' This is an application for bail filed by the petitioner who has been challaned in a murder case under F. I. R. No, 339/1975 dated 3-12-1975 registered with Police Station, Pattoki. The case has been registered on the report of one Muhammad. The allegations are that Hassan Din, the petitioner fired at complainant's son Bashir Ahmad who died on account of the pellets which hit him at the back of his head and neck. An application for bail earlier filed by the petitioner Criminal Miscellaneous No, 3728-B of 1977 was dismissed on 17-1-1978 for non-prosecution and non- compliance of the order of the Court.
2. The only ground now urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner for allowing bail to the petitioner was the delay in commencement of the trial. It was submitted that the case was registered on 3-12-1975 and already more than 2 years and 8 months have passed and the trial is not likely to commence in the near future. The report of the learned Sessions Judge, Kasur was called for which has been received. The learned Sessions Judge has reported that the trial of the case may take place in the first half of the next year. The learned counsel very vehemently argued that keeping the petitioner in jail, in these circumstances tantamounts to abuse of process of Court and law. In this regard he has placed reliance on Riyasat All v. State (1). Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel on a Division Bench judgment of this Court passed on 1-4-1978 in Criminal Miscellaneous No, 4555-B/1976.
3. On the contrary the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that delay per se is not a ground which entitles the petitioner to bail and that before considering the ground of delay, the Court has also to take into consideration the nature of allegations against the petitioner and the extent of his involvement prima fade. He submitted that if there be reasonable grounds to connect the accused with the crime of murder, delay alone should not entitle the accused to be released on bail. He distinguished the case of Rlyasat Ali from the case in hand and submitted that in the cited case the petitioner was involved only on account of circumstantial evidence whereas in the case in hand involvement of the accused is on the basis of ocular and direct evidence. He submitted that in the present case the crime has been committed in the broad daylight. He also urged that there is only one accused named in the F. I. R. And as such there is nothing prima fade even to show that the petitioner is not wanted to the crime. To support his contention that delay alone is not a ground for bail in cases punishable with death or life imprisonment he relied on Abdul Rahman and another v. The State (2), Khushi Muhammad v. The State (3), Naser Javaid v.
The State (4) and Burkhurdar v. Liyaqat and 2 others (5) to submit that the Supreme Court has considered the case of Riyasat All in this case and cancelled the bail allowed by the High Court on the ground of delay alone.
4. In so far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case of Riyasat Ali v. The State is concerned, it may be pertinently mentioned that the facts of the case are not applicable to the present case, in that in the present case there is direct ocular evidence of the murder which had been committed in the broad daylight and the petitioner is the only accused specifically named in the F. I. R.
5. That delay per se is no ground for bail in murder cases has been held in a recent pronouncement by a Full Bench of Supreme Court in the case Anwar Khan v. The State (6). In this case their Lordships of Supreme Court observed thus :- "It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was a delay of about 3 years and, therefore, the petitioner should be released on this ground. In our opinion, mere delay is no ground to grant bail. Under the present law, the committal proceedings have been abolished and murder cases are to be tried by Sessions Judge. There would be thus large number of cases pending in the Court and delay in these cases is likely to occur. In these circumstances, if accused persons are released on bail on this ground, it will have bad repercussions on the public."
' In the case of Riyasat All v. The State as well, their Lordships have observed that Supreme Court has generally taken the view that delay per se is not a ground for allowing bail. In Barkhurdur v.
Liyaqat All and 2 others, there was delay established, yet bail was cancelled which was allowed by the High Court on the premises of delay.
(1) PLD 1977 SC 480 (2) PLD 1977 Lah. 679
(3) 1978 P Cr. L J 198 (4) 1978 P Cr. L J 99
(5) P L.13 1977 SC 434 (6) 1978 SCMR 314
6. After a closer analysis of the various decisions on the subject of bail in cases which may entail sentence of death or imprisonment for life, I am of the view that if the factors for and against the grant of bail are evenly balanced, the consideration of delay in trial may operate to tilt the scale in favour of the accused, but delay per se short of the attendant circumstances of the case would not be sufficient ground.
7. Adverting to the instant case it hardly presents features warranting grant of bail to the petitioner and I am not inclined to allow bail to him. As a result, this application is dismissed.