' MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J.---Habib Bank Limited i,e, respondent filed a suit against the appellants for recovery of Rs,2,18,519 through sale of mortgaged property of respondent No,5 and prayed for a decree against respondents Nos.1 to 5 for joint and several recovery through sale of mortgaged property of respondent No,5. This suit was decreed by the learned Banking Tribunal, Lahore on 20- 4-1998 in the following terms:-- "In view of the findings on the above issues, the plaintiff is granted a decree for the recovery of Rs,2,03,905 against the defendants with proportionate costs. An amount of Rs,14,614 being approximate amount of mark-up price is not allowed. If the decretal amount is not paid by the defendants, it shall be recovered by selling the house of defendant No,5 mortgaged with plaintiff- Bank as security for the cash finance facility."
' Appellants challenged the said decree in R.F.A. On 15-8-1988 but owing to non-deposit of the decretal amount under proviso to section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, the appeal was not entertained and is yet to be heard. On 20-6-1988, respondent-Bank filed an execution petition. During execution proceedings, the learned Banking Tribunal passed an order for sale of the mortgaged property through auction. Appellants on 12-3-1989 filed an objection petition. This petition was dismissed by the learned Banking Tribunal by order dated 15-5-1989 which has been assailed by the appellants through this F.A.O.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the decree passed by the learned Tribunal was a simple money decree and the recovery through sale of the property could not be ordered and that even otherwise under Order XXXIV of C.P.C., the Tribunal was bound to initially pass a preliminary decree and then a final decree under Rule 5 thereof. In view of the above, the decree dated 20-4-1989 was inexecutable and could not be acted upon to order sale of the property in execution thereof.
3. The respondent-Bank claimed the decree to have been properly passed as a mortgage decree and also contended that the Banking Tribunal in terms of section 6(8) of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 was not bound to adhere to procedure laid down in Order XXXIV, C.P.C. To initially pass a preliminary decree and then a final decree.
4. We have examined the record and points urged by the learned counsel for the parties. Decree dated 20-4-1998 was passed against the appellants for recovery of Rs,2,03,905 alongwith costs.
Examination of the judgment shows that the learned Banking Tribunal also adjudged that on non- payment of the decree amount by the appellants, the same shall be recovered by sale of appellant No,5's house/property mortgaged with the respondent-Bank as security for the finance facility. The decree initially drawn up alongwith judgment shows that it did not include the term regarding the sale of the mortgaged property as directed in the judgment, yet, the same was amended by learned Banking Tribunal's order passed on respondent's application under section 152, C.P.C. The amended decree duly incorporated the terms of the judgment regarding sale of the mortgaged house on non-payment of decretal amount by the appellant. As such, contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants that the decree dated 20-4-1988 being a simple money decree could not be executed by directing sale of the mortgaged property, lost its basis after amendment of the decree-sheet by Banking Tribunal's order dated 21-4-1990.
5. Similarly, appellants' submission qua non-adherence under proviso to Order XXXJV of C.P.C. By Banking Tribunal in not passing a preliminary decree, has no substance. Banking Tribunals Ordinance (Ordinance No,LVIII of 1984) was promulgated to provide a mechanism of recovery of finance provided by Banking Companies under a system of financing not based upon interest. It provides for a special procedure for recovery suits as also the mechanism for execution of the decree in consequence thereof. Subsection (8) of section 6 reads as under:-- "(8) Where the claim filed before the Banking Tribunal is for the enforcement of a mortgage of immovable property, 'decree' shall mean final decree for foreclosure, sale or redemption, as the case may be, as provided in Order XXXIV of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908)".
6. A bare perusal of the above-quoted section 6(8) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 reveals that suits filed before the Banking Tribunal, if a Banking Company claims B enforcement of mortgage of immovable property, a 'decree' passed by the Tribunal was a 'final decree' for foreclosure, sale or redemption as per provisions of Order XXXIV of C.P.C. As such, through the above-quoted special provision in the Ordinance of 1984, law giver in fact did away with the lengthy and technical and multi-tier procedure of enforcement of mortgage by initially issuing preliminary decrees and then on application of the decree-holder a final decree which in itself was a time consuming, arduous and a long procedure. It is, thus, obvious that the learned Banking Tribunal passed the impugned decree dated 20-4-1988 for recovery through sale of mortgaged property in terms of section 6(8) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 and was not required to pass a preliminary decree as provided in Order =UV of the C.P.C. The decree dated 20-4-1988 was a final decree. Where for, the learned Tribunal was within its jurisdiction to order execution of the same through sale of the mortgaged property.
7. In view thereof, this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.