any employment during the intervening period, It would be for the respondent to determine that the appellant was having some employment or not during the said intervening period.
7. Parties are left to bear their own costs.