QAZI MUHAMMAD FAROOQ, J.---By this common judgment, we propose to dispose of the above- mentioned connected Civil Appeals Nos.1126 to 1133 of 2001, by leave of the Court, and Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.745-L to 755-L, 805-L and 812-L to 840-L of 2001 arising out of the judgment, dated 25-1-2001 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Appeals Nos.440-L of 1998, 636-L, 697-L, 698-L, 699-L, 1079-L, 1080-L, 1340-L, 1707-L of 1998, 1339-L, 1340-L, 1341-L, 1342-L, 1343-L, 1344-L of 1999, 633-L, 634-L, 638-L, 644-L, 650-L, 652-L, 656-L, 653-L, 658-L, 662-L, 664-L and 697-L of 1997.
2. The questions of law and facts involved in all the matters are similar. The relevant facts of some of the cases' and the questions for determination are succinctly stated in the leave granting order passed in Civil Appeals Nos.1126 of 2001 etc. It reads as under:- "By this common order, we propose to decide Civil Petitions Nos.796-L of 2001 to 803-L of 2001 as questions of law and facts are identical in all of them.
2. The respondents in Civil Petitions Nos.796-L, 797-L and 801-L of 2001 were employed as Godown- Keepers whereas in Civil Petitions Nos.799-L and 802-L of 2001 as drivers by the petitioner-bank.
Their services were terminated by the petitioner on the ground that they were employed for a fixed term. Respondents in Civil Petitions Nos.798 and 803-L of 2001 were employed as Grade-III Officers.
They were charged-sheeted and disciplinary proceedings were initiated , against them as a consequence of which they were dismissed from service. In Civil Petition No,800-of 2001, there was a regular employee of their petitioner-bank as Assistant who was dismissed from service on the charge of misappropriation.
3 . At the relevant time, section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 had not been added through amendment, therefore, the respondents approached the Labour Court through grievance petitions under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Their grievance petitions were accepted through orders passed on different dates against which the appeals filed by the petitioner-bank before the Labour Appellate Tribunal were held to have abated through orders passed on different dates, for in the meantime, section 2-A through amendment had been added in the' Service Tribunals Act. Consequent thereupon, the petitioner-bank approached the Service Tribunal. The Service Tribunal took the view that in view of the terms of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 according to which only a civil servant could file appeal against the order of the departmental authority with regard to his terms and conditions of service and disciplinary matters, therefore, section 6 of the said Act if read with section 4 ibid would render the appeals filed by the employer as incompetent and not maintainable for the Service Tribunal cannot sit over the judgment of the Labour Court as Appellate Authority.
4 Learned counsel for the petitioner bank submitted that section 6 of the Act clearly provides that as a consequence of abatement of any suit or other ,proceedings in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal, the aggrieved party could approach the Service tribunal without any discrimination as to whether he is civil servant or the employer therefore, section 6 of the Act would override section 4 ibid and being a special remedy created as a consequence of abatement of proceedings, the appeal should save been entertained by the Service Tribunal and in these proceedings, the question of legality or otherwise of original order of termination of service of the respondents could have been gone into and in case the same was found to have been legally passed, the appeal could be accepted. This argument is in the line with the reasoning given by the Service Tribunal for in that case, it would be an appeal against the judgment of the Labour Court.
The question still remains whether in such a situation, the Service Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to go into the question of legality or otherwise of orders of the Labour Court.
5. It being a question which may arise in future in many other cases and a question of law of public importance relating to jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal therefore, leave is granted to consider the same.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for suspension of operation of the order of reinstatement of the respondents in service. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Request as to suspension of order of reinstatement in service is hereby declined. However, the recovery of the amount becoming due to the respondents as a consequence of reinstatement on accrual of back benefits shall remain suspended if the petitioner-bank deposit the said amount in this Court within two months from today which shall be invested in some maximum profit bearing scheme of the Government which shall ultimately be paid to the successful party alongwith the profits.
7. The office shall fix the appeals as early as possible after obtaining orders from Honourable the Chief Justice."
3. It will be pertinent to add here that services of some of the respondents were terminated and some of them were dismissed from service by the appellants-petitioners. They sought redressal of their grievances and reinstatement from different forums and while the grievance petitions of those who had approached the Labour Court were allowed the rest obtained favourable orders from the National Industrial Relations Commission and decrees from the Civil Courts. Appeals were preferred by the appellants-petitioners against all the orders passed in favour of the respondents.
However, pursuant to insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) all the appeals before various forums abated. Consequently, the appellants- petitioners filed appeals before the Tribunal but the same were dismissed by a single judgment on the technical grounds of maintainability and jurisdiction. It was held that only a civil servant can file an appeal under section 4 of the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal against the judgments of Labour Courts etc. The law declared by this Court in Federation of Pakistan v.
Muhammad Siddiq (PLD 1981 SC 249) that in case of abatement of suits and other proceedings any party to such suit or appeal etc., can prefer an appeal before the Tribunal was not followed and justification for the same was given in the following terms:-- "The learned counsel for the appellants in support of their submissions relied upon a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan placed in PLD 1981 SC 249, wherein it has been held that this Tribunal is not devoid of jurisdiction to hear appeal or to entertain proceedings' at the instance of Government. This Tribunal is respectfully in,agreement with the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. Where, the matters relating to terms and conditions of services of civil servants were pending adjudication before any forum prior to the enactment of 1973, the same certainly were liable to be decided by this Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution. Same is the position upon insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act of 1973 after 10-6-1997 all matters relating to terms and conditions of services of the civil servants falling within the purview of section 2-A are being entertained and adjudicated upon by this Tribunal. However, this Tribunal is of the considered view that section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act of 1973 does not at all confer upon this Tribunal any authority or jurisdiction to sit as an Appellate Court upon the judgments of the Benches of the National Industrial Relations Cummission (NIRC), Labour Courts., Civil Courts and District Courts. The appellant cannot step into the shoes of section 2-A or section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by taking refuge behind the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan placed in PLD 1981. SC 249 or behind the provision of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act for the purpose of assailing the order of the Benches of NIRC, Labour Courts, Civil Courts or District Courts..."
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
In our view the impugned judgment is based on erroneous assumption of law that the appeals filed by the appellants-petitioners were not maintainable and the Tribunal was also bereft of jurisdiction in the matter. The effect of section 2-A of the Act was that notwithstanding any judgment rendered by. The Labour Court or any other forum, all such matters covered under section 2-A' of the Act stood abated. This being so the Tribunal alone had the exclusive jurisdiction to examine the grievance of such persons. It is not the case of either of the parties that the respondents are not persons employed under any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest. The proviso to section 6 of the Act makes it manifest that in the event of abatement of suits and other proceedings any party to such a suit, appeal or application can prefer an appeal before the Tribunal. Section 6 of the Act has an overriding effect vis-a-vis section 4 ibid as it has envisaged a special procedure to be followed after abatement of proceedings. The appellants-petitioners had thus rightly approached the Tribunal for redressal of their grievance and the appeals filed by them were maintainable. As regards the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal, suffice it to say, that once such appeals are filed it is the duty of the Tribunal to determine afresh as to whether the original orders passed by the appellants-petitioners in dismissing/terminating the services of the employees-respondents were lawful or otherwise on the basis of the service rules or any other rules applicable to the employees- respondents. Guidance ought to have been sought in this behalf from Federation of Pakistan v.
Muhammad Siddiq (PLD 1981 SC 249), wherein it was held as under:-- "It is not possible, we regret, to uphold the view taken by a learned Single Judge in the High Court in the case of S.M. Nafisul Hassan Shah to the effect that on appeal filed by the Government is not at all entertainable under the Act. It is true that in the proviso to section 6 of the Ordinance which preceded the Act it was specified that a civil servant, who was a party to suit, appeal or application which abated under the purview of section 6 could prefer an appeal to the appropriate Tribunal.
But in the Act itself a change was brought about in the language of the proviso. The phrase 'any civil servant who is a party to such a suit' was substituted by the phrase 'any party to such a suit'.
The Act was promulgated on the 29th of September, 1973 while the appeal before the Service Tribunal in the said case was filed on the 24th of October, 1974. If this change would have been brought to the notice of the High Court, the observation that the Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear appeal or to entertain any proceedings 'of any kind whatsoever at the instance of the Government', would not have been made."
5. By virtue of the judgment of this Court in Muhammad Siddiq (supra) two connected appeals filed by WAPDA were also allowed and the cases were remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits.
The appeals filed by WAPDA had arisen in the circumstances that suits of WAPDA employees were decreed and the appeals filed by WAPDA pending before the District Court had abated in view of the Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 whereby the Act was extended to the WAPDA employees.
The Tribunal did not properly appreciate the judgment of this Court in Muhammad Siddiq (supra) and fell in error by dismissing the appeals of the appellants-petitioners on the grounds of maintainability and lack of jurisdiction with the result that the appellants-petitioners have been left high and dry.
6. In view of the foregoing discussion, the above appeals are allowed, the petitions are converted into appeals and by allowing the same the impugned judgment is set aside and the cases are remitted to the Tribunal for decision afresh on merits in accordance with law. The parties shall be at liberty to raise whatever pleas are available to them under the law in support of their respective contentions.