This petition has been filed to challenge judgment dated 29-5-2001 passed by the learned Additional District Judge/respondent No,2 dismissing the petitioner's appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1998 passed by the learned Judge Family Court decreeing the suit filed by Mst. Samina Yasmin for recovery of her dower amount.
2. The petitioner's learned counsel mainly urged that the Family Court acted in violation of the Provisions of sections 10 and 12 of the Family Courts Act, inasmuch as, the Court did not fix a specific date for purpose of reconciliation between the parties; that respondent No,1 had forgiven the amount of dower of her own free will and was not entitled to the relief prayed for.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on the record. It is true that under the provisions of section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, after written statement is filed by the defendant, the Court is required to fix an early date for pre-trial hearing of the case. On the said date, the Court is required to ascertain the points at issue between the parties and attempt to effect a compromise or reconciliation between the parties. If reconciliation is not possible, the Court has to frame issues and fix a date for recording evidence. The emphasis in section 10 is to fix an "early date" for pre-trial hearing. It can be the same date on which written statement is to be filed or any other early date thereafter. If the contesting parties are ordered the be or happen to be present on the date fixed for filing of a written statement, then the Court can start pre-trial hearing of the case and make an effort for compromise between the parties (after the written statement is filed). The object of section 10 of the Act is to bring about reconciliation between the spouses and to keep the family unit intact and save the parties from the ordeal of future litigation. In cases for dissolution of marriage and restitution of conjugal rights, the Court must hold pre-trial proceedings with much more anxiety and keenness and use judicial wisdom so that the points of difference between the spouses are settled and the marital bond is kept intact.
However, where Talaq has already taken place, then the anxiety of the Court should be to settle the controversy between the parties through their mutual compromise and save them from unnecessary hardships and expenditure involved in the process of litigation. Under section 12 of the Act again efforts for reconciliation have to be made after the close of evidence of both the parties.
If reconciliation is not reached between parties, then the Family Court has to announce its judgment. If the Family Court does not at all hold proceedings under sections 10 and 12 of the Act, then the ultimate decree passed by the Court may legitimately be challenged before a higher legal forum. However, if the Court is conscious of the said provisions, conducts the proceedings and notes in an interim order on final judgment that efforts for reconciliation have failed, then the ultimate judgment cannot be attacked on the ground of any shortcoming or defect in the reconciliation proceedings. The Act or the Rules framed thereunder do not prescribe any special method of holding reconciliation proceedings and the matter has been left to the discretion and good sense of the Family Court. It is not necessary that facts pertaining to the manner for reconciliation must be detailed in the final judgment. Where it is clear form the order-sheet that such an attempt was made, its non-mention in the final judgment/order would notvitiate proceedings of the Court. It was so held in the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Irshad Bibi and another (PLD 1976 Lahore 1473).
4. In present case, the learned Judge Family Court had fixed 18-10-1997 as a date for filing of written statement by the defendant. The written statement was filed on the said date when the contesting parties were also present. Therefore, the Court made an effort for compromise which proved abortive. This fact was noted in the interim order and then the Court framed issues on the pleadings of the parties and fixed 13-1.1-1997 as a date for recording the plaintiff's evidence. It may by observed that the petitioner had already divorced his wile and Talaq had become effective on 4-1-1996. The respondent had filed a suit for recovery of her dower amount. In the written statement the petitioner took up the plea that his wife had forgiven the dower amount. The parties happened to be present in the Court. Therefore for purposes of expeditious disposal of the suit, the Court held pre-trial nearing of the case and made efforts for reconciliation. Thus the Court acted in accordance with the spirit of section 10 of the Act. The petitioner did not object to the procedure of holding pre-trial proceedings on the said date and could not be allowed to assail validity of the decree on the hyper-technical ground that the Court should have fixed a separate date for pre- trial hearing of the case. As mentioned above, the Court is merely required under section 10 to fix an "early date" which, in the circumstances of a case, can be of the same date when the written statement is filed. The factum of failure of pre-trial reconciliation efforts is also noted at the outset of para.3 of the final judgment. After recording evidence of the parties on 27-5-1998, the Court again held proceedings for a compromise between the parties under section 12 of the Act, which could not succeed. Thereafter, the Court fixed a date for hearing arguments and announced judgment on 9-6-1998. It also appears that the petitioner did not canvass the above point before the Appellate Court because it does not find mention in the judgment dated 29-5-2001 passed by the learned Additional District Judge. Before the Appellate Court the petitioner had merely urged that his wife/respondent No,1, had forgiven the dower amount. The Appellate Court has rightly rejected this plea after proper appraisal of the evidence.
5. I do no find any illegality or jurisdictional defect in the impugned judgment of the Courts below so as to justify interference in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Hence this petition is dismissed in limine.