' The present petition for quashment under section 561-A, Cr. P. C. Arises out of the following fact and circumstances : On 13-12-1963, allotment of agricultural land in favour of one Muhammad Sarwar was made at Khata No, 241 of R. L. II of Faridabad, Tehsil Nankana, District Sheikhupura. Through Mutations Nos. 89 to 92 said Muhammad Sarwar sold away the land to Abdul Ghafoor 12/3rd share) and to Muhammad Naeem (1/3rd share). On 17-7-1972, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation) with powers of Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land) exercising the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, cancelled the allotment of land of said Muhammad Sarwar inter alla on the ground that the land was Evacuee Trust Property and, therefore, not allotable. On 10.10-1974, Gulzar Muhammad (Qanungo Consolidation) lodged the F. I. R. With Manzoor Husain Shah, S. I, Anti- Corruption Establishment, under sections 420, 468, 471, P. P. C. Read with section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, against certain persons including the present petitioner Patwari Muhammad Salim After the usual investigation, the police challaned the accused persons for the said offences and at present the case is pending before the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Lahore, who framed the formal charge against the petitioner on 28-9-1977.
2. The main contention raised on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel Mr. Muhammad Ghani, Advocate, is that the sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner has not been given by the competent authority as required by law. It may be mentioned that the Assistant Commissioner, Nankana, has given the required sanction vide order dated 24-10-1975. According to the learned defence counsel, the petitioner being a public servant, sanction for his prosecution should have been given by that authority which was competent at the time of the commission of the offence. It is not denied by the learned State Counsel that the offence was committed in this case on 13.12-1963 when the alleged fraudulent allotment in favour of Muhammad Sarwar was made. He further admits that the Assistant Commissioner Nankana was not the competent authority to gram such unction for the prosecution of the petitioner in December, 1963. Reliance in this behalf can be placed upon the following Explanation to proviso to clause (5) of section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 "For the purpose of this subsection 'appropriate Government' shall mean the Government which at the time of the commission of the offence was the appropriate Government."
' The authority competent to appoint or dismiss the present petitioner In 1963 was the Collector of the District who was the Deputy Commissioner of the District. The learned State Counsel frankly concedes before me that in December 1963, the Assistant Commissioner, Nankana was not the competent authority to give sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner. He, however, vehemently contends that the proper stage to determine the sanction was when the F.
1. R. Was actually lodged and net when the offence was committed. As mentioned above, the Statute itself has clarified that for the purpose of determining 'appropriate Government', it is the time of the commission of the offence which is relevant. There is no ambiguity so far as the time to determine the question of appropriate Government/ authority to grant sanction for the prosecution is concerned. Reliance in this behalf is placed upon the following authorities I Ghulam Qadir v. The State PLD 1968 Lah. 181; Muhammad Shafiullah v. The State PLD 1967 Dacca 826 and State of Pakistan v. Dr. Abdul Aziz Qureshi PLD 1963 Lah.
374.
' The learned State Counsel last time got adjournment in order to search some authority to the contrary. Today he has frankly stated before me that in spire cf his test efforts he has not been able to find out any authority to the contrary. Rather he admits that in view of the positive provision in the Statute, it is the time of commission of the offence which is relevant to determine the appropriate authority to grant sanction for the prosecution of a public servant.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner also raised several other contentions to quash the proceedings. It is, however, not necessary to discuss all those contentions, as the point regarding the sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner is a crucial one and that itself is sufficient to quash the proceedings.
4. After hearing the counsel for the parties at length and going through the relevant material available on the record, I have reached the conclusion that the sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner is not by the competen authority under the Statute and consequently the proceedings pending agains the petitioner before the trial Court cannot be allowed to continue, bein without jurisdiction. Accordingly, I quash the present proceedings pendin against the petitioner Patwari Muhammad Salim in the Court of the Specie Judge, Anti-Corruption, Lahore. However, the case against the remaining accused persons shall proceed in accordance with law.
5. This petition for quashment is, therefore, accepted.