' This judgment shall decide Writ Petitions 23229, 23193, 23194, 23195, 23196, 23499, 23500, 23506, 22585, 22586 and 23283/2000. All the petitioners in these cases are engaged in the business of Travel Agents and are registered under Travel Agents Rules, 1977. Under section 2(2) of Punjab Finance Act, 1997, Stamp Act, 1899 was amended and, inter alia, following Article was added in the Schedule Ito the said Act 11-A Air Tickets by any Air Lines; (i) for Domestic Flight. Twenty five rupees per Ticket; (ii) for International Flights Two hundred fifty rupees per Ticket. The effect of the said amendment in the Schedule read with section 3 of the Stamp Act was that duty at the said prescribed rate became chargeable on an Air Ticket issued by any Air Lines. The said Stamp duty was later withdrawn vide Notification, dated 2-8-2000 issued by the Governor of Punjab.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Provincial Government had no authority to impose the said duty upon Air Tickets as it is only the Federal Government which was the authority to impose such duty as the matter falls within the ambit of the Federal Legislative List. Particularly refers to the Item 22 and Item 24 of the said list in 4th Schedule to the Constitution. Also contends that with reference to the provisions of section 3 of the Stamp Act, 1899 that Air Tickets cannot be deemed an instrument as defined in section 2(14) of the said Act and since it is only an instrument that is chargeable with duty, no duty can be charged on an Air Ticket.
3. Mr. Naseem Sabir, Additional Advocate-General` on the other hand states that the debate as to whether or not Provincial Government was competent to impose and charge the said duty would be rather academic as the duty stands withdrawn w,e,f, 2-8--2000. Learned Additional Advocate- General contends that in order to recover the said duty Governor of the Punjab made Punjab Specified instrument Stamp Rules, 1997 and under rule 4 it was provided that duty on an Air Ticket shall be paid in cash and for this purpose the person issuing an Air Ticket shall be authorized person for receiving on behalf of the Government of Punjab the payment of duty in cash. The precise contention is that petitioners in these cases had been issuing Tickets and collecting stamp duty in cash but have not deposited the same in the account of the Government of the Punjab.
They have been issued notices to present records and particulars of the collection and consequent payment of duty recovered by them.
4. I have gone through the writ petitions and comments filed by the 'respondents in the light of respective submissions of the learned counsel. I find that all these writ petitions were filed at a point of time when the said duty had already been withdrawn. The said contention of the learned , counsel for the petitioners do appear to carry weight with reference to the competency of the Provincial Government to impose duty. However, this duty which was imposed by Provincial Government was to be recovered by none else than the petitioners themselves by virtue of the said Punjab Specified Instrument Stamp Rules, 1997. I have already stated above that under rule 4(1) and (2) of the said Rules the duty was to be paid in cash and was to be received on behalf of the Provincial Government by the persons issuing the Air Tickets i,e, petitioners in the present cases. I have carefully examined the writ petitions and I do not find even a slight suggestion in the same that the petitioners had not recovered the duty on the tickets issued by them. Even learned counsel for the petitioners, when confronted, he is not in a position to come up with denial of the fact that the petitioners had been recovering the duty on behalf of the Provincial Government. This being so rule 4(3) of the said Rules require the petitioners to indicate the payment of the duty upon its receipt on the Air Ticket by affixing a stamp on it which was to be got prepared by them and signed the same. This stamping .And signing was to be deemed to be acknowledgement of receipt of payment. Rule 4(4) mandated the petitioners to deposit the amount received by them immediately under the relevant head of account. There is no plea in the writ petitions and learned counsel is unable to state that the amount was deposited after its receipt. This is, therefore, clearly the case of Jackal telling the sheep that it is dirtying the water. The petitioners themselves acted as agents of Provincial Government in the matter of receipt of the said duty on the Air Ticket issued by them. They have been called upon by the Provincial Government to present the records and deposit the amount received by them on account of the said duty. To my mind, under no principle of law or equity the petitioners can call upon this Court to restrain the Provincial Government from recovering the said amount received, by them.
5. I find that the present cases are akin to the observations made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of M/s. Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCM R 1652. In the said case the apex Court did hold that several appellants before it (Sugar Mills) were entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty on the production of sugar in excess of average production, notwithstanding the withdrawal of exemption by a subsequent notification. However, it was observed that in case the said appellants had passed on the additional burden of the Excise duty after the withdrawal of Notification they would not be entitled to the same by pressing into service the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It was further observed that it will be inequitable to deprive the State of excise duty on the excess quantity of sugar, the burden whereof stands passed on. The present case stands on rather better footing inasmuch as the case of Provincial Government to recover the said duty, 'received by the petitioners, is concerned. As in the present cases it is the petitioners who received the stamp duty in cash on the Air Tickets issued by them. I, therefore, do not find any case being made out for exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction particularly when it is glaring on the face of record that the very purpose of these writ petitions is retention of ill-gotten gains and this Court would never exercise writ jurisdiction in such-like matters. All these writ petitions are dismissed with costs.