MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J. - Through the institution of the present Constitutional petition, the petitioner has called in question Section 6(6) of the Banking Tribunal Ordinance, 1984 (since repealed) as well as the action of the respondent No. 3 in including the name of the respondent No. 2 in the Notification dated 5.8.1991 and the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent No. 1 with a prayer that the same may be declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the present writ petition are that the petitioner-company obtained 'a vehicle MAZDA wagon B-2000 from the respondent No. 2 at monthly rent of Rs. 9,500/- and consequent to that, a lease agreement was executed, It appears that the petitioner committed some default, and suit for recovery of Rs. 4,32,130/- was filed by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner before the then Banking Tribunal, who issued show-cause notice under Section 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, which was replied by the petitioner, thereby raising certain legal and factual pleas. By virtue of Notification, dated 5.8.1991, the name of respondent No. 2 was included in the schedule attached with the Banking Tribunals Ordinance. The petitioner appears to be aggrieved by the said notification of respondent No. 2 in the schedule attached to the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, which resulted in filing the present Constitutional petition.
3. According to the office report, P.C^, cards were issued to the respondents but nobody has entered appearance to represent the said respondents. Moreover, the name of the learned counsel of the respondents has duly been published in today's cause list, therefore, they are proceeded ex- parte.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent No. 2 does not fall within the definition of Banking and Banking Company as even in Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 and Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, therefore, it was precluded from filing a recovery suit against the petitioner and as a matter of fact a suit for specific performance should have been filed by the respondent No. 2. It has further been argued that in any case in view of dictum laid down in Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others (PLD 1996 Lahore 672) certain provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance have been declared unconstitutional, therefore, on this count too the assumption of jurisdiction by Banking Tribunal was not warranted under the law.
5. According to the case as set up by the petitioner in the writ petition, a lease agreement was executed between the parties and as the vehicle was leased out to the petitioner by the respondent No. 2, which is, admittedly a "leasing company," therefore, the then Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter. "Banking Company" has been defined in Section 2(a) which inter alia includes company specified in the Schedule. The definition of "Finance" as given in Section 2(e) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, includes a "lease" also. Section 13 of the afore-mentioned Ordinance provides that the Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, modify the Schedule so as to add any entry thereto or omit any entry therefrom.
The Federal Government in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 13 (ibid) has included the name of the respondent No. 2 at serial No. 18 of the Schedule attached to the Banking Tribunals Ordinance.
6. From the above narrative, it is evident that the Federal Government has the powers under Section 13 of Banking Companies Ordinance to add or omit any entry in the Schedule. The petitioner has failed to show that how the Federal Government has illegally exercised its powers. As noted above, the definition of "Finance" includes the "lease" and the respondent No. 2 is admittedly a "Banking Company". Section 6(1) of Ordinance, 1984 provides that where a customer commits a default in fulfilling any obligation to a Banking Company, the Banking Company may file a suit against such custom with Banking Tribunal, In exercise of those powers the respondent-company filed a suit for recovery against the petitioner, In view of this ho exception can be taken by the petitioner either with regard to the issuance of afore-mentioned notification or in respect of filing of the recovery suit against the petitioner by respondent No. 2.
7. As regards the next contention of the learned counsel, suffice it to say that according to the dictum laid down in Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others (PLD 1996 Lah. 672) certain provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance were struck down and notifications about the appointment of the Presiding Officers were quashed.
Subsequently Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was succeeded by Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 (XV of 1997), which repealed the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. According to Section 7(6) of Act XV of 1997, all proceedings pending before any Banking Tribunal under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance stood transferred or deemed to be transferred to the Banking Court, therefore, per force of the afore-said provision of law, the suit for recovery filed by the respondent-company which was pending before the erstwhile Tribunal also stood transferee/deemed to be transferred to the newly-constituted Banking Court established under Act XV of 1997. On 30.8.2001, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)
Ordinance, 2001 (XLV1 of 2001) was promulgated and per force of Section 29 of Ordinance, 2001, repealed Act XV of 1997. However, according to Section 7(6) of the latest Ordinance all the proceedings pending in any Banking Court including a suit for recovery shall stand transferred or deemed to be transferred and heard by the Banking Court established under the latest Ordinance.
Now the afore-noted suit for recovery shall be deemed to be transferred and pending for disposal before the Banking Court newly-established under Section 5 of Ordinance, 2001 (XLV1 of 2001).
8. In view of the above reasons and conclusions, the writ petition is devoid of merits, thus, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs. The result would be that the suit, titled "Pakistan Industrial Leasing Corporation Limited v. Extraction (Pakistan) Limited", for recovery of Rs. 4,32,130/- shall now be deemed to be pending before the Banking Court constituted under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, who shall decide the same after hearing the parties and of course, in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Administrative Banking Judge, Lahore on 30.10.2001, for the entrustment of the case to any Banking Court according to its own administrative arrangement.
9. Before parting with the judgment, it may be observed that as the suit for recovery was filed in the year 1995, and the same is still pending on account of injunctive order issued by this Court, on 27.9.1995, therefore, the Banking Court, on 27.9.1995, therefore, the Banking Court is directed to decide the case as ordered above preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order.