' The respondent. Lal Din, a transferee of House No, P. 142, Ward No, 8, an evacuee house filed an eviction application under section 13 (6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for the ejectment of the respondent on the ground of default and personal requirement. The appellant in his written statement denied the allegation of default and also disputed the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues: (1)Whether the respondent is a defaulter'?
(2)Whether the premises in dispute is required by the petitioner for his bona fide personal use?
(3)Relief.
' The learned trial Court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties came to conclusion that the appellant is a defaulter, but in view of the provisions of section 30(1)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act of 1958 it was held that the ground of personal use cannot be pressed into service within a period of six years of the transfer of the house. The requirement of the premises in dispute was not accepted. The eviction of the appellant on the basis of default was ordered on the 10th of April, 1971. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller the tenant filed an appeal. Landlord also filed cross-objections challenging the finding of the Rent Controller on issue No,
2. The learned Additional District Judge vide his order dated the 5th of May, 1973, dismissed the appeal, but accepted the prayer of the respondent and decided issue No, 2 in the affirmative.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that admittedly the house in dispute is an evacuee house and the same was transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Notice under section 30 of the Act was given on the 11th of August, 1967 and the eviction application in the Court of Rent Controller was filed on the 27th of October, 1970, which is within the statutory period of six years as contemplated by section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, and as such this application was not maintainable. It is true that under clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 30, a transferee is not entitled to eject any tenant within a period of six years but under clause (ii) of subsection (3) of this section it is provided that this provision will not apply to a tenant who owns a house in the urban area within the same town or city. Clause (ii) of subsection (3) of this section reads as follows :-
(ii) who after the transfer, has sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the house or shop, industrial concern, cinema house or printing press, or any part thereof, or has committed acts which are destructive of or injurious to the property nor shall anything therein apply to the tenant of any house or shop in any urban area within the same town or city, owns a house or shop, as the case may be."
In the instant case it is fully proved from Exhs. A/1 and A/2 that the appellant along with his brother Abdul Ghani, who has died issueless, owns a house within the Municipal limits of Lyallpur. In view of this evidence, provisions of section 30(1)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, will not be attracted to the facts of the instant case. The question of bona fide requirements of the respondent has not been pressed much. Otherwise too, there is a concurrent finding of fact of both the Courts below that the respondent requires the premises in dispute for personal use. The finding of both the Courts below on this issue is' based on a reasonable and elaborated consideration of evidence on the file and needs no interference in second appeal: Under the Explanation added; to section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance the considerations for the B assessm ent of the evidence are the same as that under section 100, C. P. C.
Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that there has been any misreading of evidence or it is not in accordance with the: requirement of law as contained in sections 13 (3)
(a) (ii) (a) and 13 (3) (b) of the Ordinance.
3. In view of the discussion made above, this appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.