' Through this petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The petitioners seek quashment of proceedings in case F.I.R. No,42 of 1997 registered on 12-2-1997 under section 324/34, P.P.C. With Police Station Cantt. Gujranwala on the statement of Irshad Ahmad son of Ahmad Din.
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 11-2-1997 at 3-00 p.m. When the complainant was sitting on his shop Shahid and Iqbal sons of Muhammad Ramzan armed with pistols came at the spot.
Iqbal raised a Lalkara on which Shahid fired with his pistol hitting the complainant on his left thigh.
In the meanwhile Muhammad Ilyas and Muhammad Idrees attracted to the spot and witnessed the occurrence. Some shots were also fired by Iqbal accused in order to stop the witnesses on coming near Mumtaz. The petitioners were arrested. They moved an application for bail after arrest which was pending in the Court of Ch. Sarfraz Ahmad Cheema, Presiding Officer Anti-Terrorist Court at Gujranwala. During the arguments affidavit of Mumtaz injured son of the complainant was produced that he has entered into a compromise with the accused/ petitioners and does not want to pursue the case. He himself also appeared in the Court and made a statement that he was injured by Shahid and Iqbal petitioners but he has pardoned them and does not want to pursue the case. Due to this reason the bail was allowed to the petitioners vide order, dated 21-4-1997.
3. Subsequently after the investigation, the challan was submitted before the learned trial Court. An application was moved before the learned trial Court under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. For the acquittal of the petitioners that a compromise has already been effected between the parties at the time of grant of bail. The learned Magistrate, Section 30 vide order, dated 22-1-2001 accepted the application of the petitioners under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. And acquitted them from the charges.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal, revision petition has been filed by the complainant which has been accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, vide order, dated 8-6-2001 and he while setting aside the order, dated 22-1-2001 remanded the case for fresh trial.
Aggrieved by the said order, dated 8-6-2001, this petition under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Has been filed for setting aside of the provisional order.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the compromise was effected and duly recorded by the learned Special Judge and granted bail after the recording of the statement of the injured P.W. And the injured P.W. Could not resile from his earlier statement and if he has resiled, even then the order of acquittal was sustainable and the impugned orders illegal and unlawful. He relied on Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and another v. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah and another 1995 M LD 563 in which the High Court has held that if a compromise is effected at bail stage the accused can be acquitted by the trial Court on the basis of the compromise. Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was filed against the said judgment which has been dismissed and is reported in Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Syed Sabir Hussain Shah 1998 SCM R 466. He further contends that the compromise was effected after obtaining Rs,15,000 by the injured from the petitioner and an application was moved to D.I.-G. In which an inquiry was conducted and during the inquiry the allegation was accepted by the complainant that he has received Rs,15,000. He argues that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside.
5. On the other hand learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent denies the receipt of any amount from the petitioners at the time of compromise before the Court while allowing bail after arrest to the petitioners.
6. Learned counsel for the State has also opposed this petition on the ground that injured P.W's. Affidavit was only to the extent of grant of bail after arrest to the petitioners and cannot be used for the acquittal of the petitioners by accepting their application under section 249-A, Cr .P.0 .
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents attached with this petition. Admittedly the compromise was effected at the time of grant of bail and an affidavit was sworn by the injured P.W. That he has entered into a compromise with the petitioners and they may be allowed bail and the same was granted to the petitioners. There is no mention in the affidavit or in the statement of injured P.W. That he has received any amount as Badl-i-Sulh' and it can be held that the compromise was to the extent of grant of bail only and cannot be made the basis for the acquittal of the petitioners under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is distinguishable as it is mentioned in the facts of the said case that Rs,4,000 was received by the injured at the time of compromise and it was accepted by the injured before the learned trial Court who granted bail to the petitioners. In Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah's case the Honorable Supreme Court has also dismissed the petition on the ground that the compromise was effected after obtaining the amount/Badl-i-Sulh by the injured P.W. And that compromise is valid even before the trial Court and the trial Court was empowered to acquit the accused on the basis of such compromise but in the instant case. I find nowhere mentioned that the injured P.W. Has received any amount as `Badl-iSu1h' from the petitioners and has then made a statement before the Court for the grant of bail. The trial Court has haphazardly accepted the application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Without calling the complainant and without calling the other party merely on the basis of a compromise which was filed at the time of grant of bail to the petitioners. This procedure cannot be adopted by the trial Court as the trial Court has to satisfy itself that the compromise has been effected between the parties with free-will and consent and if `Badl-i-Sulh' has been received that has already been verified by the Courts and the trial Court cannot acquit the accused in a slipshod manner without satisfying itself about the authentication of the compromise between the parties. The impugned order is based on cogent reasons and is supported by the material on the record and is sustainable in law.
8. This petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.