' Muhammad Rafiq and Muhammad Shafiq respondents (1 and 2) were admitted to bail by this Court on 21st of March 1978 (in Re: Cr. Misc. No. 847/B/78). Muhammad Afzal complainant in the case has come up with this application under subsection (5) of section 497, Cr. P. C. For cancellation of bail of the accused respondents.
2. Heard either side. Mr. S. M. Anwar, Advocate, learned State Counsel says that he feels quite disinclined to support the application. Concisely, the respondents and Muhammad Ramzsn alias Jani have been charged for the offence of murder under section 302/34, P. P. C. Admittedly, the respondents had dealt simple injuries to Muhammad Afzal complainant and Munir Ahmad, an eye- witness in the case and had not touched the deceased. The respondents were allowed bail for the reason that over all tentative assessme nt of the facts of the case did not justify the view that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the respondents were guilty of charge punishable with death. Cancellation of bail is claimed on a twin grounds, (i) that the entire circumstances bearing on the charge against the respondents were not kept in view in accepting the application of the respondents for grant of bail. The respondents were liable vicariously for the act of Muhammad Ramzan who had injured the deceased mortally and (ii) that after their release on bail the respondents accosted Muhammad Boota, an eyewitness in the case and threatened him to desist from making true statement at the trial. I had on a full cognition of the entire allegations against the respondents devalued the contention that prima facie they were not guilty for charge punishable with death or life imprisonment. One of the judgment in the precedent cases which I had referred to in support of above view viz. 1976 P Cr. L J 1059) was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a recent case of Muhammad Akbar and others v. The State (1). It was held by their Lordships that the case of the accused that had not caused injuries to the deceased but were responsible for having caused injuries to the witnesses was distinguishable from that of the accused who had assaulted the deceased. The contention is repelled. The next contention also could not be evalued in favour of the petitioner. Affidavit of Muhammad Boota or of those persons in whose presence the respondents had accosted Muhammad Boota have not been filed. The respondents have also filed counter affidavits to refute the allegations levelled against them. There is no reason whatever to prefer the affidavit of the petitioner to that of the respondents. In cases where oath is pitted against oath complainant who asks for orders entrenching upon the liberty of the accused must fail. It was also contended that the petitioner had lodged report with the police immediately after the respondents had threatened Muhammad Boota. The report which was a mere allegation of misconduct against the accused could not be attached much significance unless there was proper proof thereof, or there will be no end to fictitios reports to create a justification for cancellation of bail of the accused. Reference in this behalf be made to Lal Khan v. All Khan (2) in which it was held: "a mere entry in the Roznamcha or filing a report by a Police Officer for maintenance of peace at the instance of one party or even a witness, would not serve the purpose of supplying a reasonable and sufficient ground for cancelling and interfering with the bail granted by Court of law."
3. In the result, the petition stands dismissed.
(1) 1978 SCMR7 (2) PLD 1976 Kar. 1165