' The petitioner, by this revision petition, has called in question the propriety of the order dated 19- 6-76, whereby the learned District Judge, Lahore, while dismissing the petitioner's appeal in limine, rejected the plaint under rule 11(a) of Order VII, C. P. C.
2. Muhammad Haroon, an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority, respondent No, 2 came up with a civil suit for a declaration and perpetual injunction that the order placing him under suspension was illegal, malicious and in effective. The respondents contested the suit and objected to the jurisdiction of civil Court to entertain it. They also contended the at the plaintiff- petitioner had no cause of action to file the suit.
3. The trial Court found that the petitioner was a civil servant and was governed by the provisions of the Services Tribunal Act (LXX of 1973) and the order of petitioner's suspension was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Services Tribunal. As a result of that finding the plaint was returned to the petitioner under rule 10 of Order VII, C. P. C for presentation to the proper forum.
4. The petitioner went in appeal and the learned District Judge, was of a different view. He held that the suspension order was not a final order so as to attract the provisions of section 4 of the Act, therefore, the civil Court had jurisdiction, but it was observed that the circular letter dated 4-5-68 relied upon by the petitioner conferred discretion on the authority, to order suspension of their employees, and it was not shown that defendant/ respondents were under any rule or law debarred from placing the petitioner under suspension. The plaint was held to have disclosed no cause of action and it was, therefore, rejected, therefore, this appeal.
5. The learned District Judge, referred to the concluding lines of para. 2 of the circular letter dated 4-5-1968 and remarked that "ordinarily" in cases pertaining to Police and Anti-Corruption Department suspension should not be ordered unless charges have been framed by the trying Court against the employees which involve a serious moral turpitude. It was stated at the Bar that the case against the petitioner under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) and section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947) were nearing completion by the criminal Court. It would show that in such circumstances the suspension of the petitioner was not barred by any provision of law, The learned District Judge, was justified in holding that the petitioner had no matter to agitate before the civil Court and the plaint was, therefore, rightly rejected.
6. It may not be out of place to mention that mere suspension from service is not a penalty giving a cause of action to an employee to approach a civil Court for a redress. In Mian Muhammad Hayat v. Province of West Pakistan (1) the diminution of remuneration was not regarded as sufficient to constitute an order of suspension as a penalty, for the simple reason that it is provided by the rules of the services which every public employee accepts that in the event of suspension his remuneration shall be at such a level. It was held that it is within the responsibilities of the executive in respect of the public services, namely, to maintain their standards by ensuring that there are no black sheep among them, and at the same time to maintain the efficiency of the public services and the confidence of the public in those services by eliminating persons whose conduct has tended to lower standards below those required, that there should be a power to ensure the temporary severance of a member of a public service whose conduct has been such as to demand an enquiry, from the discharge of his functions, until the enquiry has been completed. It was laid down that the executive authority acts within the pleasure of the Governor, when it suspends a public employee from the discharge of the duties of his office, pending an enquiry into his actions.
7. This being the position the order suspending an employee is of a temporary phase and cannot be termed to affect the terms and conditions of his service, therefore it would give no cause of action to the suspender. In A the present case the petitioner's suspension from service was not a penalty and no cause of action has accrued to him to challenge it in a Court of law.
For the reasons, I see no ground to interfere with what the learned District Judge has found. There is no force in the revision petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed with costs.