' On 28-6-1981, petitioner filed a suit for pre-emption against the 'respondent challenging the sale made in favour of the latter vide registered sale-deed, dated 28-6-1981. This suit ex parte decreed in favour of the petitioner on 14-2-1983. However, on an application moved by the respondent, the ex parte decree was set aside, thereafter, the suit was decreed on 11-10-1987. Against the above, respondent filed an appeal, and the learned Appellate Court, was pleased to accept the same and dismissed the suit filed by petitioner on 21-7-1988. Both the Courts below, have concurrently found that the petitioner, has proved the right of pre-emption, however, the Appellate Court has non- suited the petitioner on the question of limitation. In this regard, it may be stated that according to the case of the petitioner, he had applied for the copy of the impugned sale-deed and as per copy Exh.P.1, the sale-deed in favour of the respondent, is shown to have been registered on 28-6-1981, while the case of the respondent is that the sale-deed was registered on 27-6-1981, thus the suit is barred by one day. The plea of the respondent has prevailed with the learned Appellate Court and the suit of the petitioner has been held to be barred by one day.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to Exh.P.1, stated that according to the clear endorsement, this deed was registered on 28-6-1981. Learned Civil Judge, has also summoned the original record of the Sub-Registrar, which was brought by Registry Moharrar, and as per pages 302 and 303 of the register, it reveals that the actual date of attestation of the sale-deed in the register is 28-6-1981. This date has been changed with overwriting to 27-6-1981. The copy, which has been supplied to the petitioner, also bear the registration date as 26-6-1981.
3. Learned Appellate Court, has held that it is a common ground between the parties that the sale- deed was registered on Saturday and according to the calendar, Saturday falls on 27-6-1981, therefore, he concluded that the suit was barred by one day. It is further observed by the learned Appellate Court, that because the petitioner had waited for a period of one year and then filed the suit for pre-emption on the last date with a risk, therefore, the petitioner should face the consequence in this behalf.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners by relying upon the cases reported as Bhirwan v. Ladha, and others (1996 M LD 1701), states that as per section 61(2) of the Registration Act, 1908, the registration of the document shall be deemed complete from the date, when it is entered and endorsement is made by the registering officer. The copy, which has been supplied to the petitioner as Exh.P.1, clearly indicates that it was registered on 28-6-1981, therefore, the suit filed by petitioner is well within time.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Admittedly, Exh.P.1, is a document, which has been issued to the petitioner by the Sub-Registrar and according to the endorsement on the said document, it has been registered on 28-6-1981. Besides, as has been observed by the learned trial Court there is cutting on the original register and the correct date of the registration of the document is 28-6-1982. Above all, in paragraph No,3 of the plaint, the petitioner has stated that the respondent has purchased the disputed property vide registered sale-deed, dated 28-6-1981, in reply, this paragraph in toto has been admitted by the respondent. It is settled principle of law that admissions made in a written statement have altogether different legal significance than admissions made generally. Reliance in this behalf, can be placed on the case reported as Secretary to Government West Pakistan v. Kazi Abdul Kafil (PLD 1978 SC 242).
' In the light of above discussion, I hold that the findings of the learned Appellate Court on Issue No,3 i,e, limitation, are not based upon proper reading of the record and application of law. The suit filed by the petitioner was well within time, therefore, by reversing the findings on Issue No,3, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is upheld.