Petitioner challenged the mutation of sale by way of filing a pre-emption suit on 16-7-1999. On 17- 7-1999. the learned trial Court directed the petitioner-plaintiff to deposit Zar-e-Soem within thirty days which admittedly expired on 15-84999. She, however, deposited the amount in question on 1- 9-1999 and - preferred an explanation that the Courts were closed in the month of August and that the said period be excluded from the limitation. This explanation was not accepted and the learned trial Court dismissed the suit on ground of non-deposit of Zar-e-Soem vide the judgment and decree dated 30-9-1999. This judgment was challenged in appeal but without success, and the learned Additional District Judge, vide judgment and decree dated 19-4-2001 dismissed the same.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below by submitting that the Civil Courts were closed in the month of August; that the non-deposit of Zar-e-Soem within a period of 30 days was a bona tide mistake; that the petitioner cannot be non-suited for an act of the Court and that in the interest of justice, the matter should be decided on merit rather than technicalities. In support of the contention that the period in which the Court was closed should be excluded from limitation, learned counsel relied on two judgments of this Court reported in Najabat Khan v. Noor Ahmad (PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lahore 92) and Syed Masood Hussain and others v. Muhammad Saeed Khan (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lahore 11).
3. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, defended the impugned judgment and decrees by submitting that the law of limitation has to be strictly considered; that the learned trial Court had passed the order dated 17-7-1999 to the effect that the petitioner-plaintiff should deposit the amount of Zar-e-Soem before 15-8-1999; that though the Courts were closed in the month of August, 1999 but it is admitted that the Duty Judges were available; that the National Bank which was to receive the Zar-e-Soem was also open and the explanation that since civil Courts were closed for summer vacations the Zar-e-Soem was not deposited, is not tenable in law.
He relied on two judgments from the Indian jurisdiction reported as AIR 1924 Bombay 144 and AIR 1933 Lah. 239. Heard.
4. Admittedly, the last date to deposit Zar-e-Soem in terms of the order of the learned trial Court was 15-8-1999 and the concerned Duty Judges were available throughout the month of August, 1999. After an order is passed by the learned trial Court for deposit of the amount in question, no further effective order was to be passed by the said Court for deposit of Zar-e-some in question.
The only requirement is that the requisite challan seeking permission to deposit Zar-e-soem in the bank was to be signed by the Court and if the learned Court, which passed the initial order, was not available, the same could be endorsed by the learned Duty Judge. No effort was made by the petitioner either to move the learned Duty Judge or to approach even the concerned Bank. The mandate of law is very clear. Section 24 of the Punjab Preemption Act reads as under:- "
24. Plaintiff to deposit sale price of the property.--(1) In every suit for pre-emption the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court one-third of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix: Provided that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the tiling of the suit: Provided further that if no sale price is mentioned in the sale-deed or in the mutation, or the price so mentioned appears to be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one-third of the probable value of the property."
5. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no avail to him as in PLD 1957 Lahore 92, the plaintiff pursuant to the Court direction for deposit of the amount in question during vacations, had contacted the Duty Judge. the Bank concerned and having failed in his efforts, he approached the learned trial Court by which date the vacations ended and the period of limitation had expired. By the afore-referred conduct the plaintiff in the said case, had demonstrated his bona tides. It was in those circumstances, that this Court came to his rescue. In PLD 1965 (W.P.)Lahore 11, the case pertained to a rent matter and the ratio laid down has no nexus with the point in issue in the present case. In AIR 1933 Lahore 239 the question of limitation with reference to the Court being closed was discussed and this Court laid down that if the Presiding Officer of a Court is on leave it would not tantamount to closure of the Court and for purposes of limitation, the said period., shall not be excluded. In AIR 1924 Bombay 144 the Court was called upon to comment upon the distinction between the public holidays and Court vacations and it came to the conclusion that the period of Court vacations would not tantamount closure of the Court. At page 145 it was observed as under:- "Stopping there for a moment, 'I think the present rules still preserve a distinction which I have always understood to be the fact on the Original Side, viz, that there are two descriptions of holidays or vacations. One class are absolutely closed holidays, and the other class are mere vacations or ordinary holidays. The. Christian and. Easter holidays, for instance, are absolutely closed as are also the public days notified by the Government. On those days there are no clerks in the building and no Judge is sitting. There may possibly be one or two officials for some particular business but, speaking generally, this building like other Government buildings, is closed. That is not, however, the case with the April and October vacations. The whole office is then at work, although at reduced hours; and though this may be the time of year for certain officials to go away on leave, the members of the office and their subordinates are substantially speaking on duty the whole of the vacation."
6. During the summer vacations (month of August) every year, all subordinates Courts are not closed. It is not petitioner's case that the learned Duty Judge was not available. He neither contacted, the Duty Judge nor the relevant Bank.
7. In the afore-referred circumstances, the petitioner failed to deposit the Zar-e-soem within the time prescribed by law and as directed by the learned Court. The explanation on the basis of which condonation was sought, is not tenable. The concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned lower Courts below neither reflect any irregularity nor illegality to warrant interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. This petition, having no merit is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.