1. This revision petition is directed against the order of learned District Judge Kotli, dated 31-3-2001, whereby the appeal filed by the non-petitioners was accepted and one opportunity for deposit of the one-fifth of the ostensible price of land was provided to them. The relevant and necessary facts for the disposal of the instant revision petition are, that respondent No,1 brought a suit for possession on the basis of right of prior purchase in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kotli. On October 16, 2000, written statement was filed by the defendant- petitioners. The plaintiff was ordered to deposit the one-fifth of the ostensible price of the land, till the next date of hearing, and the case was adjourned to November, 16, 2000. On November 16, 2000, the plaintiff on petitioners could not deposit the one-fifth of the ostensible price of the land.
2. An application was moved by the petitioner-defendant that as one-fifth of the consideration amount was not deposited by the plaintiff, within the time fixed by the Court, therefore, his suit may be dismissed. On the same day, the other application was also moved by the plaintiff, stating therein that on the last date, when the order for the deposit of the one-fifth of the consideration amount was passed, he was not present in the Court but his counsel was present, who did not inform him therefore, he could not arrange the money, as such one more opportunity may be provided to him. This application was moved by Ali Asghar, plaintiff through his attorney, but the application neither contained the signatures of Ali Asghar nor his attorney. The trial Judge did not allow the same and rejected the plaint. Feeling aggrieved from the said order of the trial Court, the non-petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Kotli. The said Court accepted the appeal and provided one chance to the non-petitioner for deposit of the one-fifth of the ostensible price of the land in question, on payment of costs of Rs,1,000. Now, this order has been challenged through the instant revision petition. Raja Shabir Ahmed Tabassum, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was no sufficient cause for the extension of the time, the lower Court has not exercised the discretion in judicial manner. He submitted that the application of the non-petitioner before the trial Court for the extension of the time, did not contain any reasonable cause for noncompliance of the order of the Court. He submitted that the knowledge of the counsel was the knowledge of the client. It was next submitted by him, that there was no sufficient cause for the extension of the time, at all. As the contention of the non-petitioner is concerned, that he was not retaining the knowledge about the order of the Court, it did not constitute a sufficient cause for non-compliance of the order of the Court. He referred unreported judgments of this Court titled "Muhammad Rafique v. Munshi Khan and others (Civil Revision Petition of 6-4-1999, decided on 20-11-1999)" and "Mateen Alam v. Said Ali (alias) Sardar Khan" (Civil Revision Petition No,35 of 1993, decided on 25-10-1993). While controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Raja Javaid Akhtar Khan, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners argued that the order passed by the learned District Judge is based on sound cogent, sagacious and tenacious reasoning's. It does not require any interference. He submitted that the plaintiff was not present on the day, when the impugned order was passed by the lower Court. The learned counsel for the plaintiff could not inform him about the aforesaid order. In this respect, an affidavit was sworn by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. He argued that when the plaintiff was not retaining the knowledge, about the impugned order,, then how he could have deposited the one-fifth of the ostensible price. The lower Court has rightly exercised the discre tion and provided one chance to the plaintiff-respondent. I have taken into consideration the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the record minutely and have also given my utmost ponder to the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties.
3. The main grievance of the respondent before the lower Courts was that when the order for deposit of one-fifth of the consideration amount was passed, he was not present, but his counsel was present, who did not inform him about the impugned order. It is well-settled principle of law that knowledge of the counsel is always treated as the knowledge of the party. This view finds support from AIR 1927 Madras 707 which reads as under:-- "Unless some special reasons can be shown to the contrary, the knowledge of the pleader must be taken to be the knowledge of the client. " It further finds support from PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K)
25. Even otherwise, it was the obligation of the learned counsel, to inform his client about the order of the Court. At the same time, it was also the duty of the client to seek information from his counsel, regarding the progress of the case. No negligence on the part of the learned counsel or the party can be a ground for exercise of the discretion in his favour.
4. It is to be noted that the law of pre-emption, is a creation of the statute. It is an artificial right. It defeats legitimate and legal transaction. Thus no equity is involved in it and if the plaintiff, in such suit, wants that the Court should exercise the discretion in his favour, then he has to show some very strong, cogent reasons and circumstances, entitling him for such indulgence. This view finds support from PLD 1952 Peshawar 26. The doctrine of equity could not be validly attracted to pre-emption cases, therefore, if the plaintiff fails to deposit one-fifth of the ostensible price, then his plaint is to be rejected, unless some very strong and cogent reasons are assigned by him. This view finds support from PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K)
5. 55.
6. Section 21 of the right of Prior Purchase Act postulates that in every ., suit for pre-emption, before the settlement of the issues, the Court may require the plaintiff to deposit, one-fifth of the probable value of the land or property within such time as fixed by ,the Court. Subsection (4) lays down that if the plaintiff fails to ,deposit the amount within the time fixed by the Court, then his plaint shall be rejected. Section 21 of the aforesaid Act is a mandatory. It is to be complied with strictly. The trial Court, of course, has the discretion to extend the period, but this discretion is to be exercised judicially, but not arbitrarily or capriciously. It is also to be noted that the Courts have always insisted that no latitude or undue concession may be allowed against a person, who had acquired title in the property by bona fide transaction. In order to exercise the discretion, the Court has to satisfy itself that the omission on the part of the pre-emptor was bona fide and not mala fide. The conduct of the pre-emptor has to be adjudged according to the facts of each case. This discretion could only be exercised in favour of the plaintiff if it is established that there was sufficient cause for non-compliance of the order of the Court. Such discretion can only be exercised in favour of pre-emptor, whose conduct has been bona fide. This discretion could not be exercised in favour of the pre-emptor, who has no reason for seeking further extension of the time.
7. The time could not be extended without a genuine cause. It is the fundamental duty of the plaintiff- non-petitioner seeking extension of time, to establish the sufficient cause for such extension.
8. It would not be out of place to mention here, that right of preemption is a piratical in its nature. The Courts always leaned against it. The Courts, while allowing such right, always insisted upon the strict compliance of law applicable to the pre-emption suits. This view finds support from unreported judgment of this Court titled "Muhammad Rafique v. Munshi Khan and others", decided on 20-11-1999. The relevant portion of which is as under:-- "Before dealing with the merits of the controversial issue, we would like to observe that the right of pre-emption being in the nature of piratical right; the Courts had always leaned against it and while allowing such right, have insisted upon in strict compliance of law applicable to pre-emption.
9. The provisions of section 21 (4) of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, which reads: "If the plaintiff fails within time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may fix to make the deposit or furnish the security, under subsection (1) or (2), his plaint shall be rejected or his appeal dismissed as the case may be are the mandatory in nature and a Court, in the absence of sufficient cause, is bound to pass an order in accordance therewith in rejecting the plaint, if the order is flouted. Bahadur Shah and others v.Ahmed Shah and others (1) supports our view, it has been held in that:-- The provision in subsection (4) that the plaint shall be rejected is a mandatory one and the trial Court's omission to pass an illegality such as cannot be covered by section 99, Civil Procedure Code'."
10. In the present case, the only ground of the plaintiff-respondent was that he was not present on the relevant date of hearing, when the order, regarding the deposit of one-fifth of the consideration amount was passed and the learned counsel could not inform him about it. It is no ground for exercise of discretion, as stated earlier, that it was fundamental duty of the learned counsel to inform his client, and at the same time, it was also the duty of the plaintiff to seek the information from his learned counsel, regarding the. Further progress of the case. No such discretion could be exercised in favour of the negligent and indolent person. In this case, the lower Court has wrongly and without any justification exercised the discretion in favour of the non-petitioners. The nub of the above discussion is, that this revision petition is accepted and the judgment passed by the learned District Judge Kotli on 31-3-2001, is hereby set aside. Consequently, the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kotli on November 16, 2000 is restored. Resultantly the suit of the plaintiff-respondent is rejected. Order announced.