' This is an appeal against the decision dated 28-12-1976 of Punjab Labour Court, No, 2, Lahore.
2. Mohammad Kabir, appellant, was employed as a Waiter In Flashman's Hotel, Rawalpindi. He was living in a residential quarter provided by the Hotel. One Sajawal, who was employed a Bearer by the Hotel, was also living alongwith his daughter Mst. Surraya Begum, aged 14 years 4 months, in a residential quarter provided by the Hotel. On 18-5-1976 Mst. Surraya Begum left for school as usual at 6-45 a.m. Shortly after her arrival at the school, one girl came and told her that somebody wanted to speak to her. When she came out from the northern gate of the school, she found one Latif, another co-bearer employed in the Flashman's Hotel, standing there. He told her that her father was calling her, because her mother vas not feeling well. She believing Latif, accompanied him and sat in a car, which was waiting outside. In that car Mohammad Kabir, appellant, was also sitting. The car was being driven by a driver. When the car started, she asked them as to why the car was going in a direction other than the direction in which her home was situated. Both the appellant and Latif threatened her that if she spoke, they would kill her. Thereafter, the car went towards Azad Kashmir territory. In And Kashmir, Latif and the appellant took her to a house. Latif informed her that the house belonged to the appellant. After that both of them tried to force her to get married to Latif, but she refused. They, thereupon, threatened her with dire consequences by pointing a pistol at her, even in the car they had threatened her with a pistol. Thereafter, the appellant brought a Maulvi, who performed her Nikah with Latif. She did not raise any protest on account of fear. The Nikahnama was signed by the appellant and his younger brother as marginal witnesses. After the departure of the Maulvi, Latif forcibly had sexual intercourse with her against her consent. The Nikah was performed on 19-5-1976 sometime in the morning. Younger brother of the appellant informed him that the police was looking for them in connection with an abduction case. The appellant left for Rawalpindi probably on the night of 19-5-1976 and he was arrested by the police on 20-5-1976 at Rawalpindi. On 22-5-1976 the police recovered her from the house of the appellant at his instance. The appellant was released on bail on 1-6-1976 and the criminal case is still pending against him. On 10-6.1976 the Management issued a charge-sheet Exh. R-1 to the appellant that he alongwith Mohammad Latif, also a bearer in the Hotel, on 18-5-1976 abducted Mst. Surrayya Begum, daughter of Sajawal Khan. Also another bearer employed in the Hotel. It was further alleged that the appellant was absent from duty from 19.5-1976 to 2-6.1976 without leave.
The appellant submitted his reply Exh. R-2. Dated 12-6-1976, denying the abduction charge.
Alongwith the reply he submitted a statement of Mst. Surrayya Begum under section 164, Cr. P. C., in which she had not implicated him. As regards the charge of his absence without leave, he replied that in view of the registration of a criminal case he remained in police custody and that was why he was absent. Since his reply was found unsatisfactory, an enquiry was hold in which he participated. In the inquiry P. Ws. Sajawal Kt, an, Sadiq and Mat. Surraya Begum fully implicated the appellant. The Inquiry Officer found the appellant guilty of the charge of abduction, which fell within the purview of Standing Order 15(3)(h) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 196l, because the act complained of was an act subversive of discipline. The Inquiry Officer exonerated him of the charge of being absent without leave from 19- 5-1976 to 2-6.1976, because he was in police custody in those days. The appellant, thereafter, was dismissed from service on 22-7.1976. The appellant filed a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for re-instatement, with back benefits before the Labour Court, which dismissed the same vide decision under appeal.
3. Aggrieved by the above decision, Mohammad Latif, appellant has preferred this appeal.
4. On going through the record I find that the appellant participated in the enquiry and also cross- examined the prosecution witnesses who had appeared against him. From the perusal of their statements I find that they fully implicated the appellant. I also find that all the other formalities required under the law had been observed. In view of the above the verdict of the Inquiry Officer was correct.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the charge for which the appellant bad been found guilty by the Inquiry Officer, did not amount to misconduct, because the act complained of did not take place at the establishment and during the working hours.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, referred to the following judgments :- ' In the case of Central India Coalfields Ltd, Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath where it was observed - "Through a Standing Order which provides that riotous or disorderly behaviour would constitute misconduct which entails dismissal would normally apply to the behaviour of workmen on the premises where they discharge their duties and the hours of work, there may be cases where such conduct on the part of the workmen in quarters provided by the employer in close proximity to the actual place of work, even outside the hours of work, would fall within the scope of the Standing Order, as for example, where such conduct on the part of a workman of a mine, in quarters provided in the mine area itself, may lead to breach of peace in that area, the workman may be dismissed under the provisions of the Standing Order."
' In the case of Diwan Badri Das and others (Trustees of the Tribunal) v. Industrial Tribunal, Punjab and others it was observed:- "That, if a reasonable workman of a commercial concern misbehaved himself in such a way, even outside the premises of the concern or even when he was off-duty, that it impaired the reputation of the concern or was calculated to create resentment against the same or unrest among its workers, the Management would be perfectly justified in treating that conduct as one calculated to harm its reputation and as one being subversive of discipline. The time and place of the act are not1 2 very relevant in deciding whether a particular act of the workman is or is not within the ambit of disciplinary jurisdiction of the Management! It Is the nature of the act alone which is material."
' In the case of Opal Laboratories Ltd., Karachi v. Workers' Union it was observed :- "If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which Is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the Interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant."
7. In the instant case I find that even though the act was committed by the appellant outside the premises of the respondent's establishment, but nevertheless it was of such a nature that it imparted the reputation of the respondent's establishment and was not only calculated to create resentment but also unrest among its workers. This amounted to an ace subversive of discipline, 'which is a misconduct as defined under Standing Order 15(3)(h) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant furthers contended that the Management was not justified in holding the enquiry against the appellant, when a criminal case was pending against him. This contention has not force because the pendency of a criminal case against a workman would not deprive a right of the employer to hold a domestic enquiry against him. The object of criminal proceeding is different from the domestic enquiry.
' The object of domestic enquiry is only to find out whether the workman charged with misconduct was fit to be retained in service or should be dismissed or any other penalty be awarded, if he is found guilty.
9. In any case the right of the State under the Penal Code is quite distinct from the right of a private employer against his employee who commits a misconduct. An employer is the authority to deal departmentally with allegations of misconduct against a workman even though a criminal case is pending over the same subject-matter. This would not be contrary to principles of natural justice nor would any such departmental enquiry or the finding of such enquiry constitute contempt of the Criminal Court. I am fortified in this view by the judgments in the cases of Reneo Limited, Karachi v.
Asad Ullah and Sind Tobacco Co., Hyderabad v. Zamiruddin.
' In the result, I find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. 1961 PLC 543 1961 PLC 1694 1972 PLC 83 1974 PLC Note 136 at p. 73 1974 PLC Note 48 at p. 26