' CH. MUHAMAMD ARIF, J.---The background, in which this appeal by leave of the Court has arisen against judgment dated 17-7-1995 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal dismissing in limine appellant's Appeal No,189-R of 1995 before it holding that the same was hopelessly time-barred, is that the appellant ex-Constable/Driver (No,279) having been appointed as such in the Special Branch of Islamabad Police in May, 1985 was proceeded against under the Police (Efficiency and Discipline) (E&D) Rules, 1975, hereinafter referred to the rules, for having tried to molest Mst. Ghulam Zohra, a Lady Constable in or around July, 1989. The matter was allegedly inquired into by the Line Officer who found no substance in the allegations. Mst. Ghulam Zohra succeeded in obtaining an order for another inquiry in the case through Miss Nighat Warraich, Lady Inspector Police, Special Branch, Islamabad who was of the view that the appellant should be awarded punishment under the Rules. Accordingly, the appellant was charge-sheeted on 26-8-1989 as below:-- ' He took Lady Constable to his house situated in Dhoke Chiragh Din Rawalpndi instead of taking her to the Islamabad Airport. He tried to outrage/molest the modesty of Lady Constable but on her hue and cry and when the women from the adjoining houses peeped into his house, he took her out of the house and dropped her at Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi.
"(ii) He took official Pick-up No,IDP-1155 to Rawalpindi without any authority/orders of the officers hence misused the official vehicle.
"(iii) He made wrong entries in the Daily Diary Register and also in the log book of the vehicle in the official capacity."
' The appellant refuted the charges against him but the then Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Islamabad, vide order dated 4-11-1989, dismissed him from service.
2. Remaining unsuccessful in his departmental appeal to the Inspector-General of Police, Federal Area, Islamabad vide latter's order dated 3-4-1990, the appellant submitted, what he terms as a review petition, to the Minister for Interior, Government of Pakistan. His case was that the Ministry of Interior, informed him vide their Office Memo. No,13/10/94-ICT, dated 21st March, 1995 that it has not been found possible to accede to the request of the appellant for his reinstatement. Further, he preferred Appeal No,189-R of 1995 before the Tribunal and on the Tribunal dismissing his said appeal in limine through the impugned judgment dated 17-7-1995, he obtained leave to appeal there against in the following terms: "Leave is granted in the above case to consider whether Federal Service Tribunal was justified in dismissing service appeal of the petitioner against the order dated 21-3-1995 which was admittedly within time from the date of this order on the ground that his earlier appeal against the final order of the departmental authority filed before the Tribunal was barred by limitation when the Tribunal itself had permitted to withdrawal of the earlier appeal filed by the petitioner with the observation that he will be at liberty to approach the Tribunal once again after the receipt of final reply from the authorities on his representation, and the second appeal filed by him was within time from the date of last order."
3. It was ground (a) (at page 8 of the paper-book) that the appellant had made a reference to the disposal of his earlier Appeal No,464 (R) of 1994, as under:-- "(a) That an earlier Appeal No,464-R of 1994 filed by and on behalf of the petitioner was disposed of vide order, dated the 27th November, 1994 as under:-- ' "The appellant has submitted an application for adjournment on the ground that he is expecting some final reply to his appeal to the Interior Minister. The appellant further requested that he may be allowed to approach this Tribunal afresh on receipt of final reply from the Interior Ministry. He, however, wants to withdraw this appeal. We, therefore, dispose of this appeal as having been withdrawn and the appellant is allowed to approach this Tribunal on receipt of ' final order, if so desired' ."
' "The Appeal No,189-R of 1995 as such was maintainable against the final order of the Interior Ministry, dated the 21st March, 1995 and the Hon'ble Tribunal has erred in holding that departmental appeal having already been decided by the appellate authority no way can extend the period of limitation which has expired much earlier even before filing of the previous Appeal 464-R of 1994."
4. Mr. Sheikh Riaz-ul-Haq, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing in support of this appeal, has referred to Israr Ahmed Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. And others (1990 SCM R 1356) to contend that appellant's representation by way of review was duly entertained by authority and the same was rejected on merits and that the second representation having been dealt with as above, the Tribunal was not justified in holding the appellant guilty of approaching the Tribunal beyond time. According to him, the precedent afore-referred supports the case of the appellant and the matter requires to be remitted back to the Tribunal for the purposes of decision of the appeal afresh.
5. Mr. Maulvi Anwar-ul-Haq, learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan appearing on behalf of the respondents, has vehemently contended that the appellant's first appeal before the Tribunal, against order dated 3-4-1990, was filed on 26-10-1994 and was beyond time by years at an end.
The withdrawal of appellant's Appeal No,464 of 1994-R on 27-11-1994 was a mala fide attempt on his part of resurrect the entire matter all over again. He has referred to Malak Muhammad Khan v.
Inspector-General of Police and others (1992 SCM R 1136) and Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and another (1998 SCM R 882) to contend that the mechanizations of the appellant should not be crowned with success and as the original representation was admittedly barred by time, the subsequent alleged disposal of an incompetent representation/appeal/review at the Departmental level could not create a fresh cause of action in his favour and Opt too by being equated with automatic condonation of delay in the matter of availing the remedy under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act (No, LXX of 1973).
6. We have considered the arguments addressed at the bar in juxtaposition with the material available on the record. We find lot of support from the precedents cited at the bar by the learned Law Officer claiming to non-suit the appellant on the ground that he had voluntarily withdrawn his earlier Appeal No,464 of 1994 which suffered from inordinate delay of about 4 years. Even the permission granted to him by the Tribunal to approach it all over again after receipt of ' final order, if so...' cannot be equated with making his subsequent Appeal No,189-R of 1995 being within time. It is not denied that the original order of penalty is dated 4-11-1989. Same is the position with regard to the order passed thereon by the Appellate Authority on 3-4-1990. The latter order was the final order and was rightly challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal in October-1994 (in Appeal No,464-R of 1994). As already held above, the earlier appeal of the appellant was competent but beyond time by years. The intervening efforts of the appellant in obtaining the disposal of his Appeal No,464-R of 1994 and linking his subsequent incompetent review/representation with Appeal (No,189-R of 1995), cannot but be treated as of no avail to the appellant. The Tribunal has not been shown to be in error in holding that subsequent application/representation etc. To the Authorities other than the Appellate Authority will not extend the period of limitation. "..The application/representation made to the Interior Minister was an extra-departmental appeal departmental appeal having already been decided by the Appellant Authority --and in no way can extend the period of limitation which had expired much earlier even before filing of previous Appeal (No,646-R of 1994)." (Underlining is for emphasis).
7. It may also be noticed that the petition for leave to appeal in this case was beyond time by 13 days and no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming in relation to that facet of the matter as well.
8. For all that has gone before, the instant appeal is sans merit and is liable to be dismissed with no order as to costs. So, be it.