1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This order will dispose of C. P. S. L. A. No. 140 of 1978 and C. P. S. L. A. No. 144 of 1978, as both arise from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, dated 31-10- 1977, passed in R. F. A. No. 139 of 1975.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the Punjab Government proposed to acquire certain land for the construction of the New Ravi Bridge, Lahore, and for this purpose a total area of 53 kanals 9 marlas was to be acquired. Out of this area, 39 kanals 13 marlas were situated in village Targarh, Tehsil and District Lahore, in respect of which three notifications under the Land Acquisition Act were issued on different dates. As regards the notifications it: respect of the remaining area, measuring 13 kanals 16 marlas, the sanction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was sought. Pending the said sanction of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the entire area of 53 kanals 9 marlas was allotted to various persons against their verified claims. Meanwhile, however, the Collector, after hearing the objections of the persons to be affected, gave an award on 21-7-1973, assessing the total compensation for the notified area, i.e. 39 kanals 13 marla3, to be lks. 6,66,263.44. Regarding the area which was not notified, namely, 13 kanals 16 marlas, the compensation was assessed to be Rs.
3. 2,32,098.75, which was, however, withheld until the sanction by the Chief Settlement Commissioner.
4. While making the award the Collector experienced certain difficulties with regard to the apportionment of compensation, as the revenue record showed that the acquired land was shamlat deh and the same had been allotted to various claimants against their verified claims by the allotment authorities, without preparing tatimmas. The difficulty confronted by him was with regard to ascertainment of persons entitled to and in physical possession of the land under acquisition and the extent of their entitlement. He, therefore, made a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the civil Court for establishing the title of the persons to whom compensation was to be paid. The civil Court, in terms of reference as interpreted by it, coupled with fact that no exception was taken by the parties before it to the rate of compensation, straightaway concerned itself with the ascertainment and extent of entitlement of the persons.
5. The Reference Court dismissed the claim of Muhammad Ishaque and by the same award Muhammad Saeed and Mst. Sardar Begum were declared to be entitled along with others to varying amounts of compensation.
6. Aggrieved by the award of the civil Court Muhammad Ishaque, besides others, who were adversely affected by the said award, preferred an appeal (R. F. A. No. 139 of 1975) to the Lahore High Court, At regular hearing of the said appeal the, counsel for' Mian Muhammad Saeed. (one of the respondents in the said appeal) raised a preliminary objection as to the sufficiency of court-fee.
7. The objection was upheld by the learned Single Judge, who ordered the deficiency in the court-fee to be made up within one month. Subsequently, it appears that in view of the pecuniary limits on the competence of the Single Judge of the High Court to entertain an appeal the subject-matter of which exceeds Rs. 1,00,000, in value, the matter was placed before the Division Bench of the same Court. The counsel for Mian Muhammad Saeed contended before the Division Bench that since the learned Single Judge, in view of the pecuniary limits prescribed by the High Court Rules, was not legally seized of the matter, any order made -by him wa3 without legal sanction, hence his order as to the making up of deficiency in court-fee and condoning the delay was without any legal consequence. The Division Bench, after a careful examination of the relevant law and authorities, cited before it, rejected the preliminary objections. The court observed that the learned Judge had rightly allowed the extension of time under section 149, C. P. C. Read with section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act.
8. On the merits, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the award of the civil Court was vitiated, inasmuch as the Court had not issued notices to all the persons entitled to the land and, therefore, to the compensa--tion. The Division Bench agreed and observed that on true interpretation of the terms of reference, the question to be resolved by the civil Court was the verification of all the persons who were entitled to the compensation and the proportion of their entitlement and since, as they found, the notices were net issued to all the owners and persons so entitled, the award of the civil court was not within the terms of reference and, therefore, was bad in law on that score. With these observations the Court ordered the case to be remanded to the civil Court for its proper disposal in accordance with the terms of reference, and ordered that all the parties who had received compensation either from Collector or from the Court shall surrender the entire compensation so received to the civil Court. Finally, the Court, on concession made by all the counsel, directed that since the matter was agitated by Muhammad Ishaque appellant in the interest of all the owners, whether parties before the Court or not, the court-fee paid by him should be reimbursed equally by them.
9. Since Muhammad Saeed and Me. Sardar Begum, petitioners before us were declared entitled to varying amounts of compensation by the civil Court and were adversely affected by the Division Bench's orders, whereby the case was remanded to the civil Court for its fresh determination, they have filed these petitioners (C. P. S. L. A. No. 140 of 1978 by Mst. Sardar Begum and C. P. S. L. A. No. 144 of 1978 by Mian Muhammad Saeed) to challenge the validity of the judgment passed by the Division Bench.
10. Before us, it was submitted that the learner: Judges of the High Court erred in embarking upon all the aspects of the case, in so far as the appeal was confined only to the payment of compensation with respect to Khasra No. 254, relating to village Targarh, Tehsil and District Lahore. Hence their finding that all the co-sharers of the shamlat deh of the village ought to be summoned was unjustified.
11. We may observe that the reference made to the civil Court Clearly indicates that all those persons who were entitled to compensation were to be ascertained. So, for the purpose of ascertaining the persons actually entitle to compensation, it was incumbent upon the civil Court to have issued notices to the persons who were to be affected. Since no notices were issued to all such persons, the High Court rightly observed that the decision of the civil Court was not sustainable in the eye of law, on this score.
12. It was next submitted that the order of the High Court for the refund of money was not proper, inasmuch as the order of the Reference Court was based on examination of relevant evidence. In C. P. S. L. A. No. 140 of 1978 it was also contended that since the compensation awarded to Mst.
13. Sardar Begum and Riaz-ud-Din by the Reference Court was not agitated by any of the party, the High Court could not, in exercise of its suo motu jurisdiction, direct the surrender of the money received by them in the shape of compensation.
14. We do not agree with the learned counsel the appeal before the High Court was not confined to any particular point ; the Tires of the decision by the civil Court was called in question, and the High Court was to consider each and every aspect of the matter in order to come to a right and jus conclusion. Hence its order for the surrender of compensation received by the petitioners was just and proper.
15. As for the contention that the High Court was not justified in directing the respondents before it to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500, each towards court-fee paid on the appeal, it may be noted that the counsel for the parties appearing before the High Court had voluntarily agreed that since the decision on appeal ensured for the benefit of all the owners of the shamlat deh, whether they were parties or not before the Court, the court-fee paid by tae appellant was to be shared by all of them equally, and the learned Division Bench had ordered accordingly. Hence there is no force in this contention as well.
16. In conclusion, we do not find any force in these petitions for leave to appeal which are, accordingly dismissed.