1. GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, J.-This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of High Court at Dacca, dated 5-5-1971, and arises in the following circumstances:--- Petitioner Muhammad Siraj initially joined service of the Central Government of India in 1946 in the Malaria Institute of India at Delhi; on the eve of Pakistan he opted for Pakistan and was posted at Karachi in August 1947, as Stenographer; during his service career, however, he seems to have been frequently charge-sheeted for one reason or another but somehow he succeeded to extricate himself from ail those situations until he was finally charge-sheeted on 28-12-1967 and was asked to show cause as to why major penalty be not imposed on him; in regard to the said charge---sheet one Doctor Zakir Hussain was appointed as Inquiry Officer who on 28-11-1968 submitted his report; on receipt of the report in question respondent No. 4 (who was the competent authority of petitioner) supplied a copy of it to petitioner asking him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service; in reply thereto the petitioner took up the position that respondent No. 4 was not his appointing authority, thus had no jurisdiction to have proceeded against him and consequently the subsequent inquiry held by Doctor Zakir Hussain was without jurisdiction; on receipt of the said reply from petitioner, respondent No. 4 on 21-5-1969 removed him from service under clause (f) sub-rule (1) of rule 4 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960, for `misconduct' within the meaning of sub-rule (2), rule 2 of the said Rules.
2. The petitioner filed against the said order of his removal writ petition in Dacca High Court on 29-5- 1970. But the same was dismissed on 5-5-1971 by the impugned judgment. After the commencement of Military action in the then East Pakistan on 3-12-1971, petitioner was repatriated to Karachi on 24-10-1973 through the auspices of International Red Cross; on 16-11-1973 be filed in this Court petition for leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of Dacca High Court which in spite of his constant reminders to the Registry of this Court could not come up for hearing earlier on 8-3-1978 he received a written communication from this Court that his petition was fixed for hearing today and so he is present and has argued his case personally.
3. The main objection of the petitioner, against the impugned order of respondent No. 4 herein, is that he was not his appointing authority and consequently he could neither initiate any proceedings against him nor remove him from service. He further argued that if the required power had been delegated to respondent No. 4 it would be ultra vires of the powers of the Ministry of Health, for the only authority which could have delegated the said power to him would be President of Pakistan and no other, authority.
4. Before examining these contentions, it may be mentioned that this Court now has no jurisdiction to hear any case from the Courts of Bengla Desh. In the case in hand, however, the position is different. The impugned judgment was delivered by then Dacca High Court on 5-5-1971; the petitioner had submitted to this Court his petition for leave to appeal against the said judgment on 16-11-1973' and it was thereafter i.e. Sometime in February 1974, when Bengla Desh was recognised as a separate sovereign country by Pakistan. In these circumstances this petition would be competent, for it was evidently pending long before Bengla Desh came to be recognised as a separate State. Furthermore if the impugned order in this case was to be set aside b this Court evidently the writ of the Court would run against the Government of Pakistan and Director-General Health, Ministry of Health, Labour an Social Welfare, Islamabad and not against any authority in Bengla Desh.
5. This petition is also seemingly barred by limitation. The impugned judgment was delivered by Dacca High Court on 5-5-1971, whereas the petition in this Court was filed on 16-11-1973.
6. Considering, however, that since during all this period conditions in the then East Pakistan were abnormal, which subsequently culminated in the Military action in December 1971, leading to the birth of Bengla Desh, the delay in this case is hereby condoned. Now as to the merits of the two contentions raised by the petitioner, reference may be made to page 39 of the impugned judgment in which they were considered in detail but were rejected. The view taken by the High Court, which was based on the two notifications of the Government of Pakistan, namely, Notification No. F. 25-5/64-Per., dated May 2, 1967, and Notification No. F. 72-3/69 Admn., dated April 25, 1969, was that respondent No. 4 had there under been properly delegated all the disciplinary powers of the competent authority in regard to employees of Class III to which the petitioner also belonged. By going through the said two Notifications and their construction by the High Court the said finding seems to have been reached wholly properly and so would be unexceptionable.
7. The contention of the petitioner that the said two Notifications, where-- under respondent No. 4 was delegated the power of competent authority, would be ultra vires the. Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan also has no force in it. While dealing with this contention, the High Court took notice of rule 10 of the Rules of Business, 1962, which in relevant parts reads as under :- "10. Consultation with the Establishment Division.-No Division shall, without previous consultation with the Establishment Division, issue or authorise any orders, other than orders in pursuance of any general or special delegation made by the Establishment Division, which involve:--
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(d) a change in the terms and conditions of service of officers of the All Pakistan and Class I Central Services, and of ministerial servants in the Central Directorate and Attached Departments'."
8. Relying on this Rule, which in the absence of anything brought on the record to show that the said two Notifications had not been issued in previous consultation with the Establishment Division, the finding reached by the High Court was that respondent No. 4 had been properly delegated all disciplinary powers in regard to employees serving in Class III to which the petitioner admittedly belonged. Evidently, therefore, the action taken by him against the petitioner was well within his jurisdiction to which no exception can be taken.
9. Quite apart from this position in the proceedings instituted against him, the petitioner was afforded every opportunity to defend himself. And thus it cannot be said that he had been condemned unheard or that the proceed--ings taken against him were in any way in breach of the relevant rules. For all these reasons therefore, this petition has no force in it and the same is dismissed.