' The above application, as also the appeal itself, has been pressed on the ground, inter alia, that the impugned judgment had not been typed and signed at the time of its pronouncement by the trial Court on 7-4-1977. On this question, statement of the Stenotypist of the trial Court was recorded and later comments from the learned Magistrate were also obtained. There is some discrepancy between the two because according to the Stenotypist, he had first . Typed a rough copy which was corrected by the Magistrate and, thereupon, he had typed three copies on the date of pronouncement of the judgment but "at late hours i. e. About 7 or 8 p. m.". He further stated that he had obtained the signature of the Magistrate on the corrected copy of the judgment at the Magistrate's house "at about 7 or 8 p. m. i. e. As soon as I had finished the typing." The learned Magistrate, on the other hand, says "So far as-1 remember I had got one copy of the judgment prepared which was signed by me at the time of its ' ' ' pronouncement in the open Court."
"I can submit with all certainty that the judgment was signed by me at the time of its pronouncement in the open Court."
' It is to be noted that the learned Magistrate has also commented that : "Due to rush of work the typist was directed to type out the fair and additional copies on the same day even if he had to work till late night."
' The record, however, does not contain any such copy of the judgment which can be said to have been typed earlier than its pronouncement. There are three copies of the judgment available, one of which forms the original judgment in the trial Court's record and the other two have been filed by the petitioners i. e. Annexure 'A' being the certified copy, and Annexure 'B' being an attested copy. All the the three copies are apparently form the same impression. This prima facie supports the statement of the Stenotypist that the original judgment signed by the learned Magistrate was one of the three impressions he had typed at 7/8 p, m. i. e. After pronouncement of the judgment.
2. In support of the contention that the judgment, in the circumstance, stands vitiated being in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 367, Cr. P. C. And not being curable under section 537, Cr. P. C., rulings reported in Amin Sharif v. Syeda Khanam and another (l) Abdus Sattar Howladar v. The State (2), Mahboob All v. Syed Qamar All etc. (3), Ghulam Mustafa v. The State (4) and Nisar Ahmad v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. And another have been referred to.
3. Learned counsel for the State is presently, unable to controvert but would like to argue at the time of hearing of the appeal. In the circumstance, I allow the application and suspend the sentences of the petitioners subject to their furnishing a bond in the sum of Rs. 7,000 (rupees seven thousand only) each with one surety in the like sum each to the satisfaction of the Assistant Commissioner/Duty Magistrate, Gujrat.
4. Copy dasti on payment of the usual charges.
5. The appeal be listed for hearing towards the end of October, 197. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1962 SC 97 (2) PLD 1964 Dacca 56
(3) 1969 P Cr. L J 641 (4) 1973 P Cr. L I 389 {{FOOT NOTE}}