' By registered sale deed dated 17-6-1967 Mst. Noor Jehan sold some agricultural land to the appellants. On 15-6-1968 the respondent instituted the present suit to pre-empt the sale. On the same date the trial Court called upon the respondent to deposit the Zar-i-Punjam in the sum of Rs, 7,650 by 2-9-1968. On 17-6-1968 the respondent made an application praying that instead of making the deposit in cash he should be permitted to furnish security. This application was allowed by the trial Court on 24-6-1968. On 24-7-1968 the respondent furnished a surety bond in the sum of Rs, 7,650. The subsequent proceedings taken by the trial Court are not relevant for the disposal of this appeal. Suffice it to say, that on 22-9-1969 the trial Court closed the evidence of the appellants and decreed the suit of the respondent. The appellants preferred an appeal before the District Judge who thought that the learned trial Court was not justified in closing their evidence.
Accordingly, he set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and remanded the suit for fresh decision.
2. The only point raised in this F. A.
0. Is that the security furnished by the respondent was not in accordance with law and as such his plaint ought to have been rejected by the trial Court in accordance with the provisions of section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. It is to be noticed that section 22 (1) of the Pre-emption Act lays down that in every suit for pre-emption the Court shall at, or at any time before the settlement of issues require the plaintiff to deposit in Court such sum as does not, in the opinion of the Court, exceed one-fifth of the probable value of the land or property or require the plaintiff to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment, if required, of a sum not exceeding such probable value within such time as the Court may fix in such order. According to the learned counsel for the appellants this subsection is in two parts. The first part deals with the cash deposit and the second part deals with the furnishing of security ; so far as the first part is concerned an intending pre-emptor cannot be called upon to deposit more than 15th part of the probable value of the property ; but the learned counsel argues, if the Court chooses to act under the second part then it is obligatory upon it to direct the pre-emptor to furnish security for the whole of the probable value of the property he is seeking to acquire. It is difficult to agree with the learned counsel. As I read subsection (1) I find that it merely fixes the maximum amount for which the security can be asked to be furnished and subject to this limitation the Court has a fairly wide discretion in specifying the amount for the purpose.
3. In this appeal there is one difficulty. The order by which the respondent was called upon to furnish security has become undecipherable; it was described on the margin of the application made by the respondent in this regard and the writing has. Been erased by the frequent handling of the file. The parties are not agreed with regard to the amount which the trial Court had specified for the purpose of the security. According to the respondent the security was to be furnished to the extent of the Zar-e-Punjam. On the other hand the appellant's version is that the trial Court had directed that the security should be in the amount which represented the probable value of the property in dispute. After some arguments the parties agreed that I should make another order under section 22(2) of the Pre-emption Act with regard to the amount of security and that this amount should be the same which the appellants had paid to the vendor before the Sub-Registrar.
I find from the endorsement of the Sub-Registrar that the appellants had paid a sum of Rs, 38,250 before him. Accordingly I direct that the respondent should furnish security in the sum of Rs, 38,250 to the satisfaction of the trial Court within two months from today. The learned trial Court should dispose of the suit within six months. Costs in this appeal shall abide by the final event.