1. ' SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, CJ.---In this Constitutional petition the petitioner has sought the following reliefs:--
(a) That the appointment of respondents 3 to 30 be declared as without lawful authority, mala fide, without jurisdiction, arbitrary and nullify in the eye of law and, therefore, void and of no legal effect.
(b) That the respondent S.B.P. May be directed to frame recruitment policy prior to making any fresh appointments in the Bank.
(c) That the respondent S.B.P. May be directed not to make any further appointments through direct recruitment or otherwise, during the pendency of this petition.
(d) That the respondent No,1 be directed to make appointments on the basis of Regional and Provisional quota fixed by the Federal Government.
(e) That any other relief(s) deemed fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be granted.
2. ' The brief facts as stated by the petitioner, who is the Trade Union and the C.B.A. In the establishment of respondent No,1, are that respondent No,1 inducted respondents Nos.3 to 30 as officers in the respondent-bank in violation of the Staff Regulations as well as judgment of the Supreme Court in Abdul Jabar Memon's case. It has further been stated that the petitioner is aggrieved by the appointments of these 28 officers on salaries ranging from 18,000 to Rs,4,47,656 per month. The petitioner asserted that such appointments .Were without lawful authority and were based on favourtism in violation of the fundamental rights as well as of Regulation 6(ii)(iii) of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1999. The appointments were also challenged on the ground that they were in violation of the agreements dated 14-7-1994 and 29-10-1997 arrived at between the petitioner and respondent No,l.
3. ' Comments were filed on behalf of the official respondents, wherein they raised preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the Constitutional petition to the following effect:-- (1). The petitioner, Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA), is not competent to file this petition inasmuch as Constitutional petition can be filed only by the aggrieved person or persons and not by their representatives.
4. (2). The General Secretary of the C.B.A., Mr. Sahi, was not authorized by the General Body as asserted in the writ petition. The authorization was made only by the Central Body of the C.B.A. Even if it be assumed that the Constitutional Petition has been competently filed by the employees of the State Bank represented by the petitioner C.B.A., no vested right of the said employees has been violated. Therfore, neither the said employees nor their C.B.A. Has the locus standi to file this writ petition.
5. (3). There is no violation of any law or any statutory rule or regulation in the appointment of the respondents. Nos.3 to 30 and, therefore, the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is not attracted.
(4) The matter agitated in the Constitutional Petition is a service matter and the employees of the State Bank are civil servants in view of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Therefore, Article 212 of the Constitution is a bar against the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
(5) At any rate, the impugned appointments have been made on contract exactly in accordance with Regulation 10 of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1999. Thus, the petitioner has no case.
6. ' It was, submitted on behalf of the respondent that, the appointments were made under Regulation 10 of the Staff Regulations, 1999, which was in supersession of all the provisions of the Staff Regulations and further that no vested right of the petitioner or the employees represented by it was affected by such appointments, it was denied that the aforesaid appointments in any manner violated the provisions of Articles 9 and 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan. It was further submitted that the employment of the officers in questions on contract basis were made in accordance with relevant law, rules and regulations and approved policy of the Central Board of the respondent-Bank ' Affidavit-in-rejoinder was filed by the General Secretary of the petitioner in reply to the comments filed on behalf of respondent-Bank, wherein the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondent-Bank were vehemently controverted and denied and it Was submitted that the petition was maintainable as there was violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner in particular and people of Pakistan in general and fell within the definition of public interest litigation.
7. It was further submitted that the State Bank of Pakistan had retrenched thousands of employees on the ground that is was financially under pressure and not in good economic shape but on the other hand it appointed officers on salaries ranging from Rs,15,000 to Rs,6,000 per month.
8. ' In view of the preliminary objections raised by Mr. K.M.A. Samdani with regard to the maintainability of the petition, the learned counsel for the parties were directed to advance arguments with regard to the maintainability of the petition and merits would be considered only if it was held that the petition was maintainable.
9. ' We have heard the arguments of M/s. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, K.M.A. Samdani, and Syed Zaki Muhammad, the learned counsel for the parties, have also perused the material on record, the relevant provisions of law and the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel in support of their respective arguments. Mr.. Syed Zaki Muhammad, the learned D.A.-G., adopted the arguments of Mr: K.M.A. Samdani.
10. ' Mr. K.M.A. Samdani in support of the preliminary objections submitted that in order to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, it was necessary that the person should be an aggrieved person and that aggrieved person has been defined as a person who had a legal or fundamental right, which was violated by any act of commission or omission of a public functionary resulting in legal injury and loss to the person: ' Mr. K.M.A. Samdani in support of his preliminary objections placed reliance on the cases of (i) Haji Mojakar Ali v. Regional Transport Authority, Sylhet and others (PLD 1967 Dacca 6); (ii) the Punjab Mines Labour Union v. The West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Jhelum (PLD 1972 Lahore 489); and (iii) Ch. Jalal-ud-Din and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others (1968 SCMR 995).
11. ' Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, on the other hand, vehemently refuted the objection with regard to the locus standi of the petitioner to file the above petition and submitted that there was violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner as well as fundamental rights of the people of Pakistan contained in Articles 4, 9, 18 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, as a result of which this petition amounted to a public interest litigation for which Article 199 of the Constitution could be pressed into action as for maintainability of a Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution which involved violation of fundamental rights of a large section of people or of a large number of the citizens, it was not necessary for the petitioner to be an aggrieved person within - the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution and it was sufficient for him to show some interest in the issue involved concerning violation of fundamental rights of a large number of citizens. In support of his above contention, he placed reliance on the cases of (i) Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1988 SC 416); (ii) Ardeshir Cowasjee and 10 others v. Karachi Building Control Authority (Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and 4 others) (1999 SCMR 2883); (iii)
12. Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 388); (iv)
13. Al-Jehad Trust and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1996 SC 324); (v) Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1993 SC 374); (vi) Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary v. Azizullah Memon and 16 others (PLD 1993 SC 341); (vii) In re: Abdul Jabbar Memon and others (1996 SCMR 1349); (viii) Pakistan Tabacco Company Ltd. And another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Islamabad and 3 others (1999 SCMR 382); (ix) Dr. Muhammad Tahir Achakzai and others v. Government of Balochistan and others (1999 SCMR 1689); (x) Nizamuddin and another v. Civil Aviation Authority and 2 others (1999 SCMR 467); (xi) Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1999 SC 57) and (xii) Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others (1995 SCMR 362).
14. ' We now peruse the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective arguments, Mr. K.M.A. Samdani laid great emphasis on the case of Ch. Jalal-ud-Din and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others (1968 SCMR 995). In this case, the appellant was a claimant for transfer - under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, of a portion of Property No,36, Lawrence Road, Lahore and N.C.H. Form filed on his behalf by his wife was finally rejected by the Settlement Commissioner on the ground that he did not himself apply on the prescribed form for the transfer of the property in dispute, which was done by his wife but she was not his duly authorised agent to do so. By the same order, portion in possession of one Khawaja Abdul Qayyum was transferred to the respondents Nos.4 to 7.
15. Khawaja Abdul Qayyum feeling dissatisfied filed a writ petition in the High Court, wherein the appellant was made a party but he himself did not move against the rejection of his claim until after two years for quashment of the order of the Settlement Commissioner and the same was dismissed on the ground of laches. It was contended that as reliefs sought by the appellant could be granted to him in writ petition filed by Khawaja Abdul Qayyum, the delay in tiling the writ petition was immaterial. This contention was repelled on the ground that a writ petition could be filed by a person aggrieved as such reliefs granted must be in relation to his grievance and not in favour of a third person. In the case of Haji Mojakkar Ali v. Regional Transport Authority, Sylhet and others (PLD 1967 Dacca 6), the Court while deciding the question of locus standi of a party to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court of Dacca under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962, the provisions of which were similar and analogous to the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973, held that person who intended to invoke writ jurisdiction was required to show that he had direct interest in matter and petition in representative capacity was not maintainable. In the case of The Punjab Mines Labour Union v. The West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation. Jhelum (PLD 1972 Lahore 489) while discussing the question of locus standi under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, it was held that the same could he invoked only by a person aggrieved and that too against a specific definable act of commission or omission on the part of the relevant authority and further that a Trade Union agitating individual case of a workman could not claim locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 98.
16. ' Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada on the other hand in support of his contention that the petitioner was an aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution as it was espousing the cause of its members/workers whose fundamental rights were being violated by the acts of commission by respondent No,1 placed reliance on the case of Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1988 SC 416). The pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the cited case on this issue go against what had been argued by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada and we reproduce the relevant portion from the judgment as under:-- ' It is obvious from the language of Article 18(3) that it provides a direct access to the highest judicial forum in the country for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It caters for an expeditious and inexpensive remedy for the protection of the Fundamental Rights from legislative and executive interference. It gives the Court very wide discretion in the matter of providing an appropriate order or direction including declaratory order to suit the exigencies of particular situations.
17. ' Unlike in Article 199, the Framers of the Constitution placed no limitation nor prescribed any condition or stipulation for obtaining relief and redress under Article 184(3). No strait-jacket formula was prescribed for the enforcement of the Rights, the obvious reasons that can be spelled out is that in case the Supreme Court was itself of the view in a given case that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved, it should directly interfere, and any rigid formula or strait-jacket formula or straitjacket formula prescribed for enforcement of the Rights would be self-defeating.
18. ' The cases referred to us at Serial Nos. (ii) to (xii) deal with the petition wherein the issues were relating to public interest litigation. In none of the aforecited cases, the question of maintainability of a Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, wherein the petitioner was agitating the cause of third party relating to the alleged violation of the legal rights of the third party without there being any violation of the petitioner's legal right.
19. From perusal of the aforecited cases, we find that the same do not substantiate the arguments advanced by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada as we have not been able to find any observation that Article 199 of the Constitution could be invoked by a person in a representative capacity for redress of a grievance of a third person. The petitioner being the Collective Bargaining Agent could not claim locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution for the alleged violation of the legal or fundamental rights of its members.
20. ' Mr. K.M.A. Samdani with regard to the contention of the petitioner that it was a public interest litigation as fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan were violated by appointments of the aforesaid officers submitted that a bare perusal of the memo: of petition would be sufficient to establish that not a single word was stated by the petitioner in the memo. Of petition relative to the public interest litigation on the ground of violation of the fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan or that the issue involved in the petition was of public importance and affected a large section of people or majority of citizens of Pakistan which, according to him was a condition precedent for public interest litigation. He further submitted that even if it be admitted that the petition was in the nature of a public interest litigation, then the petitioner ought to have approached the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan and could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 on account of the constraints and limitations contained in. Article 199 as a result of which public interest litigation could not be initiated in this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. In support of his contention that public interest litigation could, only be initiated in the Supreme Court, Mr. Sarr referred us to the case of (i) Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1998 SC 161); and (ii) Sh. Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law. Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1999 SC 504). In both the forecited cases, the Supreme Court has discussed in detail the nature of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 and that of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan and in both the cases, the Supreme Court pronounced that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution was much more wider and public interest proceedings, if it could be shown that the question raised was of a public importance and related to violation of fundamental right(s) guaranteed under the Constitution of a reasonably large section of people, could be initiated by any person who had some interest in such proceedings without having any personal grievance. It will be useful to reproduce the relevant portion from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Malik Asad Ali and others v. Federation of Pakikan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1998 SC 161) as under:-- ' The proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution before the High Court are subject to various consrtraints mentioned in the said Article. However, the proceedings before the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution differ in various ways from the proceedings before the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. For instance, a person may be non-suited by the High Court in proceedings under Article 199 of the constitution on the ground that he has no personal grievance, and therefore, he is not an aggrieved person. A petitioner before the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, may not have a personal grievance in the case, but if he satisfies the Court that question raised by him is of public importance and it relates to enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of a reasonably large section of people, he can successfully maintain the petition. The proceedings before the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution are in the nature of a public interest litigation in contradistinction to the proceedings before the High Court where the litigant seeks redress of his personal grievance and injury. Therefore the scope and nature of proceedings, before the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution differ in many ways from the proceedings, before the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The trappings and constrains provided in Article 199 of the Constitution on the exercise of power by the High Court, are therefore, not applicable to Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.
21. ' It will also be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion from the judgment of Sh. Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1999 SC 504) as under:-- ' To maintain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, it is not necessary that infraction of any fundamental right of the petitioner/individual must be established. The question of infringement of the fudmental right of the individual is relevant in proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution with reference to his locus standi to maintain the proceedings. In contradistinction to proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution, the question of locus standi of the petitioner is hardly of any significance in a petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The stress in proceedings under Article 184(3) of the Constitution is more on the "public importance" of the question raised in the proceedings. Therefore, some times a complaint regarding violation of the fundamental right of an individual may give rise to a question which may affect the entire community or the whole population, thus, making it a case fit for cognizance under Article 184(3) of the Constitution while in another case the violation of the fundamental rights of a large number of people may not affect the whole community or the entire population thereby rendering the question not fit for adjudication under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The condition that the petition filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution must relate to the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, does not necessarily mean or refer to the enforcement of the fundamental right of the petitioner or an individual who moves the Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.
22. Reference to enforcement of fundamental rights in Article 184(3) implies a fundamental right in enforcement whereof the whole community or public-at-large is interested.
23. ' The aforesaid observations reproduced from the aforecited two judgments of the Supreme Court leave no room for doubt that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution cannot' entertain a petition relating to public interest litigation unless and until the persons invoking the jurisdiction succeeds in establishing a violation of any of his legal or fundamental rights. This. Court would not exercise jurisdiction in respect of a petition, wherein the petitioner seeks violation of fundamental rights of a large section or a large number of people without specifying the personal grievance or injury suffered by him. It will be proper to state the reasons which have compelled us to place reliance on the cases of Malik Asad Ali and Sh. Liaquat Hussain in preference to the cases mentioned at Serial Nos.(ii) to (xii) of para. 10 hereinabove. The first reason is that these two cases were decided by larger Benches of the Supreme Court while the other cases were decided by smaller Benches. The second reason is that in these two cases the Hon'ble Supreme Court minutely examined the provisions of Articles 184(3) and 199 of the Constitution and came to the conclusion that the provisions of Article 199 did not provide public interest litigation which could be undertaken by the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. In ail other cases relied upon by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution were stretched so as to encompass public interest litigation in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases which pertained to construction of high-rise buildings in exclusively residential areas; conversion of amenity plots for commercial purposes; encroachment for land for construction of high-rise buildings on the beach; depriving the view of the sea to the people visiting the beach, etc. Which affected not only the people living in the adjoining areas where such illegal acts of commission were being carried out but even the people living in far-flung areas as such illegal acts amounted to depriving the people of the beauty of the Bench, causing heavy burden and load on the existing utility services and creating congestion, which is not the position in the present case.
24. ' Mr. Samdani further submitted that the petition was also barred by Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan inasmuch as the petitioner was espousing the cause of its members/employees who are employees of State Bank of Pakistan, which is a corporation and in view of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, employees represented by the petitioner would be deemed to be civil servants, thereby disentitling them from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction. In this connection, he further submitted that though neither in the petition nor in the affidavit-in-rejoinder it has been stated as to what legal or fundamental rights of the employees represented by the petitioner were violated or were likely to be violated by employing respondents Nos.3 to 30 in the respondent-bank yet it could be presumed that the grievance of the petitioner was that in view of the aforesaid appointments, the future chances of promotion of its members would be adversely affected and further that possibly the petitioner was of the view that anyone of its employees could be appointed in place of anyone of the above 28 officers. The presumption of Mr. Samdani was justified from the arguments advanced by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, who on being repeated asked as to what fundamental rights of the petitioner were violated submitted that employment of respondents Nos.3 to 30 had deprived the members of the petitioner, who are employees of the respondent-Bank, from being promoted or appointed to any of the posts on which respondents Nos.3 to 30 were being appointed. Mr. Samdani further submitted that it was a settled proposition of law that a civil servant could not approach this Court by having recourse to Article 199 of the Constitution for redress of a grievance relating to the terms and conditions of his service. He further submitted that the grievance that the members of the petitioner had been neglected or ruled out of consideration for promotion to the aforesaid posts was also absolutely baseless inasmuch as none of the members of the petitioner possessed the requisite qualifications, experience and expertise which was possessed by the aforesaid 28 respondents, who were appointed to the various posts. Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada was unable to advance any satisfactory or cogent arguments in rebuttal of what was stated by Mr. Samdani and merely stated that appointments made were in violation of the Service Regulations as well as violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 9 and 18 of the Constitution and the petitioner had the locus standi to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and Article 212 was no bar in the matter as the disputes and the issues in this petition did not relate to the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the petitioner.
25. ' The petitioner had approached this Court for safeguarding and protecting the rights and interest of its members, who are employees of State Bank of Pakistan. Obviously, their rights and interests which were likely to be affected by such appointments would be with regard to their future promotions. Apart from the fact that the petitioner had to establish that anyone of its members possessed the requisite qualification, expertise, skill and the experience for promotion to anyone of such post, the fact is that promotion of a civil servant is not 'a right and no Constitutional petition by a civil servant would be maintainable for obtaining a direction or order for promotion. If any authority is required in support of the above, the same is available in the cases of (i) M.A. Rafique v.
26. Managing Director (Power), WAPDA and 7 others (1990 SCMR 927); and (ii) Province of West Pakistan v. Muhammad Akhtar Qureshi and others (PID 1962 SC 428). There is no doubt that the status of the employees of the petitioner is that of civil servants in view of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act and on this ground also the petitioner would be precluded from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in relation to any matter relating to the terms and conditions of service of its members.
27. ' The next ground of which the maintainability of this petition was assailed by Mr. Samdani was that the appointments of respondents 3 to 30 were made in pursuance of a policy decision made by the Governor in consultation with the members of the Board of Directors/Central Board and submitted that a policy decision arrived at could not be challenged in a Court of law unless it could be shown that it was mala fide, prejudicial to the interest of the aggrieved persons, contrary to the provisions of law or in violation of any vested, legal or fundamental right. Relating the background.
28. Of this policy decision, he submitted that till 1971 there was a well-established practice and policy according to which regular training courses and seminars used to be conducted for training of the officers of the respondent-Bank in the field of banking, monetary and financial policies, foreign exchange and foreign trade. In these courses, senior and highly qualified bankers from abroad as well as financial and monetary experts used to deliver lectures. The officers of the respondent-Bank also used to be sent on foreign trainings abroad and in this manner the officers were always kept abreast of the latest policies in the field of banking, finance, monetary - policies, foreign exchange matters and foreign trade but this policy was discontinued since 1971 with the result that the officers of the respondent-bank were deprived of internal training courses and seminars as well as external foreign training and seminars, which resulted in their lacking in the knowledge of the latest and modren development in the field of banking, finance, monetary policies, foreign exchange matters and foreign trade, which started affecting the performance and efficiency of the respondent-bank and with the passage of time it went on increasing as those officers who had received such training either stood retired or left the respondent-Bank for seeking better employments. Mr. Samdani submitted that in order to overcome this Shortcoming, it was decided to hire highly qualified, skilful and expert professionals in the above field on contracts for periods ranging from six months to three years with a view not only to improve working of the respondent- Bank but also to impart training to the officers of respondent Bank and to acquaint them with the latest and modem developments, trends and policies relating to central banking, commercial banking, monetary and fiscal policies, foreign banking and trade.
29. ' Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada vehemently controverted the arguments of Mr. Samdani and submitted that if the object of appointing respondents Nos.3 to 30 was to impart training and acquaint the officers of State Bank of Pakistan with the modern and latest developments, trends and policies relating to central banking, commercial banking and monetary policies, then much more highly qualified, skilful and expert people could have been engaged solely for imparting training to the officers of respondent-Bank and the emoluments which would have been paid to them would have been much less than the amount which would be spent by way of salaries to respondents Nos.3 to 30. He further submitted that the aforesaid appointments were not related to any policy decision and respondents Nos.3 to 30 were appointed arbitrarily and in flagrant violation of the rules and regulations on account of nepotism and favouritism of the high officials of the respondent-Bank with a view to proviue these respondents huge benefits at the cost of other officers and employees of the respondent-Bank and was a huge burden on the finances of the respondent-Bank. He further submitted that in the circumstances the policy decision was liable to be challenged in a Court of law as it was mala fide and ultra vires of law and the Constitution. He further submitted that such appointments were made with a view to finalise a list of the officers of State Bank of Pakistan including the members of the petitioner-association, who were to be removed and/or terminated from service of the respondent-Bank.
30. ' We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and are unable to agree with the arguments of Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada on account of the fact that he has failed to bring on record any material from which it could be presumed in the least, that the appointments of respondents Nos.3 to 30 were on account of favourtism or on account of their close association with the top officers of the respondent-Bank or that they were employed with a view to finalise a list of the officers of the respondent-Bank whose services were to be terminated.
31. The background given by Mr. Samdani relating to the training and refresher courses of State Bank of Pakistan both internally and externally which ceased to be operative since 1971, in our opinion was a great setback and placed the officers of the respondent-Bank in a position of disadvantage inasmuch as it stopped them from coming into association and contacts with foreign bankers as well as with highly qualified, expert and experienced professionals in the field of banking, finance, monetary policies, trade, etc. It is also to be noted that persons, who had been trained by way of refresher courses at home and abroad up to 1971 ceased to be in the service of the respondent- Bank and the officers who replaced them did not have the benefit of the training and refresher courses. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold that there was any mala fides, ill-will, element of favouritism or any illegality in the policy made by the Board of Directors/Central Board of the respondent-Bank was in contravention of Articles 4, 9 and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan and as such would be immune from judicial review. Thus, the same is not liable to be challenged in a Court of law. If any authority is required in support of the above, the same is available in the cases of (i)
32. Mian Muhammad Nurullah and 2 others v. District Magistrate, Lahore and 3 others (1970 SCMR 214) and (ii) Zohra and 5 others v. The Government of Sindh, Health Department through its Secretary, Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and another (PLD 1996 Karchi 1).
33. ' The entire thrust of Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Prizada's arguments was that the appointments of respondents Nos.3 to 30 were in violation of Articles 4, 9; 18 and 25 of the Constitution. It may be of note that in the memo. Of petition, violation of Articles 9 and 18 was claimed. However, during the course of the arguments, he added Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution. He was repeatedly asked as to how violation of anyone of the aforesaid Articles could be made out by providing employments to respondents Nos.3 to 30 to which he was unable to give any satisfactory, plausible and cogent reply. He in support of his contention that there was violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner, that the petition involved questions and issues to public importance; that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Constitutional .Petition; and that matters relating to public policy could be agitated before this Court, placed reliance on the following additional cases: ' 1. 1995 PLC (C.S.) 251 (Kar.), (2) 1990 P.Cr.LJ 121, (3) PLD 1978 Lah. 273 (280) A, (4) PLD 1999 Kar. 472 (480), (5) 1991 SCMR 483 (b), (6) 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1175, (7) 2000 YLR 4 (6), (8) PLD 1990 SC 295, (9)
34. 1992 SCMR 563;(10) PLD 1992 SC 723 and (11) 2000 CLC 148 We have gone through the aforecited cases and find that none of them is of any help in advancing the case of the petitioner in view of the pronouncements made by the Supreme Court in the cases of Malik Asad Ali and Sh. Liaquat Hussain (supra). We are unable to agree with him that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a public interest litigation and that the petitioner in its capacity as a C.B.A. Could invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution to espouse the cause of its members.
35. Apart from the above, we may point out that the petitioner in the memo. Of the petition did not mention a single word about the issues being related to public interest litigation but when objections were raised with regard to the maintainability of the petition, the petitioner shifted its stand in the affidavit-in-rejoinder and put forward a completely different version that the issues involved in the petition related to the fundamental rights of a large number of people of the Society or a large number of the citizens of the country with a view to save this Constitutional petition, which in view of our observations in the relevant portion of this order was not maintainable as a Trade Union could not espouse the cause of its members by invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The petitioner had thus, acted not only with mala fide intention in changing its stance with a view to bring the petition within the scope of Article 199 of the Constitution but also reflected that the petitioner was himself not definite as to who were the aggrieved or affected parties and as to his locus standi to tile the petition challenging the said appointments.
36. ' Upon the above discussion, we hold that the petitioner was not entitled to, invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for espousing the cause of its members relating to the service matter; that this Court would not entertain a Constitutional petition which involves public interest litigation; and that the appointments of respondents Nos.3 to 30 made in pursuance of a policy decision with a view to harmonise, improve and streamline the working of the respondent- Bank and to provide training and knowledge to the officers of the respondent-Bank were neither mala fide nor were based on nor were on account of favouritism and also were not contrary to any provision of the law or the Constitution of Pakistan.
37. ' We find that this Constitutional petition is misconceived and not maintainable. By a short order dated 7-2-2001 we had dismissed this petition in limine alongwith the miscellaneous application pending therein for reasons to be recorded later. These are the reasons for the said short order.