' Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the receiver could only be appointed where the allegations are that the property was being wasted and damaged, but in the instant case no such allegations have been made. He referred to a ruling of the Privy Council in case of Benoy Krishna v.
Satish Chandra (AIR 1928 PC 49), wherein it has been held as under:-- ' "On an interim application for receivership such as this, the Court has to consider whether special interference with the possession of a defendant is required, there being a well-founded fear that the property in question will be dissipated, or that other irreparable mischief may be done unless the Court gives its protection. Such an order is discretionary, and the discretion is, in the first instance, that of the Court in which the suit itself is pending. When as in this case, the order of that Court is altered on appeal it becomes necessary to consider whether the Court below had before it the evidence required to support such an order and considered it in accordance with the principles on which judicial discretion must be exercised. If the Court of review rightly concludes that proper discretion was not used below, it is free to exercise its own discretion in the matter."
The only allegation in the instant case is that the petitioner has been receiving the rent of the shops and the respondents were denied their share. He contended that instead of appointment of the receiver, direction could be issued to the petitioner to deposit rent already received by him as well as the current rent in the Court and there was no need to appoint a receiver for the purpose.
3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length, we deem it proper to issue notice to the other side for a date to be fixed by the first week of April, 2002.