1. 1-2. In view of the order to be passed hereinafter no order is necessary on these applications.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer/Collector, Khairpur (appellant herein) has filed this appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 primarily against the order, dated 9-10-1995 passed by the learned District Judge, Khairpur in Land Acquisition Application No,1 of 1992, determining the compensation payable to the respondents. Order, dated 7-4-1996 rectifying his previous order wherein he had omitted to award 15% compulsory acquisition charges under section 23(2) and interest at the rate of 8% under section 34 of the Act. He has also impugned the order, dated 11-10- 1999 passed in Execution No,5 of 1990 restraining the Assistant Commissioner from withdrawing or transferring an amount of Rs,56,87,918 from Revenue Deposit Head of Account from the Government Treasury or any bank and thereafter order, dated 31-8-2000 increasing the decretal amount to Rs,90,12,731 pursuant to order, dated 7-4-1996 passed in Land Acquisition Application No,1 of 1992. The appeal was filed on 2-2-2001 after expiry of more than five (5) years of passing of the impugned orders. The Appellate Branch objected to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation, in response to which the counsel for the appellant requested the Writ Branch that the question of limitation be placed before the Court for decision.
2. ' Mr. Ghulam Dastagir Shahani, learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh, for appellant submitted that the objection of limitation would not apply in the present case as both the first order, dated 9-10-1995 determining the compensation and the second order, dated 7-4-1996 rectifying the earlier order are void ab initio. He vehemently argued for more than one hour that the orders of the learned District Judge in not specifying the date, of deposit by the Land Acquisition Officer in the two impugned orders makes them void and referred to PLD 1964 SC 97 and PLD 1977 SC 599 in support of his contention. He added that because the law of limitation does not apply to void orders, the appeal should be admitted for regular hearing by this Court as it is a first appeal against the order of the Trial Court which is normally admitted as of right.
3. ' On perusal of the order, dated 9-10-1995 passed by the District Judge determining the compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it appears that the learned District Judge omitted/overlooked to pass an order with regard to payment of Compulsory Acquisition Charges at 15% on the market value of the land under section 22(3) and interest thereon under section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Consequently, the plaintiff (respondents herein) filed an application under sections 114, 151, 152 and 153, C.P.C. And Order 47, rule 1, C.P.C.
4. Requesting the Court to pass an order for granting payment of compensation for compulsory acquisition and interest as admissible in law which had not been included in the Court order, dated 9-10-1995 due to bona fide omission. The learned District Judge after hearing the parties and perusing the record allowed the application by order, dated 7-4-1996 and observed as follows:-- "In view of the above submissions made by the Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties it is concluded that the perusal of the notification, dated 11th April, 1991 by which the land of the applicants was acquired show that the land has compulsorily been acquired and the applicants are entitled to be paid 15% of the price of the disputed land as consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The applicants are also entitled to the interest on the consideration as provided under section 34 of the Act. The applicants should also be paid interest at the rate of Rs,8% under amended section 34 of the Act on the amount of the award determined by this Court from the date of taking possession of the land i,e, 11th April, 1991 till the amount of compensation is paid or deposited. Application above said stands disposed of accordingly. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to revise the Award in view of the above said order." (Underling is added)
5. ' To appreciate the arguments of the learned Additional Advocate-General, it would be proper to refer to section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as it stood originally, after the West Pakistan Amendment of 1969 and finally after Sindh Amendment of 1971. The original section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was in the following terms:- "34. When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited."
6. ' After amendment by Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1969 section 34 read as follows:-- "34 Payment of interest.--- When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with compound interest thereon at the rate of eight per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited: ' Provided that any waiver of the above right by the landowner shall be void and he shall be entitled to the said interest notwithstanding and agreement to the contrary."
7. ' In 1971 the Land Revenue Act, 1894 was again amended vide Sindh Ordinance VI of 1971 as follows:- - "1. Short title.--- This Ordinance may be called the Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment)
8. (Repeal) Ordinance, 1971.
2. Repeal of West Pakistan Act III of 1969. --- The Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1969, is hereby repealed and shall be deemed never to have been enacted, and the amendments effected thereby in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act I of 1894), shall be deemed never to have been effected.
3. Payment of interest on compensation.--- Where a Court has directed payment of interest on any amount of compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act I of 1894) at a rate exceeding six per centum simple interest per annum interest shall be payable on cash amount notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Court, at six per centum simple interest."
9. ' Consequently, after the above amendment all amendments made in the Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1969 stood repealed and a new section (section 3 above) was added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for application in the Province of Sindh.
10. ' The argument of the learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh is that the order of the learned District Judge is void because it does not mention the date on which the amount of compensation was deposited by the concerned department with the Collector. He asserted with great force that section 34 requires the Collector to pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the time of taking possession until it is so paid or deposited and if the date of payment or deposit of the amount by the Collector is not specifically mentioned or stated in the Award or the order of the trial Court. The order of payment of interest under section 34 is incapable of implementation. And therefore, void. The learned Additional Advocate General did not elaborate the meaning of the term "void's. The Court itself will, therefore, have to undertake this exercise. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. (1990) the term "void" is defined as "having no legal force or binding effect, unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended, incapable of being enforced by law". Corpus Juries Secondo, Vol. 92 at pp.1021 to 1022 defines "void" as follows:-- "The word 'void' may be used in what is variously referred to as its literal, absolute, primary, precise, strict, and strictly accurate sense, and in this sense it means absolutely null; null and incapable of confirmation or ratification; of no effect and incapable of confirmation; of no force and effect; having no legal force or binding effect, having no legal or binding force; incapable of being enforced by law; of no legal force or effect whatever; that which has no force and effect; without legal efficacy, without vitality or legal effect; ineffectual; nugatory; unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended." (emphasis added).
11. ' According to Lahore High Court, a void order is one which is passed by an authority either lacking jurisdiction or was made in complete disregard of the mandatory provisions of law. Zahoor Ahmed v. Mahmood Ali and another PLD 1977 Lah. 1377, (1382). The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Muhammad Fazil PLD 1975 SC 331, (339) while discussing the meaning of the term "void" observed:-- "An order is to be treated as void only when it is made by a Court, Tribunal, or other authority, which had no jurisdiction either as regards the subject-matter, the pecuniary value or the territorial limits where the dispute arose. Such an order would amount to a usurpation of power unwarranted by law, and accordingly it would be a nullity.
12. ' If, on the other hand, an order is made by a Court or authority having the necessary jurisdiction, it is not an order void ab initio, but an order which may be set aside on sufficient cause being shown in this behalf."
13. ' Further, in the case of Tamizuddin Ahmed v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1964 Dacca 795, (812), Honourable High Court observed as follows:-- "The meaning of word 'void' is null and void, ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect; unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; nugatory and ineffectual so that nothing can cure it; not valid." (emphasis added).
14. ' Later in the case of Conforce Ltd. v. Syed Ali Shah PLD 1977 SC 599 at 604, the Honourable Supreme Court observed:-- "And, further, the expressions void orders and orders without jurisdiction are overworked expressions. No doubt they are relevant in some contexts but as suggested by Lord Reid in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and others (1969) 2 AC 147 it would be better to use these expressions in the narrow and original sense of the lack of competence of the Court or the Tribunal to enter on the enquiry in question." (underlining added).
15. In light of the definition given in various law dictionaries and judgments of the superior Courts referred to above, the meaning of the term "void order" may be summarized as follows:-- "A void order" is an order:
(i) which has no legal force or binding effect; or
(ii) which is not capable of being enforced by law; or
(iii) unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended; Or
(iv) an order passed by a Court or Tribunal which lacks competence; or
(v) ineffectual so that nothing can cure it."
16. ' It is an admitted position, that under section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act the Court is required to award the market value of the land calculated in the manner described therein and under subsection (2) thereof award a further sum of 15% on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition if the acquisition has been made for a public purpose. Under section 34 as it stands, the Collector is required to pay interest on the amount of compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act at the rate of 6% per annum from the time of taking possession of the land until the compensation has been paid or deposited by the beneficiary of the land acquisition with the Collector. It cannot be denied that while determining the award the District Judge inadvertently omitted to include these two payments which he was required to do under the law. The inadvertent omission of the District Judge in doing his duty was apparent on the face of record. It could be rectified in appeal or by filing an application under the appropriate provision of the Civil Procedure Code which contains several provisions enabling the Court to review orders, rectify mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the judgment or order and pass such other orders which, it may deem fit in the interest of justice. Under section 114 read with Order 47, rule 1 any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree, order or decision on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may apply for a review of the judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. Section 151, C.P:C. Declares in very clear terms that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Under section 152 clerical or arithmetical errors in judgments or orders arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. Section 153 empowers the Court to amend at any time any defect or error in any proceedings in a suit for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceedings.
17. The defect/omission/error which crept in the impugned judgment/order does not fall either within the purview of section 152, C.P.C. As there was no clerical or arithmetical mistake in the judgment or order or under section 153, C.P.C. As there was no defect or error in the proceedings. However, the defect/omission/error in the judgment/ order would fall under section 114, C.P.C. As it was apparent from the face of the record that the Court had overlooked the relevant applicable provision and made the mistake of not awarding Compulsory Acquisition Charge under section 22(3) and interest under section 34 of the Land Revenue Act. The Court could also exercise power under section 151, C.P.C. To remove the defect, rectify the error or fill in the omission under its inherent power to do justice between the parties. It appears that the Court corrected the mistake/filled in the omission it had made in its original judgment/order by exercising its power under section 114 and/or section 151, C.P.C.
18. ' The learned Additional Advocate-General did not urge that the District Judge did not have the power or jurisdiction to rectify the error. His main attack was that because the District Judge in his initial order did not include payment of Compulsory Acquisition Charge of 15% payable under section 22(3) and 6% interest payable under section 34 from the date of taking possession until it had been so paid or, deposited by the Collector is void because the omission/error made in the award was so fundamental that it could not be filled or rectified by the District Judge at all. In other words the order in its original form was an order void ab initio and could not be corrected or rectified by him at any time thereafter. I am afraid it cannot be argued that because the learned District Judge inadvertently omitted to specify the compulsory Acquisition Charge, the date of taking possession of the property and the date of payment of the market value of the land by the Collector makes it void as initio. In its unamended or uncertified state the impugned judgment or the order cannot under any principle of law be termed as without force or binding effect or incapable of being enforced. It supports the purpose for which it had been passed except that it did not provide the full benefit which defect could be cured by taking action under section 114 and or section 151, C.P.C. Further, it cannot be disputed that it was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In my opinion, it was a simple omission by oversight of the District Judge which could be filled in, corrected, cured or rectified at any time. The omission of the District Judge in not mentioning the two dates cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as one which cannot be corrected or one that makes the order absolutely void. It also cannot be argued that without inclusion of payment of interest under section 34 the award given by the District Judge could not be enforced or that the District Judge lacked the competence to correct his inadvertent omission.
19. I have given serious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh and am of the opinion that there was no illegality if the learned District Judge omitted or overlooked to mention the date of the deposit by the concerned Department because it can always be obtained or ascertained from the Collector.
20. However, on perusal of the impugned order, dated 7-4-1996 it appears that the District Judge committed a mistake when it ordered payment of interest at the rate of Rs,8 per cent under section 34 of the Act. The amendment made by West Pakistan Act III of 1969 have been withdrawn. Further the newly-added section 3 by the Sindh Amendment of 1971 also clearly states that the interest payable on the compensation shall not be in excess of simple six per centum per annum.
21. Therefore, under the present law the .District Judge was competent to award simple interest at the rate of 6 per centum only. The Award to the extent of ordering payment of interest at 8% under the alleged amended section 34 of the Act on the amount of the Award is incorrect as the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 made by the West Pakistan Act III of 1969 was withdrawn by the Sindh Ordinance VI of 1971. Exercising powers under sections 114 and 151 C.P.C. The Award is accordingly amended and it is ordered that the respondents shall be entitled to payment of simple interest on the award at the rate of six per centum only.
22. In view of the above discussion, I am of the confirmed opinion that the impugned order, dated 9- 10-1995 read with rectification order, dated 7-4-1996 cannot be termed as void by any stretch of imagination. The arguments of the learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh are accordingly rejected and it is held that the appeal filed by the appellant on 2-2-2001 against the impugned orders, dated 9-10-1995 and 7-4-1996 respectively are hopelessly barred by limitation. It is accordingly dismissed along with the listed application subject to the amendment stated above.
23. After hearing the arguments of learned Additional Advocate-General researching the law and the conclusion reached, it is crystal clear that the grounds advanced by the learned Additional Advocate-General were, prima facie, vexatious to the knowledge of the appellant as he had neither researched the law, advanced any cogent argument nor cited any law in support thereof. He wasted the precious time of the Court which could have been utilized, fruitfully in the administration of justice in other cases. The appellant shall 'consequently pay compensatory costs of Rs,10,000 to the respondents.