1. ' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, J.-This petition for leave to appeal arises out of the judgment and decree of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court dated 16-11-1977 whereby accepting the appeal the judgment and decrees passed by the District Judge, Rawalakot was partially set aside and a decree for joint possession in favour of the petitioners to the extent of eight kanals and 18i marlas of land under Survery No, 535 situate in village Nakar, Tehsil Bagh, District Poonch, was passed.
2. ' The petition was filed by Mr. B. A. Farooqi, Advocate who has been engaged by one Muhammad Alam Khan, attorney for Muhammad Afsar Khan petitioner. It has been submitted in the caveat that the appeal filed on behalf of Muhammad Afsar Khan had not been validly presented as the power of attorney executed in favour of Muhammad Alam by Muhammad Afsar petitioner does not permit him to file the petition in the Supreme Court.
3. ' The point submitted if accepted, would entail dismissal of the petition. We, therefore, do not propose to give in detail' the disputed facts of the case.
4. ' To appreciate the controversy about the authority to engage an Advocate, it is necessary to refer to the power of attorney. The relevant portion of the power of attorney reads :- {{URDU TEXT}} {{URDU TEXT}} ' It needs consideration whether on the basis of this document Muhammad Alam was competent to file the petition before the Supreme Court ?
5. ' A power of attorney under Order III, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code should be construed strictly. It gives only such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication and it cannot empower beyond what it reall conveys. One of the most important rules for the construction of power of attorney is that regard must be had to the recitals which, as showing the scope and object of the power, will control all general terms in the operative part of the instrument. Where authority is given to do a particular act followed or preceded by the general words, general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular act and general words in no way confer general powers but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for the purpose. It, therefore, follows that where special powers are followed by general words and vice versa, the general words are to be construed as limited to what is necessary for the proper exercise of the special powers. This view is also expressed in AIR 1947 Nag. 17 (Full Bench case) wherein at page 19, it is observed:- "The ordinary rule is that powers of attorney must be strictly construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication ; (Bowstead on Agency, Edn. 9, p. 59, (1883) A C 170 and (1884) A C 561). The learned author stresses that general words do not confer general powers, but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given, and are construed as enlarging the special powers when necessary, and only when necessary, for that purpose. A power of attorney is subjected to strict interpretation because it delegates powers which are to be interpreted in strict terms and, in such a way, as would be necessary to carry into effect the authority that is expressly given. The power of attorney is not open to that liberal interpretation which is given to less formal instruments such as ordinary letters or instructions in commercial transactions."
6. ' To the same effect is PLD 1969 Kar. 123, wherein at page 138 dealing with the issue it is observed :- ". . . . . Such an instrument is a written authorisation by which the principal appoints another person as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform specified acts on behalf of the principal. The primary purpose of an instrument of this nature is to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agents deal. The rule is now well established that the power- of-attorney must be. Strictly construed and strictly pursued. A power of attorney is held to confer only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the terms of this instrument, that is, the act done should be legally identical with what is authorised to be done by the instrument."
7. ' In view of the above, we new proceed to determine the point involved in the present case. The plain reading of the power of attorney conveys clear sense that Muhammad Alam attorney was permitted to peruse the cause only upto the High Court. It was, however, contended by Mr. B. A.
8. Farooqi that the power of attorney was executed during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court and, as such, the authority to prosecute the cause before the High Court may be construed to authorise the attorney to prosecute the cause in the Supreme Court as well. The argument in our view is not well-founded and it will be demanding too much to give such a liberal interpretation to this document. In the body of the power of attorney, firstly it is stated that Muhammad Alam attorney is empowered to engage counsel and file appeals but this authority is restricted and controlled by special clause appearing just after it to the effect that Muhammad Alam is permitted to prosecute the suit from the trial Court upto the High Court. The matter is further elucidated when immediately after this phraseology it is stated in the document that in the event the case is remanded back to the trial Court, the attorney is also authorised to conduct the proceedings in that Court too. Thus it is clear that Muhammad Afsar has only authorised Muhammad Alam to prosecute his case upto the High Court and if the case is remanded to the trial Court in that Court too. In. No way it empowers the agent to file an appeal or petition before the Supreme Court.
9. ' The power of attorney is couched in such clear terms that the petitioner cannot get out of its mischief. The logical and legitimate conclusion, therefore, is that Muhammad Alam was only empowered to perform all acts on his behalf from the Court of first instance up to the High Court.
10. ' The upshot of the whole discussion is that the petition having not been validly presented is hereby rejected. In view of the circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs.