' Present Constitutional petition has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer that the demand of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 regarding compound interest alongwith each instalment due from the petitioner may be declared as illegal and it may also be declared that the petitioner is only liable to pay instalment of principal loan advanced to him.
2. Facts in brief leading to the filing of the present petition are that the petitioner, in the year 1992, applied to the respondent No,2 for obtaining the finances for the purchase of MAZDA make wagon 2200cc through an agent under Prime Minister's Self-Employment Transport Scheme, which request was acceded to by respondents Nos.1 and 2 and after observing all the formalities and the deposit of 10% of the total amount, requisite finance/loan was sanctioned. Consequently, the petitioner was delivered the said vehicle and according to the petitioner he is plying the said wagon on the intercity route. It has been admitted by the petitioner that he has only deposited two quarterly instalments and could not liquidate the rest of his liabilities on account of unavoidable circumstances. The case as built-up by the petitioner in the present writ petition is that he is not liable to pay any compound interest/mark-up and the demand of the respondents in this regard is absolutely unlawful and un-Islamic. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent- Bank has vehemently opposed the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
3. The only contention raised by the learned counsel of the petitioner is that the mark-up has been declared equivalent to interest by the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan, thus, the same is not recoverable in law.
4. Admittedly, the petitioner has obtained the finance facility from the respondents Nos.1 and 2 for the purchase of a vehicle, which was provided by the Bank authorities and consequently the possession of vehicle was delivered to the petitioner after the deposit of only 10% of the total value of the vehicle. Even according to the own showings of the petitioner, he has only deposited two instalments. It is pathetic that the petitioner who has obtained the finance facility in the year 1992 has not been able to liquidate his liabilities even after the expiry of more than 9 years. On the other hand, he has courage to file the instant writ petition in the year 1993 raising the plea that he is not liable to pay any interest/mark-up. At the time of the availment of the finance facility, the petitioner must have executed some documents/agreements thereby undertaking to pay the principal amount alongwith mark-up and all other charges, thus, the petitioner entered into a contract thereby incurring the contractual obligations to liquidate all his liabilities. However, it is not clear from the averments of the writ petition as to whether the Bank has filed any suit against the petitioner for the recovery of any amount or not. Once the petitioner has entered into contractual obligations by executing the documents, the petitioner cannot wriggle out of his express commitments undertaken by him through the execution of documents. Obviously, the petitioner is bound by the documents governing the terms and conditions of the availment of facility, which, of course, must be enforceable uptill now.
5. So far as the only contention raised by the learned counsel in respect of charging the mark- up/interest, as the same is un-Islamic, is concerned, suffice it to say that this Court in view of Article 203-G of the Constitution has got no power or jurisdiction, under the law, to determine the same as per principle laid down by this Court in the case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Citibank N.A. 2001 CLC
158. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki v. Syed Muhammad Hashim and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 225 has held that no doubt interest/Riba is un-Islamic, but past and closed transaction cannot be reopened. No doubt the case of the petitioner is a past and closed transaction and the petitioner certainly cannot take advantage of Aslam Khaki's case supra.
6. In view of the above discussion, I am not inclined to exercise my Constitutional jurisdiction under the facts and circumstances of the case, which otherwise has no merits.
7. It is in this perspective and for the reasons stated above, I am constrained to dismiss this petition, which is devoid of merits, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.