' This writ petition calls in question order dated 8-6-2002 passed by M.B.R., Punjab.
2. Facts giving rise to this petition are that on the death of Shahadat Khan, Lambardar of Chak No,16/WB Tehsil and District Vehari, applications were invited for fresh appointment against that post. After observing usual formalities District Collectors, Vehari vide order dated 25-7-2001, appointed the petitioner against the said post.
3. Zulfiqar, respondent, son of the deceased Lambardar and one Imtiaz Hussain, rival candidates filed appeal against the aforesaid order before the Executive District Officer (Revenue), Vehari, which was dismissed vide order dated 6-11-2001.
4. Revision by respondent No,1, against the aforesaid order was accepted by M.B.R. (respondent No,2) on ,8-6-2002 whereby order of Executive District Officer (Revenue), was set aside and respondent No,1 was appointed as Lambardar.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that M.B.R. Had exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside well-founded orders of the District Collector and Executive District Officer (Rev.); that in PLD 1999 SC 484, rule of primogeniture was held against the injunctions of Islam but vide the impugned order, respondent No,1, was appointed being son of Lambardar in violation of the aforesaid authority; and that order of the Executive District Officer (Revenue) was well-worded and did not warrant any interference by way of revision. In support of his arguments reliance was placed on:--
(1) Ghulam Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan (PLD 1962 W.P. (Rev.) 53.
(2) Raja Muhammad Aslam v. Raja Muhammad Sarwar and others (2000 SCM R 531).
(3) Haji Noorwar Jan v. Senior Member, Board of Revenue, N.W.F.-P. And 4 others (PLD 1991 SC 531).
(4) Ghulam Farid v. Ahmad Din (1990 CLC 1983 (Rev.)).
(5) Abdul Haq v. Hakam Ali (PLD 1959 W.P. (Rev.) 8).
(6) Atta Ullah v. Pir Bukhsh (PLD 1959 W.P. (Rev.) 36).
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and I have also perused the writ petition alongwith its Annexures as well as the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner:
7. In writ jurisdiction powers of High Court are not analogous to those of an Appellate Court. It can strike down an order passed by a subordinate Court as without lawful authority and of no legal effect but cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate Court.
8. Precedent Authorities mentioned at Serial Nos.1 to 3 relates to appeal cases while those mentioned at Serial Nos.4 to 6 are regarding civil revisions whereas the present case is under writ jurisdiction hence the said authorities are not applicable.
9. A perusal of the impugned order shows that it is entirely reasonable.
10. Order dated 6-11-2001 passed by the Executive District Officer (Rev.) does not contain any reason for the decision rendered whereas reasons assigned by the District Collector in his order dated 25-7-2001 for giving preference to the petitioner were manifestly neither sound nor specific.
The questions asked by the District Collector from the petitioner and respondent No,1, and the answers to those questions which were allegedly not satisfactorily given by respondent No,1, were not mentioned in the order; stammer in speech of respondent No,1, was erroneously considered as defect, in health. Observation of M.B.R. Was that both respondent No,1 and the petitioner were of middle age and having background of Lambardari, respondent No,1, was better trained for the job.
A perusal of the impugned order shows that respondent No,1 was not appointed as Lambardar on the rule of primogeniture as was alleged by the petitioner's counsel.
11. Revision against order of the Executive District Officer (Rev.) is provided under the law before the M.B.R., hence by no stretch Of imagination it can be said that orders passed by M.B.R. On the revision petition were without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and without lawful authority.
' For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is hereby dismissed in limine.