' KHALIDA RACHID, J.-Invoking Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 Miss Naureen Khawaja, petitioner herein, through instant petition has prayed for the issuance of the writ directing the respondents/PIAC for regularizing the services of the petitioner in Group VI from the date of initial appointment in May, 1994. The petitioner has further prayed for the upgradation of her post based on her performance and also payment of the arrears.
2. The facts given in the petition, briefly stated are that PIA in the month of April, 1994 advertised 10 vacancies of the reservation staff in the Ticketing Office, Peshawar. The petitioner alongwith others applied for the vacant posts to the Administration Department, PIA. The petitioner was selected and inducted as Ticket Assistant in Booking Office, Peshawar on daily wags on the pay roll of Allauddin & Sons, approved Contractor of PIA with an understanding that her services could be regularised in due course of time since C.B.A. Union was against the direct induction in the PIA for the time being. The petitioner despite her excellent performance and dedication to her job was neither regularised nor confirmed but left to work as daily wages employee. The petitioner, through representations approached the higher Authorities of the respondents/PIA and others who matter for the redressal of her grievances but could not succeed, hence the present petition.
3. In the comments furnished by respondents Nos.1, 3 and 5, the respondents denied the claim of the petitioner and alleged that there hardly existed any relationship of employer and employee as the petitioner was never hired by the respondents/PIA. It was urged that the petitioner was contractual employee of Contractor/respondent No,4.
4. Qazi Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, who has argued the petition on behalf of the petitioner contended that the petitioner who holds 1st Division Master Degree in Public Administration from Peshawar University, the requisite qualification for the post in question, performs the function in the PIA for the PIAC and wears uniform of PIA, therefore, she is an employee of PIAC but she has illegally been dubbed on the pay roll of Allauddin & Sons Contractor. It is contended that after the induction of the petitioner in the year 1994, numerous persons, possessing much lesser qualifications, were given political appointments directly in various grades but the petitioner begged every high-up of the respondents/PIA and of the country but could not succeed to get relief, for she hailed from a poor family.
5. Mr. Hidayatullah Khan, Advocate, appearing for the respondents/PIA submitted that the petitioner was never signed in by the PIA Authorities through an advertised vacancy and that she being a contractual employee of Contractor/respondent No,4 could resort to Civil Court as contractual rights are not enforceable by recourse to writ jurisdiction or she could approach the appropriate forum for the grant of relief under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
6. We have carefully studied the legal aspect of the case. Considering the claim of Qazi Muhammad Anwar, we have been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the assertion made by the learned counsel that petitioner is an employee of PIA since she performs the same duties, assigned by PIA Authorities, as a regular employee of PIA, wears its uniform, draws salary from the PIA funds, even interviewed by PIA hiring panel. Contractor/respondent No,4 is only a middleman and is used only for the convenience of administration of PIA for which he receives commission/payment; therefore, he cannot be classified as an employer of the petitioner.
7. In an amendment in Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973) through Act XVII of 1997 after section 2, section 2-A was inserted which reads as under:-- "2-A. Service under certain corporations, etc. To be service of Pakistan.---Service under any Authority, Corporation, Body or Organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such Authority, Corporation, Body or Organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act."
8. By virtue of the aforementioned section, all employees of Corporation i,e, PIAC, have been declared to be civil servants. It is not the requirement of the amendment that a person shall be regular employee of the Corporation (PIAC) inasmuch as the definition of civil servant given in the Civil Servants Act, 1973 would not be attracted wherein a person employed on contract or workman or work-charge basis has been specifically excluded. The amendment "...Every person holding a post under Authority, Corporation, Body or Organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act" prima facie connotes that every - person performing the function of Corporation shall be deemed to be a civil servant. We, are convinced that the petitioner who is performing the function of the PIAC, is the employee of respondents/PIA. In the identical situation, this Court in the case of Abid Aman v. G.M. (Water), WAPDA (Writ Petition No,834 of 1997) has held similar view. For matter of convenience, the relevant paras. Are reproduced as under:- "2. The question that primarily falls for determination is as to whether WAPDA employees can call into question their termination from service before High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the petitioners was of the view that section 17 (1-B) of WAPDA Act, 1958 has no doubt declared the employees of WAPDA as: civil servants for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 but the same jurisdiction was ousted by the insertion of section 17(1-C) of the Act through the amending Ordinance LXXIII of 1979 and further that as the petitioners are work-charged employees, the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal is ousted.
3 We have carefully examined the law on the subject. Section 17 (1-B) of the Act has operated to declare service under the authority to be the service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under the Authority has been deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, meaning thereby, that all their grievances concerning the terms and conditions of their service shall henceforth be challenged before the Service Tribunal alone."
' There may arise a question that as no order, as envisaged by section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, has been passed, therefore, the petitioner cannot approach the Service Tribunal. 'This' controversy has, once for all, been resolved by the august Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddiqui v. Mian Abdul Malik and 4 others (PLD 1991 SC 226) where dispute was "Whether the parawise comments submitted in the High Court qualify as final order to justify appeal to Service Tribunal?". The august Supreme Court resolved the dispute in the following terms:-- "There is no requirement of law provided anywhere as to how a final order is to be passed in a departmental proceeding. In the present case, not only the representative of the competent authority considered the comments offered in the High Court to be the final order but the High Court itself acted on such representation thereby inducing the appellant to seek further relief in accordance with law. The appellant could, in the circumstances, approach the Service Tribunal for the relief."
10. It may be clarified that through amendment by Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act (XVII of 1997), the word "final" has been omitted but with this omission, the facts on the surface do not change as passing of the I order whether original or appellate is still a sine qua non for filing appeal in the Service Tribunal. In the instant petition. The comments filed by the respondents Nos.1, 3 and 5, in view of the above findings of the august Supreme Court, can be very well-treated as an order.
11. Consequently we hold that the petitioner is a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act and as her grievance pertains to the terms and conditions of service she could resort to the Service Tribunal only, therefore, we do not deem it necessary to go into the merits of the case.
12. In the result, we decline to issue the writ asked for and dismiss the petition as such.