' Irshad Ahmad etc., respondents herein, filed a suit for possession of land measuring 20 Marlas, against the appellants-defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 13-4-1986. The appellants, herein, filed an appeal before the District Judge, Sialkot on 14-5-1986. An objection was raised by the respondents that value for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction has been mentioned as Rs,1 lac, therefore, the appeal before the District Judge was not maintainable and the appeal should have been filed in the High Court. The memo. Of appeal was returned to the appellants on 28-3-1988 for presentation before the proper forum. Order dated 28-3-1988 was challenged by the appellants by filing Civil Revision No, 636-D of 1988, which was accepted by this Court on 20-2-1990 and the appeal was remanded for hearing the same on merits including the point of limitation. On remand, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation. The precise reason prevailed with the learned Additional District Judge was that the trial Court passed the decree on 13-4-1986 where against the appeal was filed before the District Judge on 14-5-1986, the value of the suit being Rs,80,000 the appeal ought to have been filed in the High Court.
2. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that in the peculiar circumstances of the case the question of limitation has lost significance. Further argued that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was enhanced up to Rs,2 lacs by amending section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1986 and at the time of passing of the impugned order dated 3-7-1994 the Additional District Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits. Reliance has been placed on the case reported as Daraz Ali and another v. Nathoo Khan 1982 SCM R 1219.
3. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the trial Court's decree was passed on 13-4-1986; the limitation for filing of appeal in the High Court was 90 days and by choosing a wrong forum the appellant's appeal was liable to be dismissed as it was barred by limitation and the learned Additional District Judge was right in saying that the time spent before the Court in pursuing the appeal, which had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, could have not been excluded while computing the period of limitation under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Reliance is placed on Mirza Muhammad Saeed v. Shahab-ud-Din and 8 others PLD 1983 SC 385.
4. The judgment and decree was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sialkot on 13-4-1986. The limitation for filing of the appeal in the High Court is 90 days. In this view of the matter, the appellants had the time to file the appeal up to 13-7-1986. On 14-.6-1986, when the appellants had yet full one month with them to approach the High Court, the law was changed and amendment was brought in section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1986, where the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge to hear the appeal was enhanced from Rs,50,000 to Rs,2 lacs w,e,f, 14-6-1986. The learned Additional District Judge while non-suiting the appellants has recorded a finding that "when the appellants preferred the appeal before the District Court the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was up to Rs, 50,000. The value of the suit for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction was Rs,80,000, so certainly the Court had no jurisdiction at the time when the appeal was presented on 14-5-1986". This view of the learned Additional District Judge is not sustainable because on the day of return of the appeal on 28-3-1988 by the Additional District Judge the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was increased from Rs, 50,000 to Rs,2 lacs by way of amendment of the Civil Courts Ordinance.
' Even otherwise, the order dated 28-3-1988 passed by the learned Additional District Judge for return of the memo. Of appeal to the appellants for presentation to the proper Court was set aside by this Court vide order dated 20-2-1990 passed in Civil Revision No, 636-D of 1988. In the circumstances of the case and increase in pecuniary jurisdiction, the Additional District Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits.
' The question of limitation in the circumstances loses significance and the appeal before the District Judge was deemed to have been presented within time. ' The Honourable Supreme Court in case reported as Daraz Ali and another v. Nathoo Khan 1982 SCM R 1219 while interpreting sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act alongwith section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance has observed as follows:-- "However, as the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court had been increased on 20-9-1978 which was neither noticed by the learned District Judge nor by its office (presumably, because of lack of information regarding the amendment brought about hardly ten days earlier) the appeal was rightly sent to the District Court for hearing and disposal, when it, as stated by the respondent's side was sent under the orders of the Chief Justice. That by itself would not render the hearing of the appeal by the District as illegal. No judicial order was necessary in this behalf. Thus, the question of limitation in the light of the aforestated facts, loses significance. The appeal would be treated to have been presented before the District Court within time."
' The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents reported as Mirza Muhammad Saeed v. Shahab-ud-Din and 8 others PLD 1983 SC 385 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case because in that case there was no jurisdiction at all available to the District Judge to hear the appeal because there was no amendment in section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, in field at the relevant time.
'For what has been discussed above, this appeal is accepted, the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge dated 3-7-1994 is set aside. The case is remanded to the Additional District Judge, Sialkot, B where the appeal of the appellants shall be deemed to be pending, which shall be decided by the Court on merits. Parties to bear their own costs.