' This writ petition is directed against the judgment, dated 18-6-1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar whereby revision under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the decree passed against the petitioner by the Chairman Conciliation Court, dated 11-11-1987 was maintained.
2. The facts are that Atta Muhammad respondent No,1 filed an application for constitution of a Conciliation Court for recovery of a sum of Rs,14,000 against the petitioner. Accordingly, Conciliation Court, Union Council No,64, Chak No,167/7-R issued notice to the petitioner. The petitioner was duly served and appeared before the Conciliation Court on 16-8-1987. Both the parties consented to the jurisdiction of the said Conciliation. Court. The parties were directed to produce two arbitrators each for the purpose of resolution of the dispute. Accordingly the petitioner appointed Niaz Ahmad, Councillor and Baqir Padhiar as his arbitrators while Atta Muhammad respondent appointed Din Muhammad Cheema and Faiz Ahmad Bajwa as arbitrators on his behalf. Thereafter, the petitioner alongwith his arbitrators did not appear before the Conciliation Court. Finally, after considering the case of Atta Muhammad, respondent, Chairman Conciliation Court passed a decree in the sum of Rs,14,000 against the petitioner on 11-11-1987.
3. The petitioner then preferred a revision before the learned Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar against the decree, dated 11-11-1987 on 3-6-1990. The said revision was considered and dismissed vide judgment dated 18-6-1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bahawalnagar. While dismissing the said revision, it was found that the revision was hopelessly barred by time as such a revision under section 8 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 could be filed only within 30 days of the impugned decree of the Conciliation Court. No application for condonation of delay was also filed. The contention of the petitioner that as the decree of the Conciliation Court was without jurisdiction, therefore, no period of limitation would run against a void order was also repelled. On merits, it was held that the claim of the respondent was covered under Schedule -Part II, section B of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 and thus, the decree of.
The Conciliation Court was unexceptionable.
4. Mr. Shaukat Ali Mian, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that as the petitioner was permanent resident of Chak No,201/8-R Halqa Union Council Chak No,199/8-R Tehsil Fortabbas District Bahawalnagar, the Chairman Conciliation Court Union Council No,64, Chak No,167/7-R had no jurisdiction to try the case. In this respect, he referred section 6 of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 which reads as under:-- "Section 6. Jurisdiction of Conciliation Courts, etc.--- (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), Conciliation Court shall be constituted and shall have jurisdiction to try a case only when the parties to dispute ordinarily reside within the jurisdiction of the same Union Council in which the offence has been committed' or the cause of action has arisen.
(2) Where one of the parties to a dispute ordinarily resides, and the offence has been committed or the cause of action has arisen, in one ward of a city, municipality or cantonment, and the other party ordinarily resides in another ward of the same city municipality or cantonment, then a Conciliation Court may be constituted in the ward in which the offence has been committed or, as the case may be, the cause of action has arisen."
5. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of force. Under section 6(2) of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 where one of the party to the dispute ordinarily resides in one ward of a city, municipality or cantonment and the other party ordinarily resides in another ward of the same city, municipality or cantonment, the Conciliation Court where the cause of action has arisen shall have the necessary jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, even if it is assumed that the petitioner is a resident of a different Chak of the same city or the municipality, it would not denude the concerned Conciliation Court if the other party resides within its jurisdiction and the cause of action also arose within the limit of the said Conciliation Court. The contention of the petitioner is also fallacious for the reason that the petitioner had himself appeared before the Conciliation Court and participated in its proceedings without raising any such objection. If a party has participated in the proceedings of the Tribunal and allowed it to assume jurisdiction, it cannot be allowed to turn around and challenge the jurisdiction when an adverse order is passed against him.
6. The other contention raised by the petitioner is that the Conciliation Court would only have jurisdiction in the matter when the claim is based upon a written document. For this proposition, he referred to Part I section B of the Schedule to the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961 which reads as under:-- "Section B - Civil Cases.--- (1) Suit for the recovery of money due on contracts, receipts or other documents."
' His precise contention is that only such claims are entertain able by the Conciliation Court which are based upon contracts, receipts or other documents. According to the term "contracts" employed in this proposition should be read ejusdem generis with receipts or other documents and excludes oral contracts. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner also has no merit. The case instituted by the respondent before the Conciliation Court was covered under Part II section B---Civil Cases of the Schedule of the said Ordinance. This provision is reproduced as under:-- Section B-Civil Cases.--- All civil cases (excepting those mentioned in section B of Part I of this Schedule), in which the value of the claim does not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees."
7. A perusal of the above provision would show that the claim of the respondent before the Conciliation Court was in the sum of Rs,14,000 and the dispute squarely fell under Part II Section B of the Schedule. As such the requirement of a written document or a written contract or receipt as envisaged in Part I, section B is not relevant.
8. The revision filed by the petitioner was hopelessly barred by time and neither before the revisional Court nor this Court, any attempt was made by the petitioner to justify such inordinate delay. The findings of the revisional Court that the revision was barred by time is unexceptionable.
9. In this view of the matter, no case for interference has been made out through this Constitutional petition. The writ petition is without force and is hereby dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.