' MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN (MEMBER).---Arguments have been heard and record perused.
2. All the aforesaid appeals are disposed of by a single judgment, all having and containing identical legal points and the judgment is being recorded in Appeal No,40(R) of 1999:
3. The appellant felt aggrieved by an order, dated 22-8-1997 whereby he was retired from service on completion of 25 years' service. Feeling aggrieved therefrom he filed a departmental appeal on 20-9-1997 which was rejected on 14-10-1997 and thereafter filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawlapindi, which was heard and disposed of on 5-11-1998 and after that the present service appeal was filed before this Tribunal on 15-1-1999.
4. A perusal of the parawise comments indicates that a serious objection regarding limitation has been raised. Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan clearly ousts the jurisdiction of all the Civil Courts, including the High Court and has conferred exclusive jurisdiction to this Tribunal on the matters relating to the terms and conditions of the servants and in this respect reliance is placed on the following authorities:- "(i) 1998 SCMR 2280;
(ii) 1992 PLC (C.S.) 1020;
(iii) 1999 SCMR 784."
' An authority having been declared incompetent under the law (Article 212 of the Constitution) cannot adjudicate upon the service matters for which the competent forum is this Tribunal. The relevant law, in the present appeals, has not been pressed into service which requires that a civil servant feeling aggrieved from any impugned order must file a departmental appeal to the competent authority within the requisite period of limitation and after waiting for 90 days, can invoke the provisions of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, but after the appeal has been responded/rejected in that event the appellant is required to file the service appeal within 30 days before this Tribunal but it is not the case in the instant appeals for the reason that the appellants did not follow the relevant law contained in Habib Bank Limited Staff Service Rules, 1981. Rule 40(4)
(d) provides a period of 3 months for this purpose but in the instant appeals the departmental appeals were filed on the dates noted against each of the following appeals:-{{TABLE}}
1. Appeal No,40(R)/99 20-9-1997
2. Appeal No,112(R)/99 20-9-1997 1116 CIVIL SERVICES 2002 Appeal No,146(R)/99 26-8-1997 Appeal No,270(R)/99 20-8-1997 Appeal No .271(R)/99 20-9-1997 Appeal No .359(R)/99 20-9-1997 Appeal No .360(R)/99 20-9.-1997 Appeal No .361(R)/99 20-9-1997 Appeal No,362(R)/99 20-9-1997 ' Thereafter the appellants filed writ petitions instead of coming directly to this Tribunal, as required under the law, and as such the appellant appears to have not only violated the legal obligation/formalities under the law but also wasted much time, energy and money in litigations before incompetent forum (i,e, High Court). It has been held in PLD 1976 SC 1995 that abatement is suo motu under the operation of law and it requires no declaration for abatement from any Court of law. It is further to observe that under section 2-A the appellants had become civil servants with effect, from 10th June, 1997 under the Service Tribunals Amendment Act No,XVII of 1997.
5. One of the most important authority is contained in 1999 PLC (C.S.) Karachi 67 wherein it has been held that limitation runs from the date of enforcement of new law (i,e, section 2-A, Act XVII of 1997). In this respect reliance is also placed on 1980 SCMR 443. Earlier a writ petition was dismissed by the Honourable High Court, Karachi, but on appeal the matter was remanded to the High Court by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan and the writ petition was again dismissed by the High Court as per the decision/judgment contained in 1998 PLC (C. S.) Karachi 220. The Honourable Supreme Court while placing reliance on the case reported as 1999 SCMR 92 (decided on 31-3- 1998) has held in the case reported as 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1078 that Service Tribunal is the competent forum in service matters and not the High Court and so much so that a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan does not lie and that the effect of section 2-A was retrospective and not prospective. Again the same principle has been enunciated in the case of K.K. Afridi v. PIAC (1998 SCMR 2607).
6. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has also held in the under mentioned authorities that litigation undergone before incompetent fora is not legally condoned:--
(i) PLD 1983 SC 385; (ii) 1975 SCMR 259; (iii) 1985 SCMR 333 & 890; (iv)1991 SCMR 1841 and (v) 1997 SCMR 1167.
' So much so that the condonation is not made even if it is due to wrong advice tendered by an Advocate for the obvious reason that the Courts have to maintain the rule of law in the ends of justice.
7. It is further to observe that limitation always remains an important point in the legal system against which no compromise is legally possible due to the well-known maxims:- "(a) delay defeats equity;
(b) time and tide wait for none;
(c) law helps the vigilant and not the indolent" ' which usually hurdle a litigant in a Court of law. Judges are supposed to act judicially without tilting towards one party against another for maintaining the rule of law and scales of justice. It has also been held in 1999 PLC (C.S.) 25 that:-- "law helps the diligent and not the indolent" as a result of which the appeal was dismissed.
7. It has also been held in the under-mentioned authorities that each day's delay must be adequately and legally explained for seeking the condonation of delay to the satisfaction of the Courts but no such requirement has been fulfilled. Condonation of delay is not a suo motu process.
It has to be proved by the party concerned as required under the law:--
(i) PLD 1988 SC 144; (ii) 1993 SCMR 17; (iii) PLD 1995 SC 396; (iv) 1998 SCMR 307(b) & 785(b); (v) 1999 MLD (Kar.) 330 (e); (vi) 1990 SCMR 1519; and (vii) 1999 SCMR 784. ' in which even one day's delay was not condoned.
' In this respect reliance is also placed on 1999 PLC (C.S.) 801 which is a well-reasoned and elaborated judgment.
' Since we have disposed of all the appeals on limitation, therefore, merits of the appeals need not be discussed as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case reported as 1987 SCMR 92(b).
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that all the appeals being hopelessly time-barred and misconceived, fails and are hereby dismissed in limine. Copies of this judgment shall be sent to all concerned, as required.