1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, CJ.---The petitioner is seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of Sindh Service Tribunal, dated 6-4-1999, whereby the appeals filed by the respondents were disposed of as follows:--- ' "We have gone through the arguments of either side carefully. The established legal position is that there is no limitation against a void/illegal order. The considered/consistent view of the superior judiciary in Pakistan has been that limitation should not be considered, where there is a material denial of justice. Moreover, the appellant in these appeals being illiterate/semi-illiterate constable, we are competent to condone delay and do so following the traditions of superior judiciary that has invariably shown magnanimity and benevolence to the downtrodden members of the society. "
2. ' As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, we have earlier allowed the similar appeals of Excise and Taxation employees of various cadres through detailed judgments, as already quoted above particularly because justice demands that whatever action is taken against a civil servant has to be through a transparent and bona fide action. Unfortunately, the respondents through a 'hoax' administrative action axed the services of these appellants, through a 'Ghost' Departmental Selection Committee whose creation, with the concurrence of S&GAD through a proper notification has not been established before us. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and order that these appellants be reinstated in service from the date of their removal from service. All the appellants (except Abdul Qadir Soomro in Appeal No,15/97) are deemed to be regular employees in view of the provisions of rule 6 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 which reads as follows:-- '6. Where an appointing authority for Grade-15 and below does not accept the recommendations of a Departmental Selection Committee or Departmental Promotion Committee, it shall record reasons, therefor, and obtain orders of the next higher authority.'
3. "In the minutes of the Departmental Selection Committee produced ' before us, not proved to be false or fabricated according to legal norms/stands, the then Director was the co-signatory. Nothing has been proved in evidence before us that the then Director or his successor-in-office had recorded reasons for dissent and obtained the orders of the next higher authority viz. Director-General, Excise and Taxation Department.
4. ' However, Mr. Abdul Qadir Soomro (Appeal No,115/97) shall have to qualify the Departmental Selection Committee as and when properly constituted and convened.
5. ' The intervening period since be treated as ' Leave Due' in case of all appellants from their removal to reinstatement in Service."
6. ' In seeking leave to appeal, the learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh, contended that the appeals filed by the respondents before the learned Sindh Service Tribunal were hopelessly time- barred, therefore, before deciding the appeals on merits, the learned Tribunal should have first addressed the question of limitation. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondents were not cleared by the Departmental Selection Committee, and therefore, their appointment could not be regularized. The above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no merit. The learned Tribunal while dealing with the question of limitation came to the conclusion that the order passed by the authorities terminating services of the respondents was a void order, and, therefore, the limitation would not come in the way of respondents. It was also held by- the learned Tribunal that on merits also the Tribunal was inclined to condone the delay as the respondents were illiterate and semi-illiterate persons. On merits of the case, the learned Tribunal held that the services of the respondents, who were appointed against newly created posts in 1992 were regularized by the Departmental Selection Committee, as per the minutes produced before the learned Tribunal, in the year 1993. The learned Tribunal accordingly, held that after the regularization of their services in 1993, the termination of services of respondents by letter dated 27-9-1995 on the ground that they were not recommended by the Departmental Selection Committee was a mala fide order. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner before us is that no Departmental Selection Committee was constituted for considering the cases of respondents in the year 1993. According to them, the Departmental Selection Committee constituted subsequently did not recommend or clear the regularization of respondents' services and therefore, their termination from service was fully justified. We cannot accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners for the simple reasons that the findings of fact recorded by the learned Tribunal, that Departmental Selection Committee was constituted in the year 1993 and according to minutes of that meeting produced before the learned Tribunal the services of the respondents were duly regularized has not been challenged in the memo. Of petition before this Court. The learned Service Tribunal also recorded a categorical finding that the subsequent Selection Committee had no existence as the petitioner could not place on record any order of S&GAD showing constitution of such a Committee or nomination of members of that Committee, for determining the question of regularization of appointment of respondents. Since these questions of fact were decided against the petitioner it was for the petitioner to have produced material before this Court to demonstrate that the findings of the learned Tribunal were either perverse or based on evidence. No such plea has been raised in the memo. Of petition filed before this Court. The question, therefore, agitated in these, cases is purely a question of fact which has been decided against the petitioner and the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the findings of learned Service Tribunal suffered from any perversity. No question of law of public importance arises in these cases. The petitions are, accordingly dismissed and leave is refused.