ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-This L. P. A. Seeks to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 16-1-69 in Writ Petition No. 898/1964, whereby the petition was dismissed and the orders of transfer of the disputed house as a single unit in favour of respondent No. 3 by the Settlement Depart--ment were maintained.
2. The dispute in this case relates to property bearing No. A/119/30/4, situated at Kali Mori, Hyderabad. This property is residential premises and consists of two portions. One portion was originally in the possession and occupation of Allah Dia, the father of the present appellant and after his death the appellant Mat. Jamila has continued to occupy the same. The other portion of the house has all along been in the possession of respondent No. 3, Mohammad Shall. According to the appellant Allahdia had filed an N. C. H. Form for the transfer of the portion in his possession. It is `alleged that respondent No. 3 had also applied for transfer of the portion In his possession but the entire property was wrongly transferred to him as one indivisible unit on the basis of his being a claimant displaced person and P. T. O. Was issued to him on 1-12-1962. The deceased Allahdia does not seem to have agitated the matter in his life time but after his death the present appellant moved the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for transfer of the portion in her possession on the plea that the house consists of two independent units and that her father had duly submitted an N.
C. H. Form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, however, by his order dated 26-10-63 declined to transfer the portion of the property to the appellant upon a find--ing that no N. C. H. Form was filed by the father of the appellant, although by the same order he held the property to consist of more than one independent. Units. As a result he directed that the portion in possession of the father of the appellant be disposed of by public auction. Respondent No. 3 thereupon appealed against the decision before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, who by his order dated 27-11-63 allowed the appeal and setting aside the aforesaid order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, directed the transfer of the entire house to the said respondent. The learned Officer, however, did not disagree with the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that the house comprises two portions which are separate and self-contained. But as the respondent No. 3 was the only applicant for the transfer of the house, he was found to be entitled to the transfer of the entire property. This order was challenged in revision before the Settlement Commissioner, who by his order dated 24-9-64 affirmed the decision of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and dismissed the revision.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 898/1964 in the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi. It will be pertinent to observe that the case of the appellant before the Departmental Authorities all along was simply that bar father had filed his N. C. H. Form for the transfer of the portion of the property in dispute but since no particulars regarding the date and number of the N. C. H. Form were disclosed and no evidence in support of this allegation was forthcoming, her plea was rejected as not established. In the High Court, however, for the first time the appellant came out with an allegation that upon a thorough search of the record an entry on register CSC-2 was found which proves that the N. C. H. Form was filed by the appellant's father on 5-1-59. A certified copy of the attract was annexed to the petition.
Respondent No. 3 inter alia repudiated the allegation of the appellant by his counter-affidavit dated 12-8-65 and contended that the extract of the entry from the register CSC-2 has been arranged in collusion with the Settlement Staff by manipulation of the record for the reason that on 5-1-59, the alleged date of filing of the N. C. H. Form, even the Settlement Organization had not come into existence and that such forms were invited from the non-allottees after 13-10-59. This counter-affidavit remained uncontroverted for more than three years until 30-1Q-68 when the attorney of the appellant filed rejoinder affidavit in the Court producing a fresh certified copy of the extract from the CSC-2 register with the corrected date of receipt of the N. Q. H. Form filed by the father of the appellant on 2-10-59. This certified copy was issued by the Department on 26-10-68.
4. The impugned orders of the Settlement Authorities were challenged before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the appellant on two grounds namely,-
(1) That the property in dispute consists of more than one residential unit and, therefore, the portion in possession of the appellant's father should have been transferred to her, and
(2) That the finding of the Settlement Authorities that the appellant's father did not submit any N. C.
H. Form is belied by the documents produced on the record and, therefore, the case liable to be remanded back to the Settlement Authorities for consideration of the appellant's claim.
The learned Single Judge after considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the patties repelled both the contentions and by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition. On the second point the learned Judge held the view that the fact that there exists a concurrent finding of fact by all the Settlement Authorities that the appellant's father did not submit any N. C. H. Form, and in view of the fact that two contradictory documents regarding the date of submission of the alleged N. C. H. Form were placed on record, it was not possible for him to set aside the finding of fact arrived at by the Settlement Authorities. On the first point, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that since the Settlement Authorities have treated the entire property as one single house, the respondent, who is a claimant displaced person, has preferential right for its transfer as against the appellant's father who was non-claimant displaced person.
Mr. S. A. Jamali, learned counsel appearing for the appellant invited us to examine the original CSC-2 register which has bean summoned in this appeal. It was contended by the learned counsel that the certified copy of the extract first produced along with the writ petition had erroneously shown the date of the Form as 5-1-59 and a correct copy. Therefore, was issued subsequently by the department, the correctness of which is fully substantiated by original register which has come from the proper custody. It was no doubt true that there exits Entry No. 3110/N. C. H. In the name of Aliahdia son of A.I Bux in respect of the property in the register corresponding to the date 2-10-59.
But on closer scrutiny of the register, the genuineness of this entry raises substantial doubts. Firstly the entry in question is contained in a bunch of pages which seem to have been loosened from the stitching of the original binding of the back. But the remarkable discrepancy in this connection is regarding the sequence of dates. The general practice which seems to have been consistently followed in most of the pages of the register, is that the date is mentioned in the first column at the top of the page and the entries are then made with consecutive numbers in a running order from that page to the facing page. Entry No. 3078 is made on 2-10-59 followed by entries in consecutive order until 3081. Then the date is changed in the next page to 5-10-59 with reference to Entry No. 3082. The subsequent entries until entry No. 3097 are supposed to be in the same date. Against the next entry bearing No. 3098 the date is changed to 2-10-59 anti the dates remain unchanged until the Entry No. 3110 relating to Alladia. It will thus be sewn that Allahdia's form is shown in date 2-10- 59 after the forms which era entered in the date 5-10-59. We confronted the learned counsel for the appellant with this position but his only submission eras that the registers were kept by the staff at the time when there was great-rush of work and, therefore, errors in mentioning the dates and other particulars are a normal phenomenon. We are, however, not impressed by this submission and do not consider that the genuineness of the entry in question is beyond reproach. We are further strengthened in our view by the conduce of the appellant to keeping quiet about this matter for the long period of 3 years during which no attempt was made by her to verify the correctness of the first copy supplied by hex from the extract of the register. The normal course of conduct expected of a person whose entire case is founded upon the plea that the misplaced N. C.
H. Form was entered in the register on a particular date would be to immediately approach the relevant authorities for checking the correctness of the copy. It was particularly so in view of the facts of the present case in so far as. The date 5-1-59 would patently falsify the case of the appellant that the N. C. H. Form was submitted by her father as by that date the forms by the non-- -claimants were not called for. But for reasons not clear to us, no attempt seems to have been made to rectify the alleged mistake within reasonable time. We are, therefore, of the confirmed view that the original register does not in any way advance the case of the appellant. Additionally we are not satisfied why no attempt was made by the appellant when she was contesting bar case before the Settlement Authorities for a search of the relevant register and allowed the Authorities to adjudicate upon her case on the basis of her oral allegations that her father had submitted such a form. The Settlement Scheme No. 1 framed under section 16 of the, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1858 relating to houses and shops provides at para. 6 for the receipt of applications for transfer of houses and shops by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and stipulates that upon receipt of such an application the Deputy Settlement Commissioner shall enter it in register CSC-2, assign a number to it and issue a receipt. A receipt for the submission of application would, therefore, be the best evidence of the fact of submission of such an application. It was submitted that the receipt had been lost. But if the receipt was lost, effort should have been made to obtain a copy of the extract from the register at a much earlier stage of the proceeding. In absence of cogent reasons, we are not satisfied that the registers were not readily avail--able. We have not been shown anything on the record of the Settlement Authorities in proof of any attempt having been made by the appellant in the form of an application to the concerned Authority or otherwise for searching the relevant register, even if we assume that the register was not readily traceable.
6. Be that as it may, we find no reason to disagree with the view of the learned Single Judge that this being a finding on a question of fact, con currently by the Settlement Authorities that the father of the appellant had not applied for the transfer of the property, it cannot be upset in the constitutional jurisdiction. I have already discussed above that no value can be attached to the entry in the register at this stage.
7. Mr. Jamali next contended that the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner were wrong in transferring the entire house to respondent No. 3 as the property consists of two units and could not, therefore, be transferred to the said respondent. In this connection learned counsel strongly relied upon the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated 26-10-63 and submitted that after the site inspection the said officer declared the house to consist of two independent units. It is no doubt true that the said officer stated in his order that he bad inspected the property and found that there were two independent house with entrances on opposite roads. He. However, observed that it was pointed out to him that there used to be an Interconnecting door between the two houses which was subsequently closed. In reaching the conclusion that the property consists of two units, the learned Officer was impressed by the fact that there did not exist on the record any order of a competent authority, declaring the two houses as one unit, nor there was any such application ever put to by respondent Mohammad Shafi to this fact. But the view adopted by the learned Officer is contrary to law.
Section 2 (4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 which defines "house" in the first proviso lays down that where any build--ing or promises consists of more than one residential units, and such units are in possession of several persons, then unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a house. The bare reading of this provision, therefore, shows that in absence of an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner or of any subordi--nate officer to whom this power is delegated declaring a building consisting of several units in possession of several persons, to be more than one house, such a building is deemed to be a single house. Normally, therefore, every single building o' premises irrespective of whether it consists of several Units and whether such units are occupied by different persons is to be treated as B single house. It is only for the purposes of treating a building to consist ref more than one unit, that an order to that effect by the competent authority is necessary. In Falzul Haque Khan v. Abdul Hamid 1978 SCMR 429, it was observed that unless a shop or house is held to be more than one, it has to be treated as one and that there is no necessity for the Settlement authorities declare a building to be one, because, the law so declares, and unless it is declared to consist of more than one residential or business unit, it is a shop or a house. Despite this clear position in law, the learned Deputy Settlement Commis-- sioner proceeded upon directly opposite proposition to the effect that in absence of an order treating property as single unit, it was deemed to be more than one unit. The order, therefore, proceeds on an patently erroneous view of the law and cannot, therefore, be taken advantage of by the appellant. It is quite clear from the said order that the two houses are separated by a common wall and, therefore, they were the part of same building, which is presumed in law to be a single house. Additionally in Faizul Haque Khan's case cited above, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that a person who is not entitled to claim transfer of a property has no locus stand! To claim division thereof. This contention, therefore, has no merit.
8. It was finally contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent No. 3 cannot be transferred the portion in occupation of the appellant as the said respondent in his CH form and applied only for the transfer of the portion in his possession. But on an examination of the CH form of the respondent, this submission is found to be factually, incorrect. Against Column No. 10 in this Form, which relates to whether the house or any part thereof is in occupation of any person other than the applicant, the respondent wrote the words "full in possession". Therefore, it is quite clear that the respondent claimed transfer of the entire property. This contention also, therefore, fails.
9. In the result, for the foregoing reasons we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it accordingly with no order an to costs.
I. MAHMUD, J.-I agree.