1. Succinctly stated the facts of the instant petition are that the plaintiff/petitioner instituted a suit 'on 24-7-1993 for possession of a house situate in Abadi Narali Tehsil Gujrar Khan, District Rawalpindi against the respondents 1 and 2. The suit was decreed on 28-2-1995. The operative part of the judgment is as under:- "In view of my findings on the above issues the present suit is hereby decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The plaintiff is directed to make up the deficiency of the court-fee of Rs,3,750 within 45 days from today. In case of non deposit of the court-fee the suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed."
2. The period fixed in the judgment making up the deficiency in the court-fee expired on 14-4-1995.
3. The petitioner made an application on 30-4-:995 for extension of the time for placing the court- fee on record on the ground that the plaintiff was not present in the Court when the judgment was announced and as such he could not come to know of the order nor he was informed by the Clerk of the 'earned counsel. On receiving a copy of the judgment through a close friend from Mirza Khurshid Ahmad, Advocate it transpired that the court-fee to the tune of ' Rs,3,750 was payable within the prescribed time. It was alleged that the delay was not wilfull and a prayer for extension of time for filing the requisite court-fee was made. The application was resisted by the respondent.
4. The learned trial Court accepted the application vide order dated 13-5-1995 and granted 30 days time to make up the deficiency in the court-fee. An appeal was filed before the learned Additional District Judge, Gujar Khan who accepted the same vide order dated 7-11-1995 and dismissed the application of the petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the payment of court-fee was a matter between the plaintiff and the State and could not be used. as a weapon to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff/petitioner. He further contended that the learned trial Court was still seized of the matter and could validly extend the time, the learned lower Court misdirected himself to the application of law. He relied upon Muhammad Sharif v. Mst. Natho and another (PLD 1965 Lahore 686), Ilam Din and another v. Abdul Majid and 2 others (1985 CLC 1197) and Mst. Parveen v. Mst. Jamsheda Begum and another (PLD 1983 SC 227).
5. Conversely Mirza Azmat Hussain, respondent No,2 representing himself and his brother respondent No,1 states that he a poor person and cannot engage a counsel.
3. The only question involved in the instant case is whether the Court is vested with the power to extend the time under sections 148 and 149 of the Code of Procedure on the application of the petitioner. It is general rule that where a party is required to do something under a decree and time limit is prescribed for doing so, the Court which passed the decree has no jurisdiction to extend the time but it is subject to the qualification that where decree or Order which fixes the time is not intended to be final and the Court still retains control over the proceedings, the Court may extend time under section 148 C.P.C. Whether the Court still retains control over the proceedings or not must be determined upon the nature of the proceedings. See Surajmal Marwari and another v.
6. Bhubaneshwar Prasad and others (AIR 1940 Patna 50).
7. It is well established that section 148 C.P.C. does not apply where the period is fixed by a decree unless the decree is in the nature of preliminary decree and the Court still retains seisin over the action. See Amjad Malik v. Muhammad Saleem and 5 others (1992 M LD 31). In the case of Muhammad Ismail v. Muhammad Akbar Bhatti and 5 others; (PLD 1997 Lahore 177) a suit for specific performance was decreed by the learned trial Court and on appeal the appellate Court 'enlarged the time specified in the decree for deposit of the balance purchase price. An application was moved for extension of time -which was rejected by the trial Court. It was held as under-- "Where the trial Court has decreed the suit for specific performance of contract, subject to condition that purchase price shall be 'deposited in Court within a specific time and also ordered that if that money is not put in within that time, the suit shall stand dismissed, the Court has no power to extend the time as in such a case; that the decree by Court is final and self-operative and in case of default of payment of purchase price; the mandate of Court tantamounts to rescission of the contract. In such a case recourse to section 148 C.P.C. or section 151 of C.P.C. will not be permissible."
8. In case of Afajuddin Molla and others v. Abdur Rehman Sk. and another (PLD 1959 Dacca 454) a similar point arose and the learned Judge relied on the observations of Kekewitch-J: in Collinson v. Jeffery (1896) 1 Ch.' 644 which is reproduced:- "Therefore, believing the , slip to have been thoroughly honest, a view which is confirmed, not only by the affidavit of the plaintiff, Collin son himself, but by the affidavit of his solicitor, who says his client is a man of substance and could have paid when called upon I think I ought to relieve the applicant if I can. Mr. Lemon says I cannot, because the action is dead. If that is the right view, the matter is beyond my power. It appears to me, however, that this action is not dead---it is comatose; it is moribund: but a final stroke has been delivered, and, therefore, in my opinion, the application is properly made and the order asked for may be granted."
9. In the instant case the decree was final and self executing it was not moribund but already dead and no final stroke was required to effect death. In the words of Kekewitch-J. the 'final stroke' has already been delivered and the action was dead. The order became operative automatically and that took away the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court to entertain an application. In Shah Wali v.
10. Ghulam Din alias Gaman and another (PLD 1966 SC 983) at 1000 the Supreme Court observed as under:- "But this section (148 C.P.C.), it is now well-settled, does not apply where the period is fixed by a decree in a suit unless the decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court still retains seisin, over the action. The principle upon which it -has been so held is that since a decree normally puts an end to the suit the power of the Court to pass any other order with respect to that particular suit thereafter comes to an end and the Court becomes functus officio with regard thereto."
11. As obseryed above the decree was self-operative with the following words:- "The suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed".
12. The learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time. The learned lower Court rightly set aside the order and dismissed the application.
13. I see no reason to differ with the learned lower appellate Court. While exercising the power under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan a revisional order cannot be declared to be without lawful authority unless the same suffers from a jurisdictional defect. No such defect has been pointed out in the present case.
14. For what has been stated above this petition has no merit and is dismissed with no order as to costs.