' Ghulam Ahmed predecessor-in interest of the petitioners had brought a suit for possession in respect of land measuring 31 Kanals, 1 Marla situated in Mauza Dagar Awan Gharbi Teshil and District, Bhakkar, the description of which finds mention in the plaint, basing thief right on Register Haqdaran-i-Zameen for the year 1976-77 that the respondents/defendanfs were tenants as Ghair Dakheel Karan, but had denied the title of the plaintiff. The suit was contested by the respondents/defendants by filing written statement controverting the claim of the plaintiffs, disputing the correctness of entries in the Revenue Record relied upon by them. It was their case that their predecessors had reclaimed the Shamlat land, sunk well and made it cultureable and were owners thereof. It was also pleaded that with the promulgation of M.L.R.64 of 1959 (Land Reforms Regulations) paragraph No,22, Aala Malkiyat rights had been abolished, they were owner for all purposes. Number of issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties were framed by the learned trial Court where after evidence was led by the parties. Vide judgment, dated 29-10-1985 the learned trial Judge decreed the suit, where against an appeal was filed by the respondents which appeal was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhakkar on 31-10-1991. This is revision petition there against. .2. Findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court on Issue No,1 which in the context of ,controversy was of importance have mainly been contested. It is contended by the learned counsel that the learned Appellate Court has committed an error in observing that Misil-i-Haqiat had no relevance with the matter and that Jamabandi for the year 1944-45 has been given extra- importance which has also been misconstrued. It is contended that the respondents were recorded in the Revenue Record as tenants who could not be given the status of proprietors of the land. It is contended that the effect of the consolidation proceedings could not be ignored. The learned counsel for the respondents supports the judgment of the learned Appellate Court and contends that the last Jamabandi in. The Mauza, was of the year 1944-45 which has correctly been referred to by the Appellate Court and that with the enforcement of paragraph No,22 of M.L.R. 64 of 1959 the Aala Malkiyat had come to an end, the respondents who had broken the land and made it cultureable could not be sued by filing any suit for possession or ejectment.
3. The evidence led by the parties comprised the Revenue Record as also the depositions of the witnesses. Both the Courts have made extensive reference to the evidence while dealing with Issue No,1. The comparative examination of the judgments of the Courts below persuades me .To the view that the appreciation, appraisal and interpretation of the documents on record made by the learned Appellate Court is based on correct analyasis thereof. While considering the documentary evidence it has been observed by the learned Appellate Court that Exh.D.2 is copy of Jamabandi for the year 1936-37 showing the possession that predecessor-in-interest of the respondents were mentioned in ownership column i,e, Aala Malkan, whereas in the Adna Malkan column the land was mentioned as Shamlat Deh and in cultivation colur the name of Kanda father of the appellants was mentioned. This-is very important doucment. Exh.D.4 is copy of Jamabandi for the year 1944-45 which shows Hussain Bukhsh etc.; predecessor-ininterest of the respondents as Aala Maliks whereas the appellants in column of Adna Malikan. (In order to remove any confusion it may be stated that the present petitioners were respondents before the First Appellate Court). Another important document was Exh.D.10 copy of Khasra Girdawari showing the respondents herein in possession as Basharah Malik Bawaja Nou Tor. It was on consideration of the whole lot of evidence including the above that the learned Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the respondents herein or their predecessor had remained in physical possession since before 1936:37 and described as Basharah Malikan Bawaja Nau Tor. It was concluded by the learned Appellate Court in the light of the - preponderance of the evidence that the status of the respondents was that of Adna Maliks _and with the enforcement of Paragraph No,22 of M.L.R. 64 of 1959 the Ala Malkiat having been abolished they had become owners of the land. The view so taken by the learned Appellate Court is absolutely justified from the evidence on the record and indeed finds support from the law applicable. The learned counsel for the parties have cited precedents in support of thier respective contentions, I however, consider it appropriate to refer to Khanan and 2 others v.
Fateh Sher through. Ahmad and 15 others 1993 SCM R 1578 which almost covers a similar controversy and clinches the issue. Paragraphs Nos.7, 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment, because of their relevancy are reproduced hereunder:- "7. In view of the finding of the Courts that the appellants are Aala Malkan without being exclusive owners, the land is Shamlat Deh and there being no finding of evidence that the respondents had broken the land with the permission of the Aala Malkan, the appellants would not be entitled to a decree for possession. They are, however, entitled to a decree for ejectment in the facts and circumstances of the case and as the respondents themselves had not pleaded that the appellants had accorded implies permission, no relief can be granted on that basis.
' The learned counsel for the respondents contended that even if a decree for ejectment is passed in view of West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation, 1959 (M.L.R. No,64) the Aala Malkiyat right of the appellants has been abolished under paragraph 22 thereof, and therefore, the decree has become inexecutable. Paragraph 22 reads as follows:-- ' Para.22 Intermediary interest.--- Aala Malkiyat and similar other interests subsisting immediately before the commencement of this , Regulation, shall, on such commencement, stand abolished, and no compensation shall be claimed by, or paid to, any person affected by the abolition."
9. The appellants have based their claim on their Aala Malkiyat right and as it has been abolished their claim for possession cannot sustain para.3 of the Regulation makes the provisions of the Regulation and any rule or Order made under it effective notwithstanding anything contrary to any law or any order or decree of the Court. The Regulation overrides all orders or decrees of the Court or rules or custom or usage which are contrary to its provisions. The learned counsel has referred to an unreported judgment in Execution. Second Appeal No,712 of 1967 Sullah and others v. Ghulam Hussain in which similar question arose and Muhammad Gul, J. (as he then was) referring to paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Regulation observed as follows:--- "The provisions Of this paragraph are peremptory and all embracing. On its plain reading it is equally 'applicable to decrees of Court notwithstanding the fact that such decrees have attained finality. It was common ground between the parties in the lower Courts that the decrees were put into execution after coming into force of the Martial Law Regulation, and having regard to the natures of the right on the basis of which the decrees were passed in favour of the appellants, I have no doubt in my mind that these decrees were rendered absolutely ineffective under paragraph 22 read with paragraph 3 of the Regulation. Indeed, the two paragraphs are unqualified in their application and it is difficult to imagine how the appellants' case can be excepted from the combined operation of the two paragraphs.
10. With the coming into force of Martial Law Regulation No,64 any decree passed in favour of the appellants on the basis of their Aala Malkiyat cannot be executed and will be rendered absolutely ineffective. In these circumstances, no decree either for possession or ejectment of the respondents can be passed in favour of the appellants."
' In view of the above legal position the petitioners could not bring a suit for possession. Against the respondents nor any decree could be passed as was done by the learned trial judge. Such a decree would simply be nugatory having no legal efficacy, nor executable. The view thus taken by the learned Appellate Court is consistent with the law and calls for no "interference by this Court.
Likewise findings recorded by the learned Additional District Judge on rest of the issues also do not suffer from any illegality and are maintained.
'As a result of the above this petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.